Equal treatment for E. Timor

Equal treatment for E. Timor

By Hadi Soesastro

JAKARTA (JP): Jakarta's view of East Timor's economic
development is a subject of debate because it is believed to
differ markedly from the perspective of the East Timorese.

It is inevitable that the view from Jakarta differs from the
local viewpoint, be it East Timor, Bengkulu or Central
Kalimantan. This problem is shared by all Indonesian provinces,
especially those which are geographically distant from Jakarta.
But this is also a problem for Jakarta itself.

The problem is perhaps most seriously felt in East Timor,
because of the geographical distance and also the historical,
cultural and psychological distance from Jakarta. Most certainly
because of the circumstances under which the province was
integrated into Indonesia.

Seen from Jakarta, the "East Timor Problem" poses a major
dilemma. There is the basic fear that if the youngest province is
treated much differently from the rest it will become much
different from the rest. But then, how can "equal treatment" be
applied to a province which doesn't share the nation's history
and is economically so far behind the other provinces?

Since 1988, Jakarta's policy on economic development in East
Timor has been based on equal treatment with the rest of the
country. This is distinct from the kind of "special treatment" it
was accorded during the 12 years following its integration. This
special treatment was manifested in the establishment of an Inter
Ministerial Coordinating Secretariat for East Timor Affairs
(TPP). Its task was to plan and oversee East Timor's economic
development. The operational management of this province's
development was carried out by the Central Team for Development
Implementation, under the coordination of the Secretary General
of the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Regional Team for
Development Implementation (TPD).

The financing of East Timor's development by the central
government was undertaken through "budget item 16" in the budget
of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The termination of this special
treatment means the discontinuation of the coordinating
secretariat and the dissolution of both the TPP and the TPD. The
central government's development projects are now financed
through the sectorial budget of the many technical government
ministries. The allocation of these development resources is by
and large decided in Jakarta. This practice reflects the highly
centralized nature of Indonesia's development planning and
implementation and has created a lot of resentment in the
regions. This practice, however, was justified on the basis of
the need to re-allocate resources among the 27 provinces to
guarantee the transfer of resources to poorer provinces.
Bappenas, the national planning board, has now introduced a
scheme called sarlita (five-year goals) to attempt to match the
sectorial projects with regional needs and aspirations.

Initially the special treatment accorded East Timor was
justified on the belief that economic development was the key to
solving the East Timor Problem. In other words, economic
development was seen as the principal instrument for integrating
East Timor into Indonesia, economically as well as politically.

There may have been various reasons for the discontinuation
of the special treatment in 1988. One argument is that such
special treatment only attest to the central government's
inability to solve the East Timor Problem. The "logical" argument
is that the East Timor Problem is essentially a political problem
and thus, should be solved politically.

Economic development should not -- and perhaps cannot -- be
seen as an instrument to obtain a number of objectives. Joao
Mariano de Sousa Saldanha (1994) has observed that economic
development failed to win the hearts of the East Timorese people.
While economic development may not produce an economic solution
that would lead to a political solution, economic development is
desirable in itself. However, Saldanha (1994) has argued for the
need to design a new economic development strategy. As
implemented today, economic development is seen to aggravate the
problem further; it has become part of the problem rather than
part of the solution.

He proposed a new economic development strategy as part of a
package of policies which includes political negotiations with
Portugal and the granting of greater autonomy (or a "special
status") to the province. It is unlikely that a political
solution can be found soon, and perhaps the central government is
ready to consider the issue of greater autonomy only as a "last
resort". If so, economic development becomes even more important
for East Timor. It is not sufficient -- but definitely necessary
-- to solve the East Timor Problem, or at least prevent the
problem from getting out of hand.

The withdrawal of the special treatment in 1988 does not
appear to have had an adverse effect on East Timor's economic
growth performance.

The political economic issue of East Timor's development center
on the question of whether the decision to withdraw the "special
treatment" and adopt an "equal treatment" approach should be
reversed and introduce a new kind of special treatment.

Various ideas have been proposed in the past few years and they
have been reviewed by Saldanha (1994), Saldanha himself has outlined
the elements of a new kind of special treatment or special status
for East Timor. He acknowledged that the acceptability of his
proposal by the central government might be a function of
intensive consultations and discussions and, of course, a
function of time. The increased calls for greater "autonomy"
appear to have taken the central government by surprise. It is
important that any proposed formula be precisely defined. In his
call for greater autonomy, Governor Abilio Jose Osorio Soares
argued that centralistic policies would make it impossible to
eradicate poverty in East Timor and other eastern regions (The
Jakarta Post, Nov. 22, 1993,) However, it is too simplistic to
expect that autonomy would automatically save the problem.

At a recent hearing in the House of Representatives, Foreign
Minister Ali Alatas stated that East Timor already enjoys more
privileges than other provinces and argued that East Timor has
autonomy in the substantive sense of the word but demands seem to
have focused on "the non-essential, such as the status of special
territory." (The Jakarta Post, Sept. 16, 1994). President
Soeharto has also reacted to those calls and has annunciated the
government's policy of not granting special autonomy to East
Timor, meaning a kind of autonomy which is different from the
autonomy enjoyed by other provinces (Suara Pembaruan, Nov. 18,
1994).

In designing a new special treatment for East Timor, it
appears highly inappropriate to make reference to the special
regions of Yogyakarta and Aceh, both politically and
substantively. Politically because such a status was granted 50
years ago under a particular historical context. Substantively,
because the special status given to this region has no real
meaning.

A more appropriate reference would be Batam and its
Development Authority. Lessons could also be drawn from Batam's
experience on what not to do. One needs to realize that the
management of Batam is faced with many bureaucratic and
administrative problems, at the policy level and the
implementation level. However, the idea of a Development
Authority for East Timor, making use of the precedence created by
Batam, should be explored seriously.

The "special treatment of the second kind" for East Timor can
be built on the idea of a Development Authority involving the
Office of the Governor and the Regional Planning Agency (Bappeda)
in a policy and administrative role, to a special division within
the National Planning Board (Bappenas). The delivery system
should be based on the local government apparatus, assisted by
experts from the technical departments in their capacity as
"hired consultants", and in cooperation with development-oriented
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) -- both national and
foreign. This more modest proposal may have a greater chance of
being accepted by the powers in Jakarta.

The writer is Executive Director of the Jakarta-based Centre
for Strategic and International Studies.

Window A: The idea of a development Authority for East Timor,
making use of the precedence created by Batam, should be explored
seriously.

Window B: The withdrawal of the special treatment in 1988 does not
appear to have had an adverse effect on East Timor's economic
growth performance.