Geopolitical realignment begins in the Asia-Pacific region
Geopolitical realignment begins in the Asia-Pacific region
Derek da Cunha examines the prospects for strategic shifts in
the Asia-Pacific.
Conventional wisdom has it that strategic, rather than
economic, imperatives were probably the more instrumental in
Vietnam's recent entry into the ASEAN fold. Indeed, the
enlargement of ASEAN to seven members is, in itself, viewed as a
development laden with strategic significance, possibly heralding
the start of a geopolitical realignment in the Asia-Pacific that
will have consequences for the region well into the 21st century.
Here, as is becoming increasingly obvious, the China factor
looms large in the regional equation, and is beginning to
determine the course of events in the Asia-Pacific to a
degree unimaginable just a decade ago.
What has changed the nature of regional dynamics is not merely
China's rapid growth as a power to be reckoned with. It is also
due to the simultaneous retrenchment of Russian power and the
slippage in U.S. credibility in the Asia-Pacific. (To be fair,
the U.S. has at times been placed in an almost impossible
position: damned if it does, damned if it doesn't.)
As for Russia, not much need be said except that the much-
expected rebounding of Russian Far Eastern military power remains
elusive.
The United States, outside of the Korean peninsula, seems
directionless in the Asia-Pacific, concentrating its mind
elsewhere. Washington's response to two events in mid-August
tends to bear out the point, and provides a study in contrast.
On the one hand, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, a senior Iraqi
military officer, defects to Jordan. In response, the U.S.
musters two aircraft carrier battle groups, one in the
Mediterranean and another in the Persian Gulf, in a resolute act
of deterring the Iraqi leader from retaliating against the
Jordanians. On the other hand, the Chinese military does a bit of
calisthenics by lobbing missiles into waters close to Taiwan,
resulting in the diversion of international air traffic and
shipping, and sending a shiver through the Hong Kong and Taiwan
bourses.
In response, the Americans are unsure what to do, provoking an
editorial in the Asian Wall Street Journal (Aug. 17) to ask,
almost in exasperation, "Where's the Seventh Fleet?"
Despite the significant U.S. troop presence in Northeast Asia
and a slew of recent U.S. proposals for expanded defense ties --
including bilateral and multilateral naval exercises -- with
Asia-Pacific states, a large question mark hangs over America's
security commitment to the region. In that light, two other
regional power centers, Japan and the ASEAN states (as a
grouping), have, almost by default, been invested with a new
strategic eminence.
Japan, notwithstanding its continued languishment at the
trough of the economic cycle, is giving indications of a more
activist regional and, indeed, international role. To a large
extent, it is China's rise which is rousing Japan to tentatively
signal a possible regional counter-balancing role where the U.S.
can no longer do so on its own. That, then, sets the stage for
Sino-Japanese strategic competition -- an unappetizing prospect
for the Asia-Pacific.
It is here that ASEAN comes into the picture. Vietnam's
membership, while giving it a semblance of insurance against the
growing power just to its north, in turn yields added strategic
weight to ASEAN. With that added weight, ASEAN is in an enhanced
position to act as a moderating influence in the Asia-Pacific,
tempering Chinese and Japanese aspirations and thereby helping to
keep the geopolitical balance in equilibrium.
This is a different concept from the one recently articulated
by Philippine President Fidel Ramos, where he suggested that
Australia and New Zealand plus ASEAN could act as a moderating
force vis-a-vis all the major powers, Russia and the U.S.
included. This writer takes the view that where geographical
proximity is at a premium and perceptions no less important,
Australia and New Zealand might be construed as somewhat off the
strategic beaten track, and might find it a bit difficult to
exert a defining role in the evolving, and essentially East and
Southeast Asian, geopolitical construct. On that score,
however, perceptions might well change.
In sum, where the resolution of the Cambodian imbroglio was
ASEAN's principal cause in the 1980s, a strategic "moderating"
role could well be the grouping's chief raison d'etre in the near
future. There could be few causes more worthy than those which
serve regional peace and stability.
Dr. Derek da Cunha is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, and is Editor of Trends.