Give negotiations a chance

Give negotiations a chance

The government of President Megawati Soekarnoputri has sent
two conflicting signals on the way it is dealing with the problem
of Aceh. On the one hand, the government held talks with
representatives of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Geneva to
search for a negotiated settlement at the weekend. Meanwhile, on
Tuesday, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Endriartono Sutarto inaugurated
the new Iskandar Muda Military Command in Banda Aceh, making the
military territorial presence in the restive province a permanent
feature.

The Geneva meeting is a welcome development, coming as it did
just as many people were dismissing, or becoming skeptical of,
the chances of a negotiated settlement. The fact that GAM and the
government sent their negotiators to Geneva at the weekend in
itself suggests that both sides are still willing to give
negotiations another chance.

The establishment, or rather re-establishment, of the Iskandar
Muda Command, on the other hand, suggests that the hardliners in
the government, particularly the generals in the Indonesian
Military (TNI), have other plans in mind besides negotiations.

The command was established against the better judgment of the
government, and in spite of warnings from various groups, that a
military option is hardly the answer to the Aceh problem. It goes
against the military's own commitment to phase out its
territorial role nationwide as part of its reform strategy to
play a reduced political role and become a more professional
force.

History, and very recent history at that, shows that the
military has become a very big part of the problem in Aceh. Given
this, it's hard to see how the military could ever expect to
become part of the solution.

The two-pronged approach to the Aceh problem -- negotiations
combined with military muscle -- is a good illustration of the
division within the Megawati administration on how it should
proceed.

The hardliners, particularly the TNI, have been campaigning
for the full restoration of a military role in Aceh. As we
recall, the military presence in Aceh was severely downgraded in
1999 when it was revealed that a decade-long operation in the
province had led to massive and unspeakable human rights
atrocities.

The other camp in the administration, led by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, is advocating negotiations as the most viable
solution to the problem. Negotiations may be long and
frustrating, but if pursued vigorously by both sides, they stand
a much better chance of succeeding in creating a long lasting
peace than a military solution could ever hope to offer.

The military may feel justified in intensifying the crack down
on the Aceh rebels, having won several battles in recent weeks,
including the slaying of GAM military commander Abdullah Syafie.
While it may have won the battles, the military has not won the
Aceh war. In fact, any military victory in Aceh would likely be
shortlived as long as the grievances of the Acehnese people, the
underlying cause of their rebellion, remain unaddressed.

The government's two-pronged approach could still increase the
chances of peace if the military option is restricted to
maintaining peace and upholding law and order. Peace, after all,
is a vital pre-requisite to any negotiation. But if the military
option is expanded to include going after the GAM rebels it could
undermine the negotiations altogether.

Now that the Iskandar Muda Command has been established, the
military would do well to exercise restraint and not use the full
extent of its new found power. The military option could be used
to nudge GAM to abandon its armed struggle, but the government
should not push its luck too far for it could become
counterproductive.

While they may be a long shot, the negotiations mediated by
the Henry Dunant Center in Geneva still offer the best hope,
probably the only hope, for breaking the current impasse in Aceh.

There were signs of progress from the Geneva meeting at the
weekend. Besides an agreement to hold more meetings in the near
future, GAM, at least according to the Indonesian government, has
agreed to use the new special autonomy law for Aceh, which came
into force on Jan. 1, as the basis for negotiations. If this is
true (no GAM official has confirmed or denied the claim), then it
marks a significant development in the Aceh conflict.

The central government in Jakarta has gone a long way in
appeasing the people of Aceh, offering the widest autonomy for
the region, including its right to keep a larger share of
revenues from local resources, such as natural gas. The
government, particularly the military, however still owes the
people of Aceh a promise to prosecute the officers responsible
for the human rights abuses committed between 1989 and 1999.

With a new and stronger commitment from both sides to work
towards peace, and with both sides carrying out their sides of
the bargain, there is no reason why negotiations cannot work.

Everyone, including the government and GAM, must give the
Geneva talks a chance to succeed. They owe that much to the
people of Aceh.