Is there an al-Qaeda connection in RI?
Is there an al-Qaeda connection in RI?
Derwin Pereira, The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore
Recent arrests of Islamic extremists in Singapore and Malaysia
have raised the worrying specter of Indonesia becoming a regional
center for Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda terrorist network. The
following is the first in a series of three articles.
The Indonesian government's official position up until now is
that there are no terrorist cells linked to Osama bin Laden in
the sprawling archipelago.
American and Indonesian intelligence agencies think otherwise.
They point to the ruined remains of a paramilitary camp in the
jungles of strife-torn Central Sulawesi as evidence that hundreds
of al-Qaeda operatives from Afghanistan had trained there with
the help of local extremists.
The truth lies somewhere in between.
In the search for the Indonesian equation in the vast global
al-Qaeda terrorist network, two things are clear:
First: there is growing evidence that the Saudi-born Osama and
his lieutenants had worked actively in the past five years to
cultivate radical Muslim groups in Indonesia by providing them
with training and funds from his war chest to get them to effect
his vision of Islamic theocracy in Asia.
Second: their efforts have boosted the military capabilities
of some of these groups and hardened their ideological framework.
The implications of these developments are disturbing in that
these groups, nurtured by outside sources ideologically and
financially, could destabilize the rest of the region through the
export of their extremist ideas and their willingness to use
force to accomplish their aims.
What are the indicators that point to an al-Qaeda connection
in Indonesia?
Last October, Indonesian intelligence officers reportedly
discovered in Solo, Central Java, a document titled Operation
Jihad In Asia, and traced it to the extremist group, Jemaah
Islamiah (JI).
The 15-page document, in Arabic, detailed operational plans to
bomb United States embassies and installations in Jakarta,
Singapore and Malaysia in December.
Indonesian intelligence sources said that it also spelt out
clearly that it was Osama who had ordered the covert operations.
A source said: "There was a concerted attempt to attack U.S.
allies and destabilize the region during this period."
The recent arrests of terrorists in Singapore and Malaysia
foiled JI's "grand Asia strategy", he added.
JI has acknowledged the existence of the document but
maintains that the initiative to carry out the raids were
entirely its own and not the work of al-Qaeda.
A JI official, who declined to be named and who wanted to be
known only as the third-most-senior member of the organization in
Indonesia, told The Straits Times: "The spies are lying and over-
dramatizing as usual. JI is not an official wing of al-Qaeda and
we did not get any orders from Osama to kill Americans or Jews.
"We did the document on our own because of a sense of Islamic
solidarity we have with Osama and our brothers in Afghanistan who
are being victimized by the Americans."
Could this have been more than just solidarity among Muslims?
Probably.
Even if the JI maintains that its links with al-Qaeda are
"informal", there are indicators to suggest that some level of
cooperation was going on between the two groups.
It was getting funds and training from Osama's group - with no
strings attached, the JI source says.
The source told The Straits Times that in the past five years,
it received at least 1.35 billion rupiah (S$239 million) from al-
Qaeda - 250 million rupiah in 1996, 400 million rupiah a year
later and 700 million rupiah in 2000
Indonesian intelligence believes that the amount of money is
much higher and that much of it came through channels that are
hard to track.
One can only surmise that given the frequent contacts between
the two groups, al-Qaeda probably had a hand in shaping the
Indonesian group's ideological bearings.
There is, after all, much common ground to build on.
The JI, like many other radical Muslim groups in Indonesia,
sees itself as the new Darul Islam, a militant outfit that tried
to establish an Islamic state in 1949, with a far greater mission
than just defending Muslims at home.
The followers of Jemaah Islamiah draw guidance from the 19th
century Islamic philosophers Mohammed Abdu and Rahid Rida and
also the more puritan Wahabism of Mohamed Abdul Wahab and Ibn
Saud.
Middle Eastern influences of a more 20th-century nature are
reflected in its views on women, democracy and relations with the
West.
Democracy is seen as a flawed Western idea incompatible with
Islam. The most obvious influence emanating from the Middle East,
however, lies in the generous dose of anti-Zionism and anti-
Americanism that pervades JI's rhetoric.
The JI source explains: "We are not a terrorist group. We
don't believe in killing civilians. Our targets are only
Americans, Jews and those who support them."
Interestingly, several radical Indonesian Islamic groups are
ideologically like-minded, making them prime catches for Osama.
An opening for al-Qaeda came with the fall of former President
Soeharto in May 1998.
The painful democratic transition and economic crisis allowed
for suppressed social, ethnic and sectarian conflicts to
resurface. At the same time, government inertia and the political
benefits of playing the Islamic card gave militant groups the
freedom to operate and recruit.
It was in such a setting that al-Qaeda approached several of
these smaller groups directly or through local proxies with
offers of financial support.
The Straits Times understands that these groups included
Fisabillilah, Laskar Jundullah, Laskar Ahlul Sunnah Wal-Jamaah
and the Front Pembela Islam (FPI).
None of them are reported to have accepted Osama's overtures.
Delia Noor from the Indonesian Institute for Islamic Studies
(IAIN) says al-Qaeda could have misread the ground, thinking it
could win over easily these Muslim groups.
"But these groups were not prepared to give up their
independence to foreign elements," he said.
Still, a closer examination reveals that several of these
militant outfits had at some point or other received money from
Middle Eastern countries like Libya, Saudi Arabia and Iraq.
It raises the argument: Why would these groups give up the
opportunity to get funds from yet another lucrative channel? It
is plausible that while most of them had nothing to do with al-
Qaeda, a few did and are now bent on detaching themselves from
any links with Osama and his al-Qaeda network after the tragic
events of Sept. 11.
Analysts believe it would have been impossible for al-Qaeda to
operate alone in Indonesia without some help from local
extremists.
They point to the discovery by the American Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) of a detailed sketch map of the U.S.
Embassy in Jakarta last July in a Middle Eastern country.
This forced the State Department to close the embassy
temporarily and issue a travel warning to Americans.
An American analyst with a Jakarta-based international risk
consultancy has this to say: "Now what does this suggest? It is
doubtful whether al-Qaeda would be so foolhardy as to send a
bearded Afghan with little local knowledge to do a sketch of the
embassy.
"The U.S. Embassy would have spotted any of them in a
heartbeat. The terrorists must have had Indonesian proxies in
place to do the job."
There are several groups on this shortlist.
The JI would obviously be the prime suspect. But some believe
that the bigger militant groups like the Mujahideen Council of
Indonesia (MMI) and Laskar Jihad could equally have done it.
Both these outfits have rejected outright any links with al-
Qaeda.
Growing speculation of MMI's links with the terrorist network
has much to do with its leader, Abu Bakar Baashir, who is one of
a trio of leaders of 13 suspected al-Qaeda-linked militants
arrested in December by Malaysian police.
Abu Bakar was named as a "directing figure" of the Malaysian
militants, whom authorities believe are members of the "second
wing" of the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM).
The KMM, like the JI in Indonesia, share similar aims - that
of establishing a Daulah Islamiah or an Islamic state made up of
Malaysia, Indonesia and the southern Philippines.
The KMM members are also under investigation for links to
Zacarias Moussaoui, who is on trial in the U.S. for his alleged
role in the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on New York and
Washington.
Abu Bakar, a 64-year-old Indonesian cleric, moved to Malaysia
in the 1980s and became a religious teacher there after spending
four years in an Indonesian prison for challenging the then
Soeharto government.
A Washington Post report said he had written a letter to
militant clerics in Indonesia and Malaysia on his return to Solo
in 1998, inviting them to prepare for jihad against Americans.
The newspaper also quoted the letter as concluding with an
offer to arrange meetings with Osama "through the safest way".
But the MMI has denied that the group's leader had written
such a letter.
"If that letter really exists, it's sufficient evidence to
arrest him, so go ahead and arrest him. But no one has, yet," it
said.
Abu Bakar told reporters last week that he had read books
about Osama while in Malaysia. But he insisted that he had never
been to Afghanistan and ruled out any links between MMI and al-
Qaeda.
"I haven't heard of them since returning to Indonesia," he
said. "There have been no talks or meetings with them."
The MMI leadership has tried hard to portray itself as a
domestic force, taking the lead in calls for introducing Syariah
or Islamic law in Indonesia.
Despite protestations of not having any international links,
well-placed sources in Solo said that the 50,000-strong MMI was
seen as a "valuable tool" by al-Qaeda, given its grassroots reach
and access to the different militant groups that make up this ad
hoc coalition.
Not obvious to many is that several MMI members use as
reference in religious teachings a Pakistani-published book on
political Islam, translated into Indonesian with an introduction
by Osama.
Furthermore, Abu Jibril, an MMI member on the run from
Malaysian police, is suspected to have been the "point-man" for
the group's links with al-Qaeda.
Sources revealed that he played a key role in arranging
meetings for al-Qaeda representatives with several groups here,
including the Laskar Jihad.
Laskar Jihad's leader, Jaafar Umar Talib, said that he turned
down the offer of money and training facilities after being
approached by al-Qaeda in 2000 to wage a religious war in the
Maluku islands in eastern Indonesia.
"I rejected their offer and after that I never saw any of them
again," he insisted.
A few months after that incident, Jaafar saw fit to send 200
militants to the Malukus to fight its Christians.
Sources said that the group, which has 10,000 to 15,000
members had received financial banking amounting to over 200
million rupiah in the initial stages of the clashes from militant
outfits in several countries, including Libya, Yemen, Saudi
Arabia, Pakistan, the Philippines and Afghanistan.
Laskar Jihad's international connections have come under
increasing scrutiny since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.
The most worrying links, of course, have been that with
Afghanistan.
Jaafar himself fought with the Afghan mujahideen between 1988
and 1989 and studied at the Mawdudi Institute in Lahore,
Pakistan.
Both shaped his view of Islam as well as the Islamic struggle
in Ambon and Indonesia as a whole.
Informal ties continued unimpeded for the last decade with
Taleban and al-Qaeda trainers having aided the group, a number of
Afghans allegedly volunteering to fight in the Maluku islands,
and the Laskar Jihad receiving arms from the Abu Sayyaf group in
the Philippines, a known member of al-Qaeda's network, political
observers and Western diplomats said.
Such international exposure has had a crucial bearing on the
Laskar Jihad's organizational structure.
The paramilitary outfit is divided into four battalions, all
named after the Prophet Muhammad's companions - Abu Bakar, Umar
Bin Khattab, Usman Bin Afan and Ali Bin Abu Thalib, sources said.
In addition, there are special forces, intelligence and
logistics units. Its weapons include homemade guns and bombs as
well as mortars captured in raids on Indonesian military arsenals
in Ambon. More recently, arms have also been flowing into Ambon
from the Abu Sayyaf.
Unlike the Jemaah Islamiah, however, the Laskar Jihad
ideological framework is essentially homegrown. It is the product
of a very specific Indonesian situation - the conflict in Ambon,
and the threat it poses, is still confined within Indonesian
borders.
But that could easily change in the long run if international
terrorist networks make further inroads into the country. The
seeds of international terrorism have been sown in Indonesia and
risk growing beyond its borders if extremists are allowed to
export their ideas to neighboring countries.
What is worrying is that groups like JI have developed a
network outside Indonesia even as they go about penetrating other
Islamic groups back home to shape their thinking in the hope that
a common ideological platform could emerge in the long run.
The JI told The Straits Times that while the detention of its
members in Singapore and Malaysia would force other members to go
further underground, it was not going to break their resolve to
wreak havoc on "American and Zionist conspirators" and build a
region-wide Islamic republic.