Indonesian unveils defense document

Indonesian unveils defense document

Leonard C. Sebastian provides an analysis of the first defense White Paper recently put out by the Indonesian government.

Indonesia is only the second country in Southeast Asia after Thailand that now has a public defense document that it can defend in the international arena and use as a reference for future dialog on national defense planning.

The 55-page English-language defense White Paper, The Policy of the State Defense and Security of the Republic of Indonesia, covers developments in the strategic environment, defense and security policy, defense and security force posture, defense and security development under the sixth five-year development plan, and the Indonesian Armed Forces in national development explaining the rationale for the Armed Forces' doctrine of dwi- fungsi by which they have a sociopolitical as well as a military function.

Until now, defense planning documents prepared within Hankam or the Ministry of Defense were not publicly available and were used primarily as internal working papers.

The White Paper, published on Oct. 24, is an important statement of intent by Indonesia to its regional neighbors aimed at generating a greater understanding of Indonesia's defense and security priorities. Writing in the preface to Indonesia's first public defense planning document, Defense Minister General Edi Sudrajat stressed that the White Paper "is intended to promote wider understanding of Indonesia's defense and security policy in support of development of the state's defense and security capabilities and of mutual understanding with other nations, particularly neighboring nations."

By publishing its first formal defense White Paper, Indonesia intends to articulate clearly that it takes the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) seriously. Two years ago, the countries taking part in the ARF agreed to work towards the publication of national defense planning documents.

The White Paper builds on a now familiar theme of "layered security" or what was known during General Benny Murdani's tenure as Armed Forces Commander as stabilitas berlapis or layered stability. This connotes a "concentric circles" or "defense in depth" approach where "the deepest layer is domestic security, followed by sub-regional (ASEAN) security, regional (Southeast Asian) security and the security of the neighboring regions in this order". Taking domestic concerns as paramount, the report argues that "medium-term instability in Indonesia will tend to be caused by internal rather than external factors".

In its very essence, defense and security policy must first and foremost serve the nation itself, national unity and territorial integrity.

According to the White Paper, the strength of the Army by the end of the Sixth Five-Year Development Plan is expected to increase from 235,237 to 243,000 personnel. The bulk of the Army's forces are assigned to territorial duties. These forces are reinforced when the need arises by a strategic strike force (Kostrad) comprised of two combat divisions and two special forces (Kopassus) commando groups. The navy's strength, estimated at 47,000, comprises two Regional Fleets, one Marine Corps and one Military Sealift Command. An air force of 23,000 personnel comprises two Air Operation Commands. Each consists of one strategic combat squadron and two tactical combat squadrons, one air transport unit and one early-warning radar network.

The White Paper does not give a substantial breakdown of the defense force structure or the budget. Neither does it outline plans for new capital equipment unlike, for instance, the Australian Defense White Paper issued in late 1994. It simply states that defense planning averaged US$1.8 billion between 1988 and 1990.

According to figures cited by the report, Indonesia's defense spending is relatively low compared with its neighbors. Indonesia spends only $10 a year per capita on defense, while Thailand spends $40, Malaysia $99 and Singapore $511. Defense spending, though, is unlikely to remain at 1.7 percent of gross domestic product and is anticipated to increase to between 2 and 3 percent of GDP.

One reason for the low defense spending figures can be found in Indonesia's own unique strategic culture. Indonesia's strategic concepts, developed in the late 1950s, are based on a total people's defense and security system (Sishankamrata). In Indonesia, economic development priorities take precedence over the defense effort. Working from an understanding that funds to equip the military with adequate hardware will not always be available, Indonesia's defense strategy has required that the ability to deter a would-be aggressor should not be based on the size of the conventional military forces it could muster, but on the resistance of the whole population.

Historical antecedents, geographical setting and a political ideology as well as knowledge that the poorly-equipped Indonesian forces could never hope to match a technologically-advanced invader, have all conspired to mold a unique territorial defense doctrine that is non-provocative in nature and tailor-made for Indonesia's national security needs.

The White Paper's strategic overview is premised on the rationale that "Indonesia's defense and security strategy is not balance of power but balance of interests". Hence the emphasis on "international dialog among nations maintaining regional peace". There is, however, guarded optimism about the current regional security environment.

It makes a positive assessment regarding cooperation with Singapore and Malaysia and the benefits that would accrue to all parties from the Singapore, Johor and Riau (SIJORI) development growth triangle. Mention is also made of the strong bilateral military cooperation between Indonesia and Singapore which will contribute to the development of the "concept of bilateral CBM (confidence- building measures)".

The White Paper also points to three issues that "could cause friction among nations which, in turn, can effect internal conditions, including domestic security". The first refers obliquely to the possibilities of potential military conflict in the South China Sea between countries determined to secure guaranteed access to "industrial raw materials and energy sources".

The second pertains to issues of democratization and human rights which will continue to be "conspicuous as long as there is no agreement, particularly between West and East, on their application based on differing cultures". The third concerns "preservation of the environment as it relates to economic development".

The report remains ambiguous regarding the U.S. role in the region making reference to the decline of the U.S. defense budget which "only changes the method of maintaining military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region, and does not lessen U.S. interest in controlling the situation in the region".

In the final assessment, the White Paper clearly illustrates that Indonesia's defense and security policy is non-provocative. Yet, because of its size, whether or not Indonesia's defense posture should be regarded as non-offensive is determined primarily by the perception of its smaller neighbors.

While analysts will argue that the defense White Paper is not as comprehensive or detailed as they would have liked, it is important to bear in mind that the significance of this report is not necessarily what is contained in its pages, but of the willingness of Indonesia to make its defense planning process more transparent. This in turn has the beneficial effect of instilling confidence and assurance on the part of Indonesia's neighbors.

Leonard C. Sebastian is a Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.