Indonesia's other war on terror

Indonesia's other war on terror

Peter Milne
Managing editor of
the Van Zorge Report
Jakarta

As the American "War on Terror" moves from its first to second
stage, Indonesia is once again under the international spotlight-
this time for purportedly not doing enough to track down possible
terrorist cells in the country. But in all the media frenzy over
the existence, or non-existence, of terrorists in what
Indonesia's Southeast Asian neighbors see as the "weak link" of
the region, a struggle against home-grown terror has been partly
obscured.

Indonesia's local war against terror, which the country has
been fighting since May 1998, is one struggle that the people of
Indonesia appear to be losing. The recent attempts by the
Commission of Enquiry into Human Rights Violations (KPP HAM) to
summon several high-ranking military and police generals for
questioning over the involvement of the security forces in the
Trisakti and Semanggi I and II tragedies (in 1999 and 1999) seem
to be foundering. Despite the supposed era of democracy and
civilian supremacy in Indonesia, the generals involved have
refused to adhere to their summonses-last week for the second
time. The total deaths of 30 students in the three incidents, who
were hailed as heroes of reformasi at the time, are being passed
over to save a handful of retired generals and senior officers
from answering a few questions.

True, the DPR did issue a decision last year that the generals
involved had not violated human rights-after intense lobbying
from the TNI/Polri faction. But this was only a recommendation
and not a legally binding decision. To assuage some of the public
furor over the DPR decision at the time, then President Wahid
authorized the National Commission on Human Rights to establish
an enquiry into the events under Human Rights Law No. 39/1999.
This is exactly what the Commission is now following through
with. According to the military, however, Law No. 26/2000 on
human rights courts entitles the DPR to recommend which
violations should be brought before the Human Rights Court. The
result of this technicality is deadlock: The generals refuse to
attend the Commission's hearings. Even by exercising subpoena
rights through the Central Jakarta District Court, the Commission
is unlikely to get its way. The generals concerned are unlikely
to ever be punished for disregarding a subpoena with the normal
six to nine months prison sentence. Plainly, political
interference at the expense of the due process of law has the
upper hand.

Bravery and doing one's duty are revered qualities in military
circles, but when serving civilians these codes of behavior no
longer seem to apply. Important civilians such as Vice-President
Hamzah Haz and Minister of Defense Matori Abdul Djalil have
appealed to the errant generals to do the right thing, but to no
avail. Moral suasion has no effect against political interference
in administering of the law.

If appearing before the KPP HAM is such an unbearably
terrifying ordeal for hardened men in green, then what can we
seriously expect when (or if) the East Timor human rights trial
eventually start? Unfortunately the writing already appears to
be on the wall: No high-ranking prosecutions in Aceh's human
rights trials and a new military command in the province, the
murder of Papuan leader Theys Eluay, and now the refusal to face
a few questions before the KPP HAM. Some carefully choreographed
appearances of senior officers implicated in the East Timor
atrocities might attempt give the impression of due legal
process. But the handing down of heavy sentences is difficult to
imagine, no matter how much these might be hoped for or
desirable. The truth is that even in the age of civilian
democracy and supremacy, ultimate supremacy, and therefore
impunity, still remains with the military.

Some of those preoccupied with fighting the international "War
on Terror" may sympathize with the Indonesian military and its
inability to purchase hardware and training from the U.S.
Admittedly, the ban on military ties with Indonesia does get in
the way of fighting the good fight against global terrorism. But
in the U.S. the executive and the military, fortunately, do not
make all the decisions. The U.S. Congress, which has banned the
sale of arms and military assistance to the Indonesian military
under the Leahy amendment, is quite specific in its requirements
for justice and the prosecution of those responsible for the
human rights violations in East Timor in 1999. There is very
little prospect that Congress will lift the restrictions on the
Indonesian military unless serious reprimands and some prison
sentences are handed out to senior officers by the human rights
court. Senior people in the U.S. close to the Indonesian
government have been trying to get this message across. But the
difference between executive and legislature in the U.S. may be
lost on many within the Indonesian military and government. The
assumption seems to be that the U.S. government will forgive and
forget Indonesian military wrongdoings in its obsession to cull
the threat of global terrorism. This is almost certainly a
miscalculation.

Another danger for Indonesia is that a failure to be seen to
do justice in the East Timor trials could lead to the
International Criminal Court being convened by the UN to judge
the case, bringing Indonesia into further conflict with the
international community. This is possible in trials where the
"local proceedings are being conducted in such a manner which is
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to
justice" (Article 17 para 2c, Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court).

While the global "War on Terror" may have made significant
progress in a relatively short time since Sept. 11, 2001, the
Indonesian struggle against the terror employed by those in power
against their own people is taking an interminably long time, and
now seems to be slowly losing momentum. If this trend continues,
Indonesia's reputation will remain tarnished and the military
will continue to go without American hardware and training. The
upshot of this is that Indonesia will find it harder to defend
its integrity and stability from external and internal threats.
Terrorists, pirates and those intent on weakening the country's
integrity, will all be able to breathe easier-along with a
handful of retired generals and senior serving officers.