High profile diplomacy in 1995
High profile diplomacy in 1995
By Meidyatama Suryodiningrat
JAKARTA (JP): Nineteen ninety-five was again a year of big headlines for Indonesian foreign policy.
Sustaining the spotlight from last year's Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum meeting in Bogor, West Java, Indonesia's ventures into the international arena received much media attention.
Gone are the days of so-called "low-profile" foreign policy. Indonesia now feels it has a right to play a more dominant role in the international sphere and will not be shy about it.
Despite the voluminous exposure received, a breakdown of the year's main events still leaves analysts pondering whether the higher profile is a prelude to something significant or "much ado about nothing".
"There seems to be an awful lot of activity. You can see it everywhere in the newspapers, but still we are left wondering if we really have had that much of a success," said Hero Kuntjoro- Jakti, the director of the Center for Japanese Studies and former head of the University of Indonesia's international relations department.
The year began brightly with Indonesia joining the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for a two-year tenure.
Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Alatas went on record for the first time saying that Indonesia should be considered for a permanent seat if the Security Council was going to be expanded.
Albeit sponsoring some important resolutions in the Security Council, Indonesia was too often left helpless on a number of important issues such as a resolution to condemn Israel which was vetoed by Washington and to lift the economic sanctions against Iraq.
Legislator Zamharir A.R. when asked to assess Indonesia's performance in the first year at the Security Council felt that little was accomplished, particularly when Indonesia chaired the Council in August.
"We should have been able to do more," said Zamharir, who is Deputy Chairman for the Committee for Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation.
Kusnanto Anggoro, a researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, takes a more somber view of the performance at the Council, saying that Indonesia was not selected to hold a seat due to any special ability but because it was Indonesia's turn.
Researcher Syamsumar Dam from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences noted that Indonesia's ineffectiveness was due to control of the world body by the "big" powers.
Syamsumar argued that all the "small" countries in the world, including Indonesia, would find their goals, no matter how noble, difficult to achieve without the consent of the big states.
Another major issue that came up at the UN was the extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). After being in effect for 25-years, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was up for review in May. The United States wanted to make the treaty permanent.
Indonesia urged caution, arguing instead for the possibility of assigning fixed rolling periods for the treaty.
Indonesia rallied opposition against a permanent vote and tried to harness its position during the Non-Aligned Movement's (NAM) ministerial meeting which was held in Bandung, West Java, just a fortnight before the NPT conference.
These efforts failed miserably and by an overwhelming majority the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty became permanent. In the end even NAM's attempts to take a united position on the issue fell to tatters.
Though failing to achieve unity on the NPT question, NAM continued its reverence for NAM's spirit. With Indonesia at the helm, member states gathered in Bandung to rekindle the spirit at the 40th Anniversary of the Asia-Africa Conference.
The highly publicized event, attended by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, showed the world that NAM still shared a common vision despite difficulties finding common ground on important policy issues.
In October Indonesia handed NAM's chairmanship over to Colombia in a grand ceremony at the group's summit in the Colombian resort city of Cartagena.
Indonesia was praised for its three-year chairmanship. Every one of the over 50 heads of state attending mentioned Indonesia's role in rejuvenating the Movement.
Indonesia consistently offered its ideas and opinions to various global concerns throughout the year.
In March President Soeharto attended the UN Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen and delivered an elaborate speech on the problems and challenges facing developing nations.
He also attended the 50th anniversary celebrations of the UN in New York in October and gave a speech stating the necessity for reform.
Along with visits to Germany and Suriname, the president took trips to the newly formed states of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, signifying Indonesia's attention to areas which seem remote to Southeast Asia.
Soeharto's visit to Zagreb and Sarajevo in mid-March must be considered the highlight of the year.
As he flew through hazardous areas to personally assess the situation there, Soeharto's trip, once and for all, refutes criticism that Indonesia was aloof in its support of the Bosnian people.
Upon his return, Soeharto proposed an alternative peace plan to settle the crisis and said Indonesia was willing to facilitate the process if asked.
Unfortunately, the process almost became a media folly when Indonesia's special envoy to Bosnia, Nana Sutresna, announced in August that the heads of the warring factions had "agreed in principle" to meet in Indonesia soon.
However, when the press later tried to confirm these claims, officials in the war-torn republic denied any knowledge of the proposed meeting.
In response to the press scrutiny, Jakarta claimed the invitation had been issued at the highest levels and the printed denials were "disinformation."
Another embarrassing snafu occurred during the All-Inclusive East Timor Dialog (AETD) in Austria in June which brought pro- and anti-integration Timorese together for reconciliation talks.
At the end of the talks a joint declaration was released which, oddly, cited UN Resolution 37/30 as the basis of talks between Jakarta and Lisbon.
The inclusion of the UN Resolution was a grave mistake since it violates the UN Secretary General's statement of Jan. 9, 1995, which precluded discussion on the political status of East Timor during the AETD.
After the talks, Indonesian officials used the alibi that they had been duped by Fretilin leader Ramos Horta whom they said had access to the only computer used to draft the declaration.
Throughout the year East Timor continued to be a thorn for Indonesia. Waves of Timorese students "invaded" several foreign embassies to seek asylum. All were rejected thus forcing them to turn to Portugal instead.
Though the foreign ministry laughed it off as a "tired old game" the incidents heightened international scrutiny of the issue.
In January Alatas met his Portuguese counterpart Jose Manuel Durao Barroso in Geneva for the fifth UN sponsored talks to find an internationally acceptable solution to the East Timor issue.
While there were hopes that talks would begin to discuss substantive matters, progress remained slow.
The Mantiri affair proved to be another debacle which tested ties with neighboring Australia.
On July 6 Jakarta withdrew the nomination of Lt. Gen. (ret.) H.B.L. Mantiri as Ambassador to Canberra leaving the post vacant after an Australian public outcry over past remarks he reportedly made about East Timor.
Many here charged that Mantiri's nomination showed a lack of anticipation and insensitivity towards the deeply rooted feelings the Australian public have towards East Timor and the military.
Analysts believe the Mantiri affair demonstrates that the foreign ministry is not always in complete control of its own foreign policy.
Kusnanto Anggoro contends that "bureaucratic infighting" occurs in such matters and the foreign ministry often ends up the weaker side.
Similarly Hero Kuntjoro-Jakti notes the involvement of other institutions in guiding the nation's foreign policy.
"Since the re-establishment of Indonesian-Chinese relations there is a new actor called the State Secretariat in the determination of foreign policy," he remarked.
Hero maintains that the involvement of other institutional actors is not necessarily a bad thing as long as there is coordination and cohesion.
Despite all the fracas, Soeharto's and Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating's strong rapport quelled fears that cracks would appear in the bilateral ties. This was affirmed during a mini summit between the two in Bali in September.
In the end, Jakarta and Canberra capped off 1995 with the historical signing of a security agreement and the appointment of a senior diplomat, Wiryono Sastrohandojo, as ambassador for Australia.
While Wiryono's diplomatic caliber is unquestionable, the quality of Indonesian diplomats fell under great scrutiny in August when Alatas underlined the need for them to be more pro- active.
From a lack language proficiency to debating skills, the deficiencies of Indonesian diplomats were publicly questioned.
Kusnanto Anggoro suggests that the problem may not lie in the quality of the country's new breed of diplomats, but in the bureaucratic structure which hinders rather than encourage people to be assertive.
He said junior officials are apprehensive about asserting themselves for fear it might offend their superiors reinforcing the perception of Alatas being "a one man show".
The year closed on a pinnacle of achievement with the signing of the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) by the seven members of ASEAN and Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar.
Though ignored by the nuclear weapon states, SEANWFZ marks the fruition of 10 years of hard work.
It reduces the likelihood of a nuclear holocaust in this region and strengthens confidence among the signatory states.
As the head of SEANWFZ's working group, Indonesia can be proud of this accomplishment.
Hours prior to SEANWFZ's signing in Bangkok this month, for the first time ever, all 10 heads of government of Southeast Asia gathered for informal talks.
Thus, despite all the frustrations of the year, the dream of a united Southeast Asia lends much hope to peace and stability in the region which Indonesia had a leading hand creating.