Free and Open: The Strategic Direction of Indonesia–Japan Relations

Japan’s political landscape has entered a new phase. On 9 February, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi scored a landslide victory in the general election, cementing the dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the House of Representatives. The result reinforces leadership broadly seen as conservative and security-oriented. Experts say Takaichi is inclined to emphasise the expansion of Japan’s defence capabilities, maintaining higher defence spending, advancing the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy, and deepening strategic partnerships with Southeast Asia, including Indonesia.

Moreover, Takaichi’s victory is significant for strengthening her political position, following her inauguration last year. With a strong parliamentary mandate, she may face little internal opposition, opening opportunities to push long-term strategic agendas, including in defence.

This could also speed up Japan’s defence diplomacy with its key partners. For example, Indonesia and Japan held the third 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministers’ Meeting in Tokyo in November 2025. The meeting marked increasingly intense cooperation in maritime security, equipment procurement, and strategic coordination.

It should be noted that Japan’s Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi and Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi are from the same party as PM Takaichi, indicating that the direction of strategic cooperation between Indonesia and Japan is likely to stay aligned with Takaichi’s priorities.

This development could reshape the direction of Indonesia–Japan strategic relations as both countries seek to safeguard their maritime security interests amid rising tensions in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. The meeting shows that Indonesia–Japan relations are no longer symbolic, but are increasingly focused on tangible strategic partnership. For Japan, Indonesia plays an important role in supporting Tokyo’s interests in the region, particularly FOIP.

From the 2+2 meeting and courtesy visits by Prime Minister Takaichi to Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono and Indonesian Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin on 18 November 2025, Tokyo emphasised that the new government is pursuing greater cooperation with Indonesia.

Indonesia’s status as the largest country in ASEAN and its shared identity as an archipelagic state with common maritime security interests make it an important partner for Japan in facing regional security dynamics.

Beyond political interests, Indonesia’s large market also makes it an important economic partner for Japan in Southeast Asia, especially for the Japanese automotive industry. Although not among Tokyo’s top 10 trading partners, nearly 2,000 Japanese companies operate in Indonesia and contribute around 8.5% to Indonesia’s GDP. In addition, these companies contribute almost 25% to Japan’s exports in 2023.

In 2024, Japan’s exports to Indonesia reached US$12.98 billion, making Indonesia Tokyo’s 13th largest trading partner. The majority of exports consisted of machinery (US$2.84 billion), vehicles (US$2.36 billion), iron and steel (US$1.81 billion), and electrical equipment (US$624.89 million).

The two countries have also signed the Indonesia–Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (IJ-EPA), which came into effect in 2008 and is Japan’s first bilateral trade agreement with Indonesia. The agreement can be used by Tokyo to strengthen bilateral ties with Jakarta beyond the political and defence domains.

In other words, the latest commitments by both countries to strengthen bilateral cooperation open opportunities to deepen trade ties, enabling Jakarta and Tokyo to diversify their economic partners amidst rising geopolitical competition and regional tensions.

Meanwhile, for Indonesia, the new Tokyo administration is a fresh wind to revitalise and strengthen Indonesia–Japan strategic cooperation, especially as geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific rise.

Firstly, Japan is among the few countries that has consistently expressed support for President Prabowo Subianto’s priority programmes, namely Makan Bergizi Gratis (MBG) and Indonesia’s clean energy transition.

For example, the Japanese government has provided US$3.3 million to support MBG implementation in Biak Numfor Regency, Papua. In addition, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) runs training programmes related to providing nutritious lunches to support MBG implementation in Indonesia.

Cooperation also extends to the renewable energy sector. For instance, Japan supports the construction and operation of the Muara Laboh Geothermal Power Plant in Solok Selatan, West Sumatra, which is important to help Indonesia achieve its ambition to accelerate its transition to renewable energy. These examples underscore Japan’s involvement in areas aligned with Indonesia’s long-term priorities.

Secondly, Japanese investment in Indonesia has provided opportunities to diversify funding sources for Jakarta and reduce dependence on China. Indeed, Japan has consistently ranked among the top five foreign investors in Indonesia in the last three years.