How Beijing Reads America
For years, many in the West have assumed that China wants to replace America as the world’s ruler as quickly as possible. However, the way Beijing views America turns out to be more complicated than that.
China does see America facing many internal pressures: political polarisation, rising social fragmentation, massive debt, and Washington’s tendency to use tariffs, sanctions, and economic pressure against both adversaries and allies. All of this leads some Chinese elites to believe that America’s global dominance is slowly beginning to crack. Interestingly, however, Beijing does not appear to view America as a weak country.
On the contrary, in many Chinese strategic analyses, America is regarded as a still very powerful force, but now increasingly restless because it feels its position is being challenged. For Beijing, an anxious America could be more dangerous than a confident one. A hegemon feeling its dominance disrupted tends to act more harshly, more impulsively, and more unpredictably.
This kind of perspective is evident in the Chaguan column in The Economist’s 9 May 2026 edition, titled On American Decline. In that article, China is depicted as seeing America not as a crumbling power, but as a hegemon that is still strong yet increasingly aggressive in defending its position.
This view helps explain why China itself appears quite cautious. Beijing’s rhetoric is often harsh, especially regarding Taiwan and the South China Sea. However, compared to Russia, for instance, China is relatively more calculated in using its military power. Beijing seems aware that America still has too many advantages to be underestimated.
America still possesses the world’s largest global alliance network. The dollar still dominates the international financial system. Its universities and technology companies remain centres of global innovation. In fields such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, aerospace, and global military power, America is still at the forefront.
Therefore, a number of Chinese thinkers like Wang Jisi and Da Wei have repeatedly warned Beijing not to fall into excessive overconfidence. Wang Jisi, for example, has written about US power/US decline and cautioned that the decline of American hegemony does not automatically mean the loss of American power. Da Wei from Tsinghua also emphasises that China does not need and does not want to simply “replace” America as a new hegemon.
This perspective also aligns with several Western analysts. Graham Allison (Destined for War, 2017), for instance, sees US-China rivalry as a structural competition between an established power (ruling power) and a rising power. Meanwhile, Michael Beckley and Hal Brands in various writings in Foreign Affairs argue that although America’s relative dominance faces pressure, the country’s fundamental power remains very substantial.
Therefore, Beijing seems to distinguish between the decline of American hegemony and moral influence and the continued magnitude of America’s power itself. In this view, Washington’s global influence and legitimacy may be eroding in various regions, but America’s capacity in military, technological, financial, and alliance networks remains very large. In simple terms, China may believe that the era of single American dominance is slowly cracking, but they also believe America is still very capable of “stirring things up”.
This perspective helps explain China’s attitude towards Donald Trump. On one hand, Beijing likely sees Trump as a symbol of America’s political polarisation and fragmentation. High tariffs, pressure on allies, trade wars, and Washington’s transactional approach are seen as indicating cracks in the liberal globalisation model that America itself once led.
On the other hand, Beijing also sees that America under Trump is increasingly willing to use power openly: tariffs, technology restrictions, investment controls, supply chain pressures, and financial sanctions. In other words, China may view America not as retreating peacefully, but as entering a harder phase in defending its position.
As a result, US-China relations are now increasingly shifting from mere economic competition to comprehensive strategic competition. Trade wars are mixed with struggles over technology, artificial intelligence, rare earths, maritime security, and Taiwan. The economic interdependence once seen as a source of stability is now increasingly viewed as a strategic vulnerability. The IMF has even repeatedly warned of the risks of geoeconomic fragmentation, namely the splitting of the global economy into competing strategic blocs.
Nevertheless, Beijing does not yet seem willing to take the risk of large-scale direct confrontation with America. Many of China’s steps remain in the grey area: limited military pressure around Taiwan, strengthening domestic technology, expanding economic influence, and increasingly active diplomacy in the Global South. China still seems to believe that time is on its side.
For middle powers like Indonesia, the way Beijing reads America is important to understand. Because the rivalry between the two countries does not appear likely to turn into open war in the near future, but nor will it return to the old optimism of globalisation. The world seems to be moving towards an era of long-term competition: interconnected, yet simultaneously suspicious of each other.
In such a situation, the challenge for many countries is not to choose one side, but to maintain their own strategic room for manoeuvre. Because both Beijing and Washington seem to increasingly view international relations not just as a matter of cooperation, but also of influence, resilience, and balancing.