How to protect the Malacca Straits

How to protect the Malacca Straits

Michael Richardson, The Straits Times, Asia News Network/Singapore

Singapore's Defense Minister Teo Chee Hean has called for
tighter security in the Malacca Straits to prevent a possible
maritime terrorist attack that could, at least temporarily, close
the 900 km sea lane to international shipping carrying a quarter
of the world's trade and half its oil.

The suicide attacks at the weekend on Iraq's two main oil
terminals using small boats packed with explosives were
reminiscent of the strikes against American destroyer USS Cole in
October 2000 and the laden French oil tanker Limburg in October
2002, both in Yemen's waters and both blamed on Osama bin Laden's
al-Qaeda network.

There are several very busy but relatively narrow
international shipping straits around the world. One of the best
known is the Hormuz Strait, leading to the oil-rich and
politically volatile Persian Gulf. This waterway is patrolled
regularly by naval vessels of the two littoral states, Oman and
Iran, as well as by American and allied warships, all of which
have a common interest in keeping it open and safe.

Rear-Admiral (NS) Teo noted that there is a particular risk
from big ships carrying oil or chemicals that could be sunk in
the narrowest parts, or choke-points, of the straits, or be
turned into floating bombs.

The strait most vulnerable to a terrorist strike using a ship
as a weapon is probably the congested Bosporus Strait, which
connects the Black Sea with the Mediterranean, bisecting Turkey
and dividing Asia from Europe.

This is just less than one kilometer wide at its narrowest
point, where it passes through the heart of Istanbul, the
commercial capital of Turkey. About 50,000 vessels a year go
through the Turkish strait, about the same number as through the
Malacca Straits.

But the South-east Asian waterway, although three times as
wide at its narrowest point south of Singapore, is far more
important to global trade than the Turkish strait. And it is not
patrolled regularly because, so far, its three littoral states --
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore -- have not been able to
develop sufficient common interest to work with major users of
the straits who want better protection both from pirates and
terrorists.

How could a consensus for a new form and level of security in
the Malacca Straits be built? One way might be to include
collaborative security arrangements for the straits on the agenda
of official discussions to shape the still evolving ASEAN
Security Community. This would enable Indonesia to take
"ownership" of any deal that was agreed upon. But it would need
to be structured to appeal to Indonesia, by far the least
dependent of the three littoral states on seaborne international
trade.

Indonesia proposed the ASEAN Security Community to complement
the ASEAN Economic Community, which other members of the group,
including Singapore, have made a priority. Singapore said last
month it felt the time was not right to establish a regional
peacekeeping force as part of the ASEAN Security Community.
Singapore could create a better atmosphere by agreeing to explore
the peacekeeping plan further.

But probably the most important step is to engage the
Indonesian armed forces as well as the government in Jakarta and
persuade them to support collaborative security arrangements for
the Malacca Straits.

The U.S. government has been seeking to do this but is
constrained by congressional legislation imposing restrictions on
military ties and arms sales to Indonesia because of past human
rights abuses by the Indonesian military.

Still, senior U.S. and Indonesian defense and intelligence
officials agreed last week at a meeting in Washington to resume
their bilateral defense dialogue before the end of this year. The
Bush administration has also promised to provide training
opportunities for Indonesian officers.

Ultimately, what may be needed is large-scale foreign military
aid to help Indonesia create an effective coast guard or a navy
with enough ships and properly trained and paid personnel to
secure its waters in and close to the Malacca Straits.

The status of the straits makes it a politically sensitive
issue. Under international law, a major part of the straits is
within the territorial sea of the three littoral states. Foreign
vessels have the right to unimpeded transit through shipping
lanes, but countries whose vessels use them have no right to
patrol or arrest attackers unless they are authorized to do so by
the coastal state in whose waters the incident occurred.

If a flexible approach was taken by the littoral states, some
experts have said it might be possible to use Article 43 of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as a legal basis
for improving security in the straits.

Article 43 deals with navigational safety and pollution in the
waterway. It could be stretched to include security, perhaps
initially by allowing approved naval or coast guard vessels of
other states to exercise joint responsibility for protecting
international shipping through the straits.

A precedent for this was set by an agreement between India and
the U.S. for the Indian navy to escort through the Malacca
Straits "high-value" American merchant ships, such as those
carrying ammunition and supplies, in 2002 and part of last year
to free U.S. navy ships for other missions.

Malaysia gave a nod to this arrangement and Indonesia did not
object. Singapore's navy patrol craft, too, have escorted some
tankers, container vessels and cruise ships through the waters
south of Singapore to guard against terrorist attacks.

The writer is a visiting senior research fellow at the
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore. This is a
personal comment.