High profile diplomacy in 1995<\/p>\n
By Meidyatama Suryodiningrat<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Nineteen ninety-five was again a year of big
\nheadlines for Indonesian foreign policy.<\/p>\n
Sustaining the spotlight from last year's Asia Pacific
\nEconomic Cooperation (APEC) forum meeting in Bogor, West Java,
\nIndonesia's ventures into the international arena received much
\nmedia attention.<\/p>\n
Gone are the days of so-called "low-profile" foreign policy.
\nIndonesia now feels it has a right to play a more dominant role
\nin the international sphere and will not be shy about it.<\/p>\n
Despite the voluminous exposure received, a breakdown of the
\nyear's main events still leaves analysts pondering whether the
\nhigher profile is a prelude to something significant or "much ado
\nabout nothing".<\/p>\n
"There seems to be an awful lot of activity. You can see it
\neverywhere in the newspapers, but still we are left wondering if
\nwe really have had that much of a success," said Hero Kuntjoro-
\nJakti, the director of the Center for Japanese Studies and former
\nhead of the University of Indonesia's international relations
\ndepartment.<\/p>\n
The year began brightly with Indonesia joining the United
\nNations Security Council (UNSC) for a two-year tenure.<\/p>\n
Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Alatas went on record for the
\nfirst time saying that Indonesia should be considered for a
\npermanent seat if the Security Council was going to be expanded.<\/p>\n
Albeit sponsoring some important resolutions in the Security
\nCouncil, Indonesia was too often left helpless on a number of
\nimportant issues such as a resolution to condemn Israel which was
\nvetoed by Washington and to lift the economic sanctions against
\nIraq.<\/p>\n
Legislator Zamharir A.R. when asked to assess Indonesia's
\nperformance in the first year at the Security Council felt that
\nlittle was accomplished, particularly when Indonesia chaired the
\nCouncil in August.<\/p>\n
"We should have been able to do more," said Zamharir, who is
\nDeputy Chairman for the Committee for Inter-Parliamentary
\nCooperation.<\/p>\n
Kusnanto Anggoro, a researcher at the Centre for Strategic and
\nInternational Studies, takes a more somber view of the
\nperformance at the Council, saying that Indonesia was not
\nselected to hold a seat due to any special ability but because it
\nwas Indonesia's turn.<\/p>\n
Researcher Syamsumar Dam from the Indonesian Institute of
\nSciences noted that Indonesia's ineffectiveness was due to
\ncontrol of the world body by the "big" powers.<\/p>\n
Syamsumar argued that all the "small" countries in the world,
\nincluding Indonesia, would find their goals, no matter how noble,
\ndifficult to achieve without the consent of the big states.<\/p>\n
Another major issue that came up at the UN was the extension
\nof the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). After being in
\neffect for 25-years, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was up
\nfor review in May. The United States wanted to make the treaty
\npermanent.<\/p>\n
Indonesia urged caution, arguing instead for the possibility
\nof assigning fixed rolling periods for the treaty.<\/p>\n
Indonesia rallied opposition against a permanent vote and
\ntried to harness its position during the Non-Aligned Movement's
\n(NAM) ministerial meeting which was held in Bandung, West Java,
\njust a fortnight before the NPT conference.<\/p>\n
These efforts failed miserably and by an overwhelming majority
\nthe Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty became permanent. In the end
\neven NAM's attempts to take a united position on the issue fell
\nto tatters.<\/p>\n
Though failing to achieve unity on the NPT question, NAM
\ncontinued its reverence for NAM's spirit. With Indonesia at the
\nhelm, member states gathered in Bandung to rekindle the spirit at
\nthe 40th Anniversary of the Asia-Africa Conference.<\/p>\n
The highly publicized event, attended by UN Secretary General
\nBoutros Boutros-Ghali, showed the world that NAM still shared a
\ncommon vision despite difficulties finding common ground on
\nimportant policy issues.<\/p>\n
In October Indonesia handed NAM's chairmanship over to
\nColombia in a grand ceremony at the group's summit in the
\nColombian resort city of Cartagena.<\/p>\n
Indonesia was praised for its three-year chairmanship. Every
\none of the over 50 heads of state attending mentioned Indonesia's
\nrole in rejuvenating the Movement.<\/p>\n
Indonesia consistently offered its ideas and opinions to
\nvarious global concerns throughout the year.<\/p>\n
In March President Soeharto attended the UN Summit on Social
\nDevelopment in Copenhagen and delivered an elaborate speech on
\nthe problems and challenges facing developing nations.<\/p>\n
He also attended the 50th anniversary celebrations of the UN
\nin New York in October and gave a speech stating the necessity
\nfor reform.<\/p>\n
Along with visits to Germany and Suriname, the president took
\ntrips to the newly formed states of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and
\nUzbekistan, signifying Indonesia's attention to areas which seem
\nremote to Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n
Soeharto's visit to Zagreb and Sarajevo in mid-March must be
\nconsidered the highlight of the year.<\/p>\n
As he flew through hazardous areas to personally assess the
\nsituation there, Soeharto's trip, once and for all, refutes
\ncriticism that Indonesia was aloof in its support of the Bosnian
\npeople.<\/p>\n
Upon his return, Soeharto proposed an alternative peace plan
\nto settle the crisis and said Indonesia was willing to facilitate
\nthe process if asked.<\/p>\n
Unfortunately, the process almost became a media folly when
\nIndonesia's special envoy to Bosnia, Nana Sutresna, announced in
\nAugust that the heads of the warring factions had "agreed in
\nprinciple" to meet in Indonesia soon.<\/p>\n
However, when the press later tried to confirm these claims,
\nofficials in the war-torn republic denied any knowledge of the
\nproposed meeting.<\/p>\n
In response to the press scrutiny, Jakarta claimed the
\ninvitation had been issued at the highest levels and the printed
\ndenials were "disinformation."<\/p>\n
Another embarrassing snafu occurred during the All-Inclusive
\nEast Timor Dialog (AETD) in Austria in June which brought pro-
\nand anti-integration Timorese together for reconciliation talks.<\/p>\n
At the end of the talks a joint declaration was released
\nwhich, oddly, cited UN Resolution 37\/30 as the basis of talks
\nbetween Jakarta and Lisbon.<\/p>\n
The inclusion of the UN Resolution was a grave mistake since
\nit violates the UN Secretary General's statement of Jan. 9, 1995,
\nwhich precluded discussion on the political status of East Timor
\nduring the AETD.<\/p>\n
After the talks, Indonesian officials used the alibi that they
\nhad been duped by Fretilin leader Ramos Horta whom they said had
\naccess to the only computer used to draft the declaration.<\/p>\n
Throughout the year East Timor continued to be a thorn for
\nIndonesia. Waves of Timorese students "invaded" several foreign
\nembassies to seek asylum. All were rejected thus forcing them to
\nturn to Portugal instead.<\/p>\n
Though the foreign ministry laughed it off as a "tired old
\ngame" the incidents heightened international scrutiny of the
\nissue.<\/p>\n
In January Alatas met his Portuguese counterpart Jose Manuel
\nDurao Barroso in Geneva for the fifth UN sponsored talks to find
\nan internationally acceptable solution to the East Timor issue.<\/p>\n
While there were hopes that talks would begin to discuss
\nsubstantive matters, progress remained slow.<\/p>\n
The Mantiri affair proved to be another debacle which tested
\nties with neighboring Australia.<\/p>\n
On July 6 Jakarta withdrew the nomination of Lt. Gen. (ret.)
\nH.B.L. Mantiri as Ambassador to Canberra leaving the post vacant
\nafter an Australian public outcry over past remarks he reportedly
\nmade about East Timor.<\/p>\n
Many here charged that Mantiri's nomination showed a lack of
\nanticipation and insensitivity towards the deeply rooted feelings
\nthe Australian public have towards East Timor and the military.<\/p>\n
Analysts believe the Mantiri affair demonstrates that the
\nforeign ministry is not always in complete control of its own
\nforeign policy.<\/p>\n
Kusnanto Anggoro contends that "bureaucratic infighting"
\noccurs in such matters and the foreign ministry often ends up the
\nweaker side.<\/p>\n
Similarly Hero Kuntjoro-Jakti notes the involvement of other
\ninstitutions in guiding the nation's foreign policy.<\/p>\n
"Since the re-establishment of Indonesian-Chinese relations
\nthere is a new actor called the State Secretariat in the
\ndetermination of foreign policy," he remarked.<\/p>\n
Hero maintains that the involvement of other institutional
\nactors is not necessarily a bad thing as long as there is
\ncoordination and cohesion.<\/p>\n
Despite all the fracas, Soeharto's and Australian Prime
\nMinister Paul Keating's strong rapport quelled fears that cracks
\nwould appear in the bilateral ties. This was affirmed during a
\nmini summit between the two in Bali in September.<\/p>\n
In the end, Jakarta and Canberra capped off 1995 with the
\nhistorical signing of a security agreement and the appointment of
\na senior diplomat, Wiryono Sastrohandojo, as ambassador for
\nAustralia.<\/p>\n
While Wiryono's diplomatic caliber is unquestionable, the
\nquality of Indonesian diplomats fell under great scrutiny in
\nAugust when Alatas underlined the need for them to be more pro-
\nactive.<\/p>\n
From a lack language proficiency to debating skills, the
\ndeficiencies of Indonesian diplomats were publicly questioned.<\/p>\n
Kusnanto Anggoro suggests that the problem may not lie in the
\nquality of the country's new breed of diplomats, but in the
\nbureaucratic structure which hinders rather than encourage people
\nto be assertive.<\/p>\n
He said junior officials are apprehensive about asserting
\nthemselves for fear it might offend their superiors reinforcing
\nthe perception of Alatas being "a one man show".<\/p>\n
The year closed on a pinnacle of achievement with the signing
\nof the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
\n(SEANWFZ) by the seven members of ASEAN and Cambodia, Laos and
\nMyanmar.<\/p>\n
Though ignored by the nuclear weapon states, SEANWFZ marks the
\nfruition of 10 years of hard work.<\/p>\n
It reduces the likelihood of a nuclear holocaust in this
\nregion and strengthens confidence among the signatory states.<\/p>\n
As the head of SEANWFZ's working group, Indonesia can be proud
\nof this accomplishment.<\/p>\n
Hours prior to SEANWFZ's signing in Bangkok this month, for
\nthe first time ever, all 10 heads of government of Southeast Asia
\ngathered for informal talks.<\/p>\n
Thus, despite all the frustrations of the year, the dream of a
\nunited Southeast Asia lends much hope to peace and stability in
\nthe region which Indonesia had a leading hand creating.<\/p>",
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