Indonesian unveils defense document

Indonesian unveils defense document

Leonard C. Sebastian provides an analysis of the first defense
White Paper recently put out by the Indonesian government.

Indonesia is only the second country in Southeast Asia after
Thailand that now has a public defense document that it can
defend in the international arena and use as a reference for
future dialog on national defense planning.

The 55-page English-language defense White Paper, The Policy
of the State Defense and Security of the Republic of Indonesia,
covers developments in the strategic environment, defense and
security policy, defense and security force posture, defense and
security development under the sixth five-year development plan,
and the Indonesian Armed Forces in national development
explaining the rationale for the Armed Forces' doctrine of dwi-
fungsi by which they have a sociopolitical as well as a military
function.

Until now, defense planning documents prepared within Hankam
or the Ministry of Defense were not publicly available and were
used primarily as internal working papers.

The White Paper, published on Oct. 24, is an important
statement of intent by Indonesia to its regional neighbors aimed
at generating a greater understanding of Indonesia's defense and
security priorities. Writing in the preface to Indonesia's first
public defense planning document, Defense Minister General Edi
Sudrajat stressed that the White Paper "is intended to promote
wider understanding of Indonesia's defense and security policy in
support of development of the state's defense and security
capabilities and of mutual understanding with other nations,
particularly neighboring nations."

By publishing its first formal defense White Paper, Indonesia
intends to articulate clearly that it takes the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) seriously. Two years ago, the countries taking part
in the ARF agreed to work towards the publication of national
defense planning documents.

The White Paper builds on a now familiar theme of "layered
security" or what was known during General Benny Murdani's tenure
as Armed Forces Commander as stabilitas berlapis or layered
stability. This connotes a "concentric circles" or "defense in
depth" approach where "the deepest layer is domestic security,
followed by sub-regional (ASEAN) security, regional (Southeast
Asian) security and the security of the neighboring regions in
this order". Taking domestic concerns as paramount, the report
argues that "medium-term instability in Indonesia will tend to be
caused by internal rather than external factors".

In its very essence, defense and security policy must first
and foremost serve the nation itself, national unity and
territorial integrity.

According to the White Paper, the strength of the Army by the
end of the Sixth Five-Year Development Plan is expected to
increase from 235,237 to 243,000 personnel. The bulk of the
Army's forces are assigned to territorial duties. These forces
are reinforced when the need arises by a strategic strike force
(Kostrad) comprised of two combat divisions and two special
forces (Kopassus) commando groups. The navy's strength, estimated
at 47,000, comprises two Regional Fleets, one Marine Corps and
one Military Sealift Command. An air force of 23,000 personnel
comprises two Air Operation Commands. Each consists of one
strategic combat squadron and two tactical combat squadrons, one
air transport unit and one early-warning radar network.

The White Paper does not give a substantial breakdown of the
defense force structure or the budget. Neither does it outline
plans for new capital equipment unlike, for instance, the
Australian Defense White Paper issued in late 1994. It simply
states that defense planning averaged US$1.8 billion between 1988
and 1990.

According to figures cited by the report, Indonesia's defense
spending is relatively low compared with its neighbors. Indonesia
spends only $10 a year per capita on defense, while Thailand
spends $40, Malaysia $99 and Singapore $511. Defense
spending, though, is unlikely to remain at 1.7 percent of gross
domestic product and is anticipated to increase to between 2 and
3 percent of GDP.

One reason for the low defense spending figures can be found
in Indonesia's own unique strategic culture. Indonesia's
strategic concepts, developed in the late 1950s, are based on a
total people's defense and security system (Sishankamrata). In
Indonesia, economic development priorities take precedence over
the defense effort. Working from an understanding that funds to
equip the military with adequate hardware will not always be
available, Indonesia's defense strategy has required that the
ability to deter a would-be aggressor should not be based on the
size of the conventional military forces it could muster, but on
the resistance of the whole population.

Historical antecedents, geographical setting and a political
ideology as well as knowledge that the poorly-equipped Indonesian
forces could never hope to match a technologically-advanced
invader, have all conspired to mold a unique territorial defense
doctrine that is non-provocative in nature and tailor-made for
Indonesia's national security needs.

The White Paper's strategic overview is premised on the
rationale that "Indonesia's defense and security strategy is not
balance of power but balance of interests". Hence the emphasis on
"international dialog among nations maintaining regional peace".
There is, however, guarded optimism about the current regional
security environment.

It makes a positive assessment regarding cooperation with
Singapore and Malaysia and the benefits that would accrue to all
parties from the Singapore, Johor and Riau (SIJORI) development
growth triangle. Mention is also made of the strong bilateral
military cooperation between Indonesia and Singapore which will
contribute to the development of the "concept of bilateral CBM
(confidence- building measures)".

The White Paper also points to three issues that "could cause
friction among nations which, in turn, can effect internal
conditions, including domestic security". The first refers
obliquely to the possibilities of potential military conflict in
the South China Sea between countries determined to secure
guaranteed access to "industrial raw materials and energy
sources".

The second pertains to issues of democratization and human
rights which will continue to be "conspicuous as long as there is
no agreement, particularly between West and East, on their
application based on differing cultures". The third concerns
"preservation of the environment as it relates to economic
development".

The report remains ambiguous regarding the U.S. role in the
region making reference to the decline of the U.S. defense budget
which "only changes the method of maintaining military
capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region, and does not lessen U.S.
interest in controlling the situation in the region".

In the final assessment, the White Paper clearly illustrates
that Indonesia's defense and security policy is non-provocative.
Yet, because of its size, whether or not Indonesia's defense
posture should be regarded as non-offensive is determined
primarily by the perception of its smaller neighbors.

While analysts will argue that the defense White Paper is not
as comprehensive or detailed as they would have liked, it is
important to bear in mind that the significance of this report is
not necessarily what is contained in its pages, but of the
willingness of Indonesia to make its defense planning process
more transparent. This in turn has the beneficial effect of
instilling confidence and assurance on the part of Indonesia's
neighbors.

Leonard C. Sebastian is a Fellow at the Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, Singapore.