Indonesian Politics in Review (February 2026)

February 2026 will be remembered as one of the most turbulent months in recent memory for Indonesian foreign policy, domestic governance, and law enforcement alike. The country found itself navigating a world suddenly lurching towards wider conflict, whilst simultaneously grappling with corruption scandals, political positioning ahead of the 2029 election cycle, and the enduring challenge of institutional reform.

The month’s most dramatic development came on 28 February, when the United States and Israel launched coordinated military strikes against Iran in an operation designated “Operation Epic Fury” and, in Israeli terminology, “Operation Lion’s Roar.” The attacks, which reportedly killed Iranian Defence Minister Amir Nasirzadeh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Commander Mohammed Pakpour, struck military installations, government facilities, and, in one of the conflict’s most disturbing episodes, a girls’ primary school in Minab, Hormozgan Province, killing at least 57 students and leaving 53 more buried under rubble. Iran retaliated swiftly, launching ballistic missiles and drones against fourteen US military bases across seven countries, including the Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, and installations in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. Explosions were reported across Gulf capitals, Dubai’s airports were shuttered, and the UN Security Council convened an emergency session. UN Secretary-General António Guterres issued an urgent call for de-escalation, whilst the UN Human Rights Chief Volker Turk condemned the attacks outright.

Indonesia’s response was swift and substantive. President Prabowo Subianto, returning from a productive diplomatic tour of the United States, the United Kingdom, Jordan, and the UAE, offered to travel to Tehran personally to mediate between Washington and Tehran – a striking gesture that earned international attention and reinforced Indonesia’s long-standing free and active foreign policy doctrine. The Foreign Ministry expressed deep regret over the collapse of nuclear negotiations in Geneva and called for all parties to exercise restraint. Indonesian embassies in Tehran, Riyadh, Doha, and Manama issued advisories to the approximately 329 Indonesian nationals in Iran and the tens of thousands of umrah pilgrims in Saudi Arabia, with the Ministry of Hajj and Umrah monitoring nearly 58,873 pilgrims whose return schedules were disrupted by airspace closures. Legislators including TB Hasanuddin and Commission I member Sukamta pushed the government to take firmer public stances, with international law expert Hikmahanto Juwana urging Indonesia to leverage its position on the Board of Peace to demand emergency action. The situation also complicated Indonesia’s existing Gaza commitments: the government confirmed it remains on track to deploy the first contingent of an eventual 8,000 peacekeepers to southern Gaza in early April as part of the International Stabilisation Force, though retired military officers publicly questioned the constitutionality of deploying troops without full parliamentary approval.

Closer to home, the month produced a major policing scandal that exposed deep rot within provincial law enforcement. The arrest of drug trafficker Erwin Iskandar – known as Ko Erwin – in the waters off Tanjung Balai, North Sumatra, as he attempted to flee to Malaysia by sea, unravelled a network of corruption that reached directly into the Bima City Police leadership. Former Bima City Police Chief AKBP Didik Putra Kuncoro was found to have received approximately Rp 2.8 billion in protection money from Ko Erwin, with narcotics reportedly stored at his official residence. Didik was formally dismissed without honour by the National Police ethics tribunal and transferred to administrative limbo at Yanma Polri pending final termination. His successor, AKBP Mubiarto Banu Kristanto, was quickly appointed. Former Bima narcotics unit chief AKP Malaungi and five additional suspects were transferred to the Criminal Investigation Directorate (Bareskrim) in Jakarta for cross-examination. The case cast an uncomfortable light on the structural vulnerabilities of provincial policing, and the National Police Chief General Listyo Sigit Prabowo used the month to push through a broader reshuffle of 54 senior and mid-ranking officers, including the appointment of Brigadier General Totok Suharyanto as head of the anti-corruption task force Kortastipidkor.

The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) maintained its own momentum. In a separate investigation, KPK detained Budiman Bayu Prasojo, Head of the Customs Intelligence Section at the Directorate General of Customs and Excise, as the seventh suspect in a bribery and gratification case linked to the importation of counterfeit goods. Investigators recovered Rp 5.19 billion in five suitcases from a safe house in Ciputat, Tangerang Selatan, with the KPK alleging that Budiman had orchestrated the movement of funds between safe houses to obstruct the investigation. The KPK linked the scheme directly to the proliferation of illegal cigarettes in Indonesia, a connection that drew sharp attention from the public and legislators alike. Separately, the Jakarta Corruption Court delivered a significant verdict against Muhammad Kerry Adrianto Riza, son of fugitive oil tycoon Riza Chalid, sentencing him to fifteen years’ imprisonment and ordering Rp 2.9 trillion in restitution for corruption involving crude oil and refinery product management at PT Pertamina between 2018 and 2023. The Attorney General subsequently filed an appeal against verdicts in the broader nine-defendant case, arguing that the court had failed to adequately account for the full scale of state losses. Anti-corruption activists welcomed the Kerry verdict but pressed the Attorney General to pursue Riza Chalid himself, who remains at large.

On the political front, February saw energetic jockeying by parties looking towards 2029. PSI Chairman Kaesang Pangarep conducted a high-profile Ramadan safari across Islamic boarding schools throughout Java, receiving warm receptions and being addressed affectionately as “Gus” by senior Nahdlatul Ulama figures in Jakarta – a form of Islamic honorific that carries significant political symbolism. PSI Chairman Ahmad Ali was careful to note that Kaesang harbours no immediate presidential ambitions, given that President Prabowo Subianto and Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka are firmly in place. NasDem continued its own Ramadan consolidation tour across East Java, reporting seat gains in Greater Madura, whilst PPP’s Chairman Muhammad Mardiono opened the party’s West Kalimantan regional deliberation as part of a national restructuring effort ahead of the 2029 cycle. Two advocates filed a constitutional challenge at the Constitutional Court seeking to bar the families of sitting presidents and vice presidents from running in future presidential elections – a petition that drew comment from former President Joko Widodo, who affirmed equal constitutional standing for all citizens, and animated debate across party lines. Former presidential candidate Anies Baswedan warned publicly of Indonesia’s growing tendency towards political dynasties, whilst the civil movement Gerakan Rakyat missed its February deadline for formal registration as a political party, having not yet established the required organisational structures across all provinces and sub-districts.

The month also produced genuine regulatory and institutional progress. Indonesia’s pharmaceutical regulator BPOM achieved WHO Listed Authority status, becoming the first developing nation to reach this recognition threshold and placing Indonesian pharmaceutical and vaccine standards on par with developed-nation regulators. The achievement generated immediate commercial interest from countries across the Middle East, Asia, and Africa and is expected to open significant export pathways for domestic producers including PT Etana Biotechnologies Indonesia and Bio Farma. Meanwhile, the government confirmed that Government Regulation Number 17 of 2025 (PP Tunas) on child protection in digital systems would enter into full force in March, prompting submissions from industry associations including Kadin and idEA urging a proportionate, risk-based implementation approach that does not stifle digital innovation. President Prabowo’s return from his diplomatic tour also delivered tangible trade outcomes: a reciprocal trade agreement with the United States granting zero-tariff access for 1,819 Indonesian products, a framework agreement with ARM Limited for semiconductor industry development involving 15,000 Indonesian engineers, and UAE commitments to expand investment in Indonesian energy and infrastructure.

Domestic law and order concerns ran through the entire month. Student protests outside the National Police Headquarters on 27 February, led by the University of Indonesia’s executive board, demanded structural police reform and accountability for the fatal beating of 14-year-old Arianto Tawakal by a Brimob officer in Tual, Maluku. The Metro Jaya Police deployed nearly 4,000 personnel and notably had officers recite Islamic prayers during the protest as a gesture of Ramadan solidarity – a scene that attracted considerable attention and illustrated the complex social dynamics surrounding policing during the holy month. Separately, a controversy over East Kalimantan Governor Rudy Mas’ud’s procurement of an Rp 8.5 billion official vehicle drew criticism from the KPK, the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, and his own Golkar party, with even the provincial legislature chairman allocating a further Rp 6.8 billion for his own vehicle – compounding rather than resolving the optics problem.

Looking ahead, March and April will test Indonesia’s capacity to hold multiple complex agendas simultaneously. The first deployment of Indonesian peacekeepers to Gaza is expected in early April, a mission that requires careful constitutional and logistical navigation. The Iran-US-Israel conflict shows no sign of abating, and Indonesia’s offer of mediation – however symbolically important – faces the practical reality that neither Washington nor Tehran has formally accepted Prabowo’s offer to travel to Tehran. Domestically, the KPK’s customs corruption investigation appears poised to expand upward through the hierarchy of the Directorate General of Customs, whilst the Pertamina crude oil case enters its appeal phase with the Attorney General signalling dissatisfaction with the scale of the court’s findings. The PP Tunas digital child protection regulation enters force against a backdrop of still-unresolved tensions between regulatory ambition and industry concerns. And with the 2029 electoral cycle now firmly on the horizon, the Constitutional Court’s eventual ruling on dynastic candidacy restrictions will shape the political terrain for years to come.