Excerpts of joint team's findings on the May riots

Excerpts of joint team's findings on the May riots

JAKARTA (JP): The following are excerpts from the final report
prepared by the joint fact-finding team (TGPF) on the May 13 to
May 15 riots in Jakarta, Solo, Surabaya, Medan and Palembang
which was released here on Tuesday evening.

1. The root cause of the May 13 to May 15 riots was the
interaction of two key processes, namely the process of struggle
on the part of the political elite in connection with the problem
of maintaining the power of the national leadership and the
process of rapid economic and monetary deterioration. Within the
struggle between the political elites there were key agents in
the field who played an important part in the riots. In
connection with this, the meeting at the Kostrad (Army's
Strategic Reserves Command) headquarters on May 14, 1998, should
be seen as competent to disclose the roles of the actors within
the struggle that led into the riots.

2. The May 13 to May 15 riots was the culmination of a series of
violent events, such as kidnappings (which in reality had been
committed as far back as 1974, in the form of intelligence
operations which could not be effectively supervised) and the
Trisakti incident. The TGPF is convinced that the Trisakti
incident was the trigger of the riot. The May 13 to May 15 riot
cannot be separated from various further by-product impacts
manifesting themselves in widespread fear among members of the
public and eroding confidence in law enforcement.

3. First-hand data and facts show that there were three patterns
to the riots.

- First, the riots were of local, sporadic, limited and
spontaneous nature. They took place within a relatively brief
period and inflicted losses and claimed victims on a relatively
small scale. The riots under this pattern occurred because,
objectively, in view of the social, economic and political
conditions then pertaining, it was impossible to prevent the
unrest from breaking out.

- Second, there was a relationship between different scenes of
the riots, with (evidence of) similar methods of operations.
Provocateurs of this type played a more prominent role that those
in the riots of the first type. They did not come from the
location where the riot broke out. Then there was the similarity
or even uniformity in the time and the order of events. As riots
of this type occurred on a major scale in several locations,
there was an indication that they occurred consecutively and
systematically. However, no indication has been found to the
effect that the riots of this type were premeditated and broke
out on a wider scale rather than simply occurring locally and
consecutively. There is a missing link in the effort to prove
that these riots occurred because of an objective situation. The
riots of this type occurred on a big scale and were found in all
locations.

- Third, there were indications that the riots occurred
deliberately. The element of deliberateness was bigger than the
objective condition then pertaining. Riots of this type were
generally similar to those of the second type, but the element of
exploitation of the situation in these riots was more obvious
than in those of the second type. In this third type, it is
assumed that the riots was created as part of a political
struggle at the level of the elite. As is the case of the riots
of the second type, in these riots there were several missing
links, namely evidence or information referring to the obvious
relationship between the elite and the masses.

4. According to first-hand findings, there were many parties
involved in the riots that were seeking personal or group
benefits. It can further be concluded that all parties involved
played at all levels. This conclusion is an affirmation that all
parties were involved, from local hoodlums and mass organizations
to groups within the Armed Forces. They gained benefits not only
from their deliberate efforts to exploit the riots but also by
means of their inaction. It is in this context that it is
concluded that the Armed Forces, that shouldered the
responsibility to prevent the riots from breaking out, did not
take sufficient action to ensure this.

5. The exact number of the lives lost nationwide cannot be
revealed because of the weakness in the monitoring system and in
the reporting procedure. More lives of common people were lost
than any other group. Most of them were burned to death. They
cannot just be blamed by stigmatizing them as looters. In the
same way, the value of material losses cannot be ascertained,
they can only be estimated.

6. On the basis of the facts found and the information from
witnesses/expert witnesses, sexual violence was committed,
including rapes, during the May 13 to May 15 riot. From a number
of cases which have been verified, it may be concluded that
sexual violence was committed against rape victims, victims of
rapes with torture, victims of sexual assaults and torture and
victims of sexual harassment. The victims were Indonesian
residents of various backgrounds, but mostly of ethnic Chinese
origin.

7. It has yet to be ascertained whether the sexual violence that
occurred was premeditated or mere excesses of the rioting. No
facts have been discovered about the aspect of religion in the
sexual violence. It is also concluded that the instruments of
positive laws are inadequate and are therefore not responsive
enough to enable all rape cases discovered or reported to be
legally processed soon.

8. These riots were able to spread because of inadequate
safeguarding measures to prevent, restrict and overcome the
perpetration of a series of acts of violence, which could have
been anticipated and which later evolved on an escalated scale.
It can be concluded that the vulnerability and weaknesses in
security operations in Jakarta particularly were closely linked
to the entire process of the political-military struggle, which
the operational commander of Greater Jakarta must be held to
account for.

Indications of security vulnerability and weaknesses in
different gradation in other cities where riots also broke out
were also linked to the political-military struggle at the
national level.

9. It is affirmed that the cause and effect of a series of
incidents of violence culminating in the outbreak of the May 13
to May 15 riots can be perceived as an effort geared toward the
creation of a situation of emergency which would require the
implementation of extra-constitutional powers in order to keep
the situation under control with the preparation toward this
having started at the level of the highest decision maker.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the above conclusions, the TGPF presents the
following policy and institutional recommendations:

1. The government must conduct further investigation into the
root causes and main perpetrators of the May 13 to May 15, 1998,
riots and then draw up and publish a white paper on the role,
responsibility and inter-relationship of all parties connected
with this unrest. The government must conduct further
investigations into the May 14, 1998, meeting at the Kostrad
headquarters to reveal and ascertain the role of Lt. Gen Prabowo
Subianto and other parties in the whole process which
precipitated the riots.

2. The government should follow up cases which may be judicially
connected with regard to the involvement of civilians and
military personnel in the fairest manner in order to uphold legal
authority, including speeding up the judicial process now going
on in the kidnapping cases and the Trisakti case. As regards the
kidnapping of activists, Lt. Gen Prabowo and all those involved
in the abductions must be brought before a military tribunal.
Further investigations must also be made to uncover the full
story surrounding the shooting of the Trisakti University
students.

3. The government should provide security guarantees to witnesses
and victims and set up a permanent agency assigned to implement a
witness protection program.

4. The government should rehabilitate and provide compensation to
all victims and their families and assist their families in
processing the victims' legal documents. The government also
should help with the reconstruction of gutted buildings,
commercial establishments and social facilities.

5. The government should immediately ratify the international
antiracial and discrimination conventions and realize their
implementation in permanent legal products, including the
implementation of the antitorture convention.

6. The government should eliminate all forms of hoodlumism
developing in all kinds of environments, layers and professions
in society pursuant to the prevailing laws.

7. The government should immediately formulate a law on state
intelligence which shall confirm the main responsibility,
functions and scope of the implementation of intelligence
operations in authorized government/state agencies so that the
interests of state security can be protected and on the other
hand human rights respected. Of no less significance will be that
intelligence operations can be effectively supervised by
supervisory institutions so that they will not turn into
instruments to pursue the political interests of certain parties.

CLOSING

The May 13 to May 15, 1998 riot was a tragedy that tarnished
the dignity and honor of human beings, the nation and the state.
The government and the community must earnestly take every step
to prevent the recurrence of further rioting like this. It is of
great urgency that the attention and solidarity of all parties
should be manifested in concrete terms to the victims and their
families so that the restoration of violated rights may be
realized together. Our honor as a civilized nation is also
determined by the extent our nation can put right its weaknesses
and shortcomings and by the speed with which we remove fear and
bring into reality peace and security for everyone without
exception.