Give negotiations a chance<\/p>\n
The government of President Megawati Soekarnoputri has sent
\ntwo conflicting signals on the way it is dealing with the problem
\nof Aceh. On the one hand, the government held talks with
\nrepresentatives of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Geneva to
\nsearch for a negotiated settlement at the weekend. Meanwhile, on
\nTuesday, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Endriartono Sutarto inaugurated
\nthe new Iskandar Muda Military Command in Banda Aceh, making the
\nmilitary territorial presence in the restive province a permanent
\nfeature.<\/p>\n
The Geneva meeting is a welcome development, coming as it did
\njust as many people were dismissing, or becoming skeptical of,
\nthe chances of a negotiated settlement. The fact that GAM and the
\ngovernment sent their negotiators to Geneva at the weekend in
\nitself suggests that both sides are still willing to give
\nnegotiations another chance.<\/p>\n
The establishment, or rather re-establishment, of the Iskandar
\nMuda Command, on the other hand, suggests that the hardliners in
\nthe government, particularly the generals in the Indonesian
\nMilitary (TNI), have other plans in mind besides negotiations.<\/p>\n
The command was established against the better judgment of the
\ngovernment, and in spite of warnings from various groups, that a
\nmilitary option is hardly the answer to the Aceh problem. It goes
\nagainst the military's own commitment to phase out its
\nterritorial role nationwide as part of its reform strategy to
\nplay a reduced political role and become a more professional
\nforce.<\/p>\n
History, and very recent history at that, shows that the
\nmilitary has become a very big part of the problem in Aceh. Given
\nthis, it's hard to see how the military could ever expect to
\nbecome part of the solution.<\/p>\n
The two-pronged approach to the Aceh problem -- negotiations
\ncombined with military muscle -- is a good illustration of the
\ndivision within the Megawati administration on how it should
\nproceed.<\/p>\n
The hardliners, particularly the TNI, have been campaigning
\nfor the full restoration of a military role in Aceh. As we
\nrecall, the military presence in Aceh was severely downgraded in
\n1999 when it was revealed that a decade-long operation in the
\nprovince had led to massive and unspeakable human rights
\natrocities.<\/p>\n
The other camp in the administration, led by the Ministry of
\nForeign Affairs, is advocating negotiations as the most viable
\nsolution to the problem. Negotiations may be long and
\nfrustrating, but if pursued vigorously by both sides, they stand
\na much better chance of succeeding in creating a long lasting
\npeace than a military solution could ever hope to offer.<\/p>\n
The military may feel justified in intensifying the crack down
\non the Aceh rebels, having won several battles in recent weeks,
\nincluding the slaying of GAM military commander Abdullah Syafie.
\nWhile it may have won the battles, the military has not won the
\nAceh war. In fact, any military victory in Aceh would likely be
\nshortlived as long as the grievances of the Acehnese people, the
\nunderlying cause of their rebellion, remain unaddressed.<\/p>\n
The government's two-pronged approach could still increase the
\nchances of peace if the military option is restricted to
\nmaintaining peace and upholding law and order. Peace, after all,
\nis a vital pre-requisite to any negotiation. But if the military
\noption is expanded to include going after the GAM rebels it could
\nundermine the negotiations altogether.<\/p>\n
Now that the Iskandar Muda Command has been established, the
\nmilitary would do well to exercise restraint and not use the full
\nextent of its new found power. The military option could be used
\nto nudge GAM to abandon its armed struggle, but the government
\nshould not push its luck too far for it could become
\ncounterproductive.<\/p>\n
While they may be a long shot, the negotiations mediated by
\nthe Henry Dunant Center in Geneva still offer the best hope,
\nprobably the only hope, for breaking the current impasse in Aceh.<\/p>\n
There were signs of progress from the Geneva meeting at the
\nweekend. Besides an agreement to hold more meetings in the near
\nfuture, GAM, at least according to the Indonesian government, has
\nagreed to use the new special autonomy law for Aceh, which came
\ninto force on Jan. 1, as the basis for negotiations. If this is
\ntrue (no GAM official has confirmed or denied the claim), then it
\nmarks a significant development in the Aceh conflict.<\/p>\n
The central government in Jakarta has gone a long way in
\nappeasing the people of Aceh, offering the widest autonomy for
\nthe region, including its right to keep a larger share of
\nrevenues from local resources, such as natural gas. The
\ngovernment, particularly the military, however still owes the
\npeople of Aceh a promise to prosecute the officers responsible
\nfor the human rights abuses committed between 1989 and 1999.<\/p>\n
With a new and stronger commitment from both sides to work
\ntowards peace, and with both sides carrying out their sides of
\nthe bargain, there is no reason why negotiations cannot work.<\/p>\n
Everyone, including the government and GAM, must give the
\nGeneva talks a chance to succeed. They owe that much to the
\npeople of Aceh.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/give-negotiations-a-chance-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}