Give negotiations a chance

The government of President Megawati Soekarnoputri has sent two conflicting signals on the way it is dealing with the problem of Aceh. On the one hand, the government held talks with representatives of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Geneva to search for a negotiated settlement at the weekend. Meanwhile, on Tuesday, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Endriartono Sutarto inaugurated the new Iskandar Muda Military Command in Banda Aceh, making the military territorial presence in the restive province a permanent feature.

The Geneva meeting is a welcome development, coming as it did just as many people were dismissing, or becoming skeptical of, the chances of a negotiated settlement. The fact that GAM and the government sent their negotiators to Geneva at the weekend in itself suggests that both sides are still willing to give negotiations another chance.

The establishment, or rather re-establishment, of the Iskandar Muda Command, on the other hand, suggests that the hardliners in the government, particularly the generals in the Indonesian Military (TNI), have other plans in mind besides negotiations.

The command was established against the better judgment of the government, and in spite of warnings from various groups, that a military option is hardly the answer to the Aceh problem. It goes against the military's own commitment to phase out its territorial role nationwide as part of its reform strategy to play a reduced political role and become a more professional force.

History, and very recent history at that, shows that the military has become a very big part of the problem in Aceh. Given this, it's hard to see how the military could ever expect to become part of the solution.

The two-pronged approach to the Aceh problem -- negotiations combined with military muscle -- is a good illustration of the division within the Megawati administration on how it should proceed.

The hardliners, particularly the TNI, have been campaigning for the full restoration of a military role in Aceh. As we recall, the military presence in Aceh was severely downgraded in 1999 when it was revealed that a decade-long operation in the province had led to massive and unspeakable human rights atrocities.

The other camp in the administration, led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is advocating negotiations as the most viable solution to the problem. Negotiations may be long and frustrating, but if pursued vigorously by both sides, they stand a much better chance of succeeding in creating a long lasting peace than a military solution could ever hope to offer.

The military may feel justified in intensifying the crack down on the Aceh rebels, having won several battles in recent weeks, including the slaying of GAM military commander Abdullah Syafie. While it may have won the battles, the military has not won the Aceh war. In fact, any military victory in Aceh would likely be shortlived as long as the grievances of the Acehnese people, the underlying cause of their rebellion, remain unaddressed.

The government's two-pronged approach could still increase the chances of peace if the military option is restricted to maintaining peace and upholding law and order. Peace, after all, is a vital pre-requisite to any negotiation. But if the military option is expanded to include going after the GAM rebels it could undermine the negotiations altogether.

Now that the Iskandar Muda Command has been established, the military would do well to exercise restraint and not use the full extent of its new found power. The military option could be used to nudge GAM to abandon its armed struggle, but the government should not push its luck too far for it could become counterproductive.

While they may be a long shot, the negotiations mediated by the Henry Dunant Center in Geneva still offer the best hope, probably the only hope, for breaking the current impasse in Aceh.

There were signs of progress from the Geneva meeting at the weekend. Besides an agreement to hold more meetings in the near future, GAM, at least according to the Indonesian government, has agreed to use the new special autonomy law for Aceh, which came into force on Jan. 1, as the basis for negotiations. If this is true (no GAM official has confirmed or denied the claim), then it marks a significant development in the Aceh conflict.

The central government in Jakarta has gone a long way in appeasing the people of Aceh, offering the widest autonomy for the region, including its right to keep a larger share of revenues from local resources, such as natural gas. The government, particularly the military, however still owes the people of Aceh a promise to prosecute the officers responsible for the human rights abuses committed between 1989 and 1999.

With a new and stronger commitment from both sides to work towards peace, and with both sides carrying out their sides of the bargain, there is no reason why negotiations cannot work.

Everyone, including the government and GAM, must give the Geneva talks a chance to succeed. They owe that much to the people of Aceh.