Examining 26 Problem Points in the KPK Law Amid Discourse on Reverting to the Old Version
Seventh President of Indonesia Joko Widodo and his Vice President Ma’ruf Amin have said the KPK Law should be reverted to its old version if the new regulation has proven to weaken the anti-corruption agency’s performance.
In this regard, Jokowi agreed with the proposal by KPK Chairman for the 2011-2015 period Abraham Samad Riyanto, who said he had conveyed this to President Prabowo Subianto during a meeting on Jalan Kertanegara IV, South Jakarta, some time ago.
Jokowi said the KPK Law revision was originally a DPR initiative. He reiterated that he did not sign the law after it was passed in the DPR Plenary Session.
“Yes, I agree, that’s good,” Jokowi replied after watching a Persis Solo match against Madura United at Manahan Stadium in Solo on Friday (13/2).
Meanwhile, Ma’ruf Amin saw nothing wrong with reverting the KPK Law to its old version if many parties feel the KPK’s performance in eradicating corruption has declined.
“I think if everyone considers that the KPK currently lacks performance because of the Law, then it should be reverted,” Ma’ruf said at the Ministry of Hajj and Umrah Office in Jakarta on Saturday (14/2).
Law Number 19 of 2019 on the Second Amendment to Law Number 30 of 2002 on the KPK was enacted during the Jokowi-Ma’ruf era. At the time, the government and DPR were seen as not listening to public input, including from the KPK itself, which opposed the amendments. The KPK identified at least 26 points in the revision draft that would weaken anti-corruption efforts.
Point 1: Weakening of KPK independence by placing the KPK as a state institution under the executive branch and making KPK employees civil servants (ASN). The law’s formulation only adopted part of the Constitutional Court’s ruling, failing to recognize the KPK’s position as an entity related to judicial power and a constitutionally important institution.
Point 2: The provision stipulating that the Leadership serves as the highest authority was removed.
Point 3: The Supervisory Board holds more power than the KPK Leadership. Meanwhile, the requirements to become a KPK Leader are stricter than those for the Supervisory Board—such as holding a law degree or another degree with at least 15 years of expertise and experience in law, economics, finance, or banking.
Point 4: The Supervisory Board’s authority extends into the technical handling of cases, namely granting or denying permission for wiretapping, searches, and seizures, making these operations difficult.
Point 5: Ethical prohibition standards and anti-conflict of interest rules for the Supervisory Board are lower than those for KPK leadership and employees. Regulations potentially creating conflicts of interest exist, such as the Supervisory Board not being prohibited from meeting with suspects or other parties connected to cases handled by the KPK.
Point 6: Still regarding the Supervisory Board—for the first time, members may be selected from serving law enforcement officials with at least 15 years of experience.
Point 7: KPK Leaders are no longer investigators and public prosecutors, creating risks for pro justicia actions in enforcement operations.
Point 8: The KPK previously highlighted the eligibility issue of Nurul Ghufron, who was hindered by age requirements since the new KPK Law requires a minimum age of 50, while Ghufron was only 45 at the time. This risks rendering decisions and policies invalid.
Point 9: Reduction of investigation authority. Investigators can no longer request travel bans. This poses risks for transnational corruption cases and makes it easier for perpetrators to flee abroad during investigations.
Point 10: Wiretapping reductions. At least six stages of wiretapping are required—from Investigator, Task Force Chief, Investigation Director, Deputy for Enforcement, Leadership, to the Supervisory Board—plus a case review beforehand. Wiretapping is considered more difficult due to bureaucratic layers.
Point 11: Sting operations (OTT) become more difficult due to the more complex wiretapping applications and other regulations in the new KPK Law.
Point 12: Certain articles risk being misinterpreted as if the KPK can no longer conduct sting operations. For example, Article 6 letter a states the KPK is tasked with taking preventive actions so that corruption does not occur. Some politicians have used this to argue that when the KPK learns someone is about to receive money, it should “prevent” and notify the official not to accept the bribe.
Point 13: Risk of criminalization of KPK employees related to wiretapping due to unclear regulations, such as provisions on destroying wiretap records unrelated to cases.
Point 14: The risk of civil servant investigators being placed under the coordination and supervision of Police investigators, while simultaneously the law positions the KPK as the agency coordinating and supervising Police and Prosecutors in handling corruption cases.
Points 15 and 16: Regarding prosecution authority—in carrying out prosecutions, the KPK must coordinate with “related parties.” It is unclear who these related parties are.
Point 17: KPK employees are vulnerable to control and lack independence in carrying out their duties due to their ASN status.
Point 18: Investigation Termination Orders (SP3). The two-year time limit is considered to complicate case handling.
Point 20: The amendment of Article 46 paragraph (2) of the KPK Law, which previously served as the basis for special provisions exempting the KPK from special procedures that had hindered law enforcement in processing state officials—such as requiring permits to examine certain officials. The new Article 46 appears to eliminate the lex specialis nature of the KPK Law, even though corruption is an extraordinary crime that should be confronted with extraordinary measures and authority.
Point 21: A conflict of norms. Article 69D states that before the Supervisory Board is formed, KPK duties and authority shall be carried out based on provisions prior to the amendment. Meanwhile, Article II stipulates the law takes effect on the date of its promulgation.
Point 22: The fate of the KPK Advisory Board—whether advisors become Supervisory Board members or immediately cease their roles when the KPK Law is promulgated. There is no clarity.
Point 23: Another crucial point is the loss of authority to handle cases that disturb the public.
Point 24: The KPK is only based in the national capital. The KPK no longer has the prospect of being strengthened or having regional representatives.
Point 25: There is no strengthening of the prevention aspect. The longstanding obstacle of KPK recommendations not being followed up on is also not addressed by the revision.
Point 26: The KPK’s supervisory authority is reduced—the article governing the KPK’s authority to conduct oversight, research, or review of agencies carrying out duties and authority over institutions providing public services no longer exists.