How to protect the Malacca Straits

Michael Richardson, The Straits Times, Asia News Network/Singapore

Singapore's Defense Minister Teo Chee Hean has called for tighter security in the Malacca Straits to prevent a possible maritime terrorist attack that could, at least temporarily, close the 900 km sea lane to international shipping carrying a quarter of the world's trade and half its oil.

The suicide attacks at the weekend on Iraq's two main oil terminals using small boats packed with explosives were reminiscent of the strikes against American destroyer USS Cole in October 2000 and the laden French oil tanker Limburg in October 2002, both in Yemen's waters and both blamed on Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network.

There are several very busy but relatively narrow international shipping straits around the world. One of the best known is the Hormuz Strait, leading to the oil-rich and politically volatile Persian Gulf. This waterway is patrolled regularly by naval vessels of the two littoral states, Oman and Iran, as well as by American and allied warships, all of which have a common interest in keeping it open and safe.

Rear-Admiral (NS) Teo noted that there is a particular risk from big ships carrying oil or chemicals that could be sunk in the narrowest parts, or choke-points, of the straits, or be turned into floating bombs.

The strait most vulnerable to a terrorist strike using a ship as a weapon is probably the congested Bosporus Strait, which connects the Black Sea with the Mediterranean, bisecting Turkey and dividing Asia from Europe.

This is just less than one kilometer wide at its narrowest point, where it passes through the heart of Istanbul, the commercial capital of Turkey. About 50,000 vessels a year go through the Turkish strait, about the same number as through the Malacca Straits.

But the South-east Asian waterway, although three times as wide at its narrowest point south of Singapore, is far more important to global trade than the Turkish strait. And it is not patrolled regularly because, so far, its three littoral states -- Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore -- have not been able to develop sufficient common interest to work with major users of the straits who want better protection both from pirates and terrorists.

How could a consensus for a new form and level of security in the Malacca Straits be built? One way might be to include collaborative security arrangements for the straits on the agenda of official discussions to shape the still evolving ASEAN Security Community. This would enable Indonesia to take "ownership" of any deal that was agreed upon. But it would need to be structured to appeal to Indonesia, by far the least dependent of the three littoral states on seaborne international trade.

Indonesia proposed the ASEAN Security Community to complement the ASEAN Economic Community, which other members of the group, including Singapore, have made a priority. Singapore said last month it felt the time was not right to establish a regional peacekeeping force as part of the ASEAN Security Community. Singapore could create a better atmosphere by agreeing to explore the peacekeeping plan further.

But probably the most important step is to engage the Indonesian armed forces as well as the government in Jakarta and persuade them to support collaborative security arrangements for the Malacca Straits.

The U.S. government has been seeking to do this but is constrained by congressional legislation imposing restrictions on military ties and arms sales to Indonesia because of past human rights abuses by the Indonesian military.

Still, senior U.S. and Indonesian defense and intelligence officials agreed last week at a meeting in Washington to resume their bilateral defense dialogue before the end of this year. The Bush administration has also promised to provide training opportunities for Indonesian officers.

Ultimately, what may be needed is large-scale foreign military aid to help Indonesia create an effective coast guard or a navy with enough ships and properly trained and paid personnel to secure its waters in and close to the Malacca Straits.

The status of the straits makes it a politically sensitive issue. Under international law, a major part of the straits is within the territorial sea of the three littoral states. Foreign vessels have the right to unimpeded transit through shipping lanes, but countries whose vessels use them have no right to patrol or arrest attackers unless they are authorized to do so by the coastal state in whose waters the incident occurred.

If a flexible approach was taken by the littoral states, some experts have said it might be possible to use Article 43 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as a legal basis for improving security in the straits.

Article 43 deals with navigational safety and pollution in the waterway. It could be stretched to include security, perhaps initially by allowing approved naval or coast guard vessels of other states to exercise joint responsibility for protecting international shipping through the straits.

A precedent for this was set by an agreement between India and the U.S. for the Indian navy to escort through the Malacca Straits "high-value" American merchant ships, such as those carrying ammunition and supplies, in 2002 and part of last year to free U.S. navy ships for other missions.

Malaysia gave a nod to this arrangement and Indonesia did not object. Singapore's navy patrol craft, too, have escorted some tankers, container vessels and cruise ships through the waters south of Singapore to guard against terrorist attacks.

The writer is a visiting senior research fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore. This is a personal comment.