Indo-U.S. ties characterized by paranoia to partnership

Indo-U.S. ties characterized by paranoia to partnership

By Nivedita Mukherjee

NEW DELHI: The paradigm shift in Indo-US ties ushered in by the outgoing Clinton administration could be characterized as paranoia to partnership. This would cushion the pinpricks of accommodating unresolved differences under the new regime.

A newly established, Indo-US sponsored Asia Center for Democratic Governance, a village in Pondicherry where each morning fishermen get the latest information on water and wave conditions from a U.S. Navy website, from 2,65,000 visa applicants in 1997 to 4,95,000 in 2000, Bill Clinton's praise of a Rajasthan woman's milk cooperative and its computerized billing in his speech at Warwick University, England are some signposts.

The progress from paranoia to partnership from the time Prime Minister I.K. Gujral invited President Clinton to visit India in 1997 is manifest in two trends. First, from the Indian perspective -- a decisive parting from the presumption that whatever was good for the U.S. was bad for India which dictated Indian policy for most of the decades after India's independence.

Second, on the U.S.' part -- the moving away from the insistence on viewing India largely through the prism of its strategic alignment with Pakistan.

The end of the Cold War and the simultaneous opening up of the Indian economy began to change perceptions on both sides but it was not until 1997 that the Clinton administration formally adopted a new policy framework aimed at broadening and deepening Indo-US ties.

This was reflected soon after the arrival of Ambassador Richard Celeste to India. A mission statement was adopted which defined the purpose of the new mission as exercising leadership in promoting the interests of both countries. "We seek both to expand mutual under-standing and to expand a common agenda for the future.

We strive to reflect the best of our nation's values and respect the best of Indian values in all that we do," it said. Early in October, when Celeste convened a meeting of his senior staff -- virtually a new team from the one that wrote the original mission statement -- the revised statement which followed extensive discussions said, "We seek to strengthen mutual understanding and to build a dynamic partnership for the 21st century."

Instrumental in this revision were, India's nuclear weapons tests in May 1998 and the alacrity with which the U.S. imposed sanctions on India rekindled a sense of paranoia on both sides. Sanctions, recriminations, suspicions abounded.

But post-Pokhran II, the most serious and sustained dialogs in the history of Indo-US relations were held between US Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott and Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh.

A year later, Pakistan-supported infiltration into Kargil provided the context for a dramatic shift in dealings between the Indian and US governments. During the Kargil conflict, the direct telephone communication between Clinton and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee set an unprecedented standard for transparency and confidence in bilateral relations.

Since then, the parameters of cooperation have expanded. The government's unequivocal expression of its belief that a broad- based and robust engagement with the U.S. is in India's national interest was matched by Clinton's visit to India and the "successful" visit of Vajpayee to the U.S. that followed.

The joint economic dialog on issues ranging from matters related to double taxation impacting American companies doing business in India to market access issues in the context of the WTO initiative of the joint working group on terrorism, the joint export controls dialog, counter-narcotics collaboration and law- enforcement cooperation have all been instrumental in bridging the gap.

But all this and convergence of Indo-U.S. views on diverse areas should not lull us into a false sense of complacency. In the past few years, the U.S. has become India's largest trading partner accounting for 21 per cent of India's global exports and despite the frequent harping on the steadfast commitment to the trade reform agenda, investors in the U.S. continue to be wary about India as a destination.

Soft-ware and information techno-logy are the outstanding exceptions. But even here, there is concern over the Indian government's seeming reluctance to support an aggressive pro- technology stance within the World Trade Organization.

Congressman Jim McDermott on his visit to New Delhi late in 2000 voiced US concern that the second-generation reforms initiated by the Indian government were meeting tough resistance.

According to the AT Kearney report, given a choice, 56 per cent of multinational companies wanted to invest in China and just 14 per cent were interested in investing in India.

The stakes for India are very high, and if U.S. investors pulled out, it would negatively affect foreign investment in India from other countries, too, he warned.

There is growing consensus among Indian and U.S. experts about the need for greater bilateral interaction between USA and India at the Track II level, comprising think-tanks, business groups, academic institutions and non government organizations. The focus ought to be on ways for enhancing trade and investment relations.

Many commercial issues could be ironed out and bilateral understanding increased through Track II efforts. The predominant feeling is that despite profound changes in India's economic landscape, the issue of implementation remains critical, as do issues like how India would pursue the second generation of reforms and the impact of removing quantitative restrictions on imports into India.

Another carryover issue for the next administration is the restraint on areas like military sales and technology transfer and its concern over whether the nations were complying by the norms laid down for underground testing of nuclear weapons.

There are reminders that beyond India's self-imposed moratorium, progress has been grudging on harmonizing respective views on non-proliferation.

The only high point was the structuring of a non-proliferation framework for the two countries to work on -- signature on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, strengthening export controls, constructive efforts to negotiate a Fissile Material Control Treaty and restraint in the deployment of nuclear weapons.

But there have been assurances that the issue of sanctions would be examined afresh in the new administration under President George W Bush, who is expected to encourage joint working with the Asian countries.

He is also said to be in favor of bringing Indian Americans into the US political stream.

On issues of security and peace in the region, he would "any day stand with India".

The author is on the staff of The Statesman, New Delhi, in which this article first appeared.