Indo-U.S. ties characterized by paranoia to partnership<\/p>\n
By Nivedita Mukherjee<\/p>\n
NEW DELHI: The paradigm shift in Indo-US ties ushered in by
\nthe outgoing Clinton administration could be characterized as
\nparanoia to partnership. This would cushion the pinpricks of
\naccommodating unresolved differences under the new regime.<\/p>\n
A newly established, Indo-US sponsored Asia Center for
\nDemocratic Governance, a village in Pondicherry where each
\nmorning fishermen get the latest information on water and wave
\nconditions from a U.S. Navy website, from 2,65,000 visa
\napplicants in 1997 to 4,95,000 in 2000, Bill Clinton's praise of
\na Rajasthan woman's milk cooperative and its computerized billing
\nin his speech at Warwick University, England are some signposts.<\/p>\n
The progress from paranoia to partnership from the time Prime
\nMinister I.K. Gujral invited President Clinton to visit India in
\n1997 is manifest in two trends. First, from the Indian
\nperspective -- a decisive parting from the presumption that
\nwhatever was good for the U.S. was bad for India which dictated
\nIndian policy for most of the decades after India's independence.<\/p>\n
Second, on the U.S.' part -- the moving away from the
\ninsistence on viewing India largely through the prism of its
\nstrategic alignment with Pakistan.<\/p>\n
The end of the Cold War and the simultaneous opening up of the
\nIndian economy began to change perceptions on both sides but it
\nwas not until 1997 that the Clinton administration formally
\nadopted a new policy framework aimed at broadening and deepening
\nIndo-US ties.<\/p>\n
This was reflected soon after the arrival of Ambassador
\nRichard Celeste to India. A mission statement was adopted which
\ndefined the purpose of the new mission as exercising leadership
\nin promoting the interests of both countries. \"We seek both to
\nexpand mutual under-standing and to expand a common agenda for
\nthe future.<\/p>\n
We strive to reflect the best of our nation's values and
\nrespect the best of Indian values in all that we do,\" it said.
\nEarly in October, when Celeste convened a meeting of his senior
\nstaff -- virtually a new team from the one that wrote the
\noriginal mission statement -- the revised statement which
\nfollowed extensive discussions said, \"We seek to strengthen
\nmutual understanding and to build a dynamic partnership for the
\n21st century.\"<\/p>\n
Instrumental in this revision were, India's nuclear weapons
\ntests in May 1998 and the alacrity with which the U.S. imposed
\nsanctions on India rekindled a sense of paranoia on both sides.
\nSanctions, recriminations, suspicions abounded.<\/p>\n
But post-Pokhran II, the most serious and sustained dialogs in
\nthe history of Indo-US relations were held between US Deputy
\nSecretary Strobe Talbott and Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh.<\/p>\n
A year later, Pakistan-supported infiltration into Kargil
\nprovided the context for a dramatic shift in dealings between the
\nIndian and US governments. During the Kargil conflict, the direct
\ntelephone communication between Clinton and Prime Minister Atal
\nBehari Vajpayee set an unprecedented standard for transparency
\nand confidence in bilateral relations.<\/p>\n
Since then, the parameters of cooperation have expanded. The
\ngovernment's unequivocal expression of its belief that a broad-
\nbased and robust engagement with the U.S. is in India's national
\ninterest was matched by Clinton's visit to India and the
\n\"successful\" visit of Vajpayee to the U.S. that followed.<\/p>\n
The joint economic dialog on issues ranging from matters
\nrelated to double taxation impacting American companies doing
\nbusiness in India to market access issues in the context of the
\nWTO initiative of the joint working group on terrorism, the joint
\nexport controls dialog, counter-narcotics collaboration and law-
\nenforcement cooperation have all been instrumental in bridging
\nthe gap.<\/p>\n
But all this and convergence of Indo-U.S. views on diverse
\nareas should not lull us into a false sense of complacency. In
\nthe past few years, the U.S. has become India's largest trading
\npartner accounting for 21 per cent of India's global exports and
\ndespite the frequent harping on the steadfast commitment to the
\ntrade reform agenda, investors in the U.S. continue to be wary
\nabout India as a destination.<\/p>\n
Soft-ware and information techno-logy are the outstanding
\nexceptions. But even here, there is concern over the Indian
\ngovernment's seeming reluctance to support an aggressive pro-
\ntechnology stance within the World Trade Organization.<\/p>\n
Congressman Jim McDermott on his visit to New Delhi late in
\n2000 voiced US concern that the second-generation reforms
\ninitiated by the Indian government were meeting tough resistance.<\/p>\n
According to the AT Kearney report, given a choice, 56 per
\ncent of multinational companies wanted to invest in China and
\njust 14 per cent were interested in investing in India.<\/p>\n
The stakes for India are very high, and if U.S. investors
\npulled out, it would negatively affect foreign investment in
\nIndia from other countries, too, he warned.<\/p>\n
There is growing consensus among Indian and U.S. experts about
\nthe need for greater bilateral interaction between USA and India
\nat the Track II level, comprising think-tanks, business groups,
\nacademic institutions and non government organizations. The focus
\nought to be on ways for enhancing trade and investment relations.<\/p>\n
Many commercial issues could be ironed out and bilateral
\nunderstanding increased through Track II efforts. The predominant
\nfeeling is that despite profound changes in India's economic
\nlandscape, the issue of implementation remains critical, as do
\nissues like how India would pursue the second generation of
\nreforms and the impact of removing quantitative restrictions on
\nimports into India.<\/p>\n
Another carryover issue for the next administration is the
\nrestraint on areas like military sales and technology transfer
\nand its concern over whether the nations were complying by the
\nnorms laid down for underground testing of nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n
There are reminders that beyond India's self-imposed
\nmoratorium, progress has been grudging on harmonizing respective
\nviews on non-proliferation.<\/p>\n
The only high point was the structuring of a non-proliferation
\nframework for the two countries to work on -- signature on the
\nComprehensive Test Ban Treaty, strengthening export controls,
\nconstructive efforts to negotiate a Fissile Material Control
\nTreaty and restraint in the deployment of nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n
But there have been assurances that the issue of sanctions
\nwould be examined afresh in the new administration under
\nPresident George W Bush, who is expected to encourage joint
\nworking with the Asian countries.<\/p>\n
He is also said to be in favor of bringing Indian Americans
\ninto the US political stream.<\/p>\n
On issues of security and peace in the region, he would \"any
\nday stand with India\".<\/p>\n
The author is on the staff of The Statesman, New Delhi, in
\nwhich this article first appeared.<\/p>",
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