Equal treatment for E. Timor
Equal treatment for E. Timor
By Hadi Soesastro
JAKARTA (JP): Jakarta's view of East Timor's economic development is a subject of debate because it is believed to differ markedly from the perspective of the East Timorese.
It is inevitable that the view from Jakarta differs from the local viewpoint, be it East Timor, Bengkulu or Central Kalimantan. This problem is shared by all Indonesian provinces, especially those which are geographically distant from Jakarta. But this is also a problem for Jakarta itself.
The problem is perhaps most seriously felt in East Timor, because of the geographical distance and also the historical, cultural and psychological distance from Jakarta. Most certainly because of the circumstances under which the province was integrated into Indonesia.
Seen from Jakarta, the "East Timor Problem" poses a major dilemma. There is the basic fear that if the youngest province is treated much differently from the rest it will become much different from the rest. But then, how can "equal treatment" be applied to a province which doesn't share the nation's history and is economically so far behind the other provinces?
Since 1988, Jakarta's policy on economic development in East Timor has been based on equal treatment with the rest of the country. This is distinct from the kind of "special treatment" it was accorded during the 12 years following its integration. This special treatment was manifested in the establishment of an Inter Ministerial Coordinating Secretariat for East Timor Affairs (TPP). Its task was to plan and oversee East Timor's economic development. The operational management of this province's development was carried out by the Central Team for Development Implementation, under the coordination of the Secretary General of the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Regional Team for Development Implementation (TPD).
The financing of East Timor's development by the central government was undertaken through "budget item 16" in the budget of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The termination of this special treatment means the discontinuation of the coordinating secretariat and the dissolution of both the TPP and the TPD. The central government's development projects are now financed through the sectorial budget of the many technical government ministries. The allocation of these development resources is by and large decided in Jakarta. This practice reflects the highly centralized nature of Indonesia's development planning and implementation and has created a lot of resentment in the regions. This practice, however, was justified on the basis of the need to re-allocate resources among the 27 provinces to guarantee the transfer of resources to poorer provinces. Bappenas, the national planning board, has now introduced a scheme called sarlita (five-year goals) to attempt to match the sectorial projects with regional needs and aspirations.
Initially the special treatment accorded East Timor was justified on the belief that economic development was the key to solving the East Timor Problem. In other words, economic development was seen as the principal instrument for integrating East Timor into Indonesia, economically as well as politically.
There may have been various reasons for the discontinuation of the special treatment in 1988. One argument is that such special treatment only attest to the central government's inability to solve the East Timor Problem. The "logical" argument is that the East Timor Problem is essentially a political problem and thus, should be solved politically.
Economic development should not -- and perhaps cannot -- be seen as an instrument to obtain a number of objectives. Joao Mariano de Sousa Saldanha (1994) has observed that economic development failed to win the hearts of the East Timorese people. While economic development may not produce an economic solution that would lead to a political solution, economic development is desirable in itself. However, Saldanha (1994) has argued for the need to design a new economic development strategy. As implemented today, economic development is seen to aggravate the problem further; it has become part of the problem rather than part of the solution.
He proposed a new economic development strategy as part of a package of policies which includes political negotiations with Portugal and the granting of greater autonomy (or a "special status") to the province. It is unlikely that a political solution can be found soon, and perhaps the central government is ready to consider the issue of greater autonomy only as a "last resort". If so, economic development becomes even more important for East Timor. It is not sufficient -- but definitely necessary -- to solve the East Timor Problem, or at least prevent the problem from getting out of hand.
The withdrawal of the special treatment in 1988 does not appear to have had an adverse effect on East Timor's economic growth performance.
The political economic issue of East Timor's development center on the question of whether the decision to withdraw the "special treatment" and adopt an "equal treatment" approach should be reversed and introduce a new kind of special treatment.
Various ideas have been proposed in the past few years and they have been reviewed by Saldanha (1994), Saldanha himself has outlined the elements of a new kind of special treatment or special status for East Timor. He acknowledged that the acceptability of his proposal by the central government might be a function of intensive consultations and discussions and, of course, a function of time. The increased calls for greater "autonomy" appear to have taken the central government by surprise. It is important that any proposed formula be precisely defined. In his call for greater autonomy, Governor Abilio Jose Osorio Soares argued that centralistic policies would make it impossible to eradicate poverty in East Timor and other eastern regions (The Jakarta Post, Nov. 22, 1993,) However, it is too simplistic to expect that autonomy would automatically save the problem.
At a recent hearing in the House of Representatives, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas stated that East Timor already enjoys more privileges than other provinces and argued that East Timor has autonomy in the substantive sense of the word but demands seem to have focused on "the non-essential, such as the status of special territory." (The Jakarta Post, Sept. 16, 1994). President Soeharto has also reacted to those calls and has annunciated the government's policy of not granting special autonomy to East Timor, meaning a kind of autonomy which is different from the autonomy enjoyed by other provinces (Suara Pembaruan, Nov. 18, 1994).
In designing a new special treatment for East Timor, it appears highly inappropriate to make reference to the special regions of Yogyakarta and Aceh, both politically and substantively. Politically because such a status was granted 50 years ago under a particular historical context. Substantively, because the special status given to this region has no real meaning.
A more appropriate reference would be Batam and its Development Authority. Lessons could also be drawn from Batam's experience on what not to do. One needs to realize that the management of Batam is faced with many bureaucratic and administrative problems, at the policy level and the implementation level. However, the idea of a Development Authority for East Timor, making use of the precedence created by Batam, should be explored seriously.
The "special treatment of the second kind" for East Timor can be built on the idea of a Development Authority involving the Office of the Governor and the Regional Planning Agency (Bappeda) in a policy and administrative role, to a special division within the National Planning Board (Bappenas). The delivery system should be based on the local government apparatus, assisted by experts from the technical departments in their capacity as "hired consultants", and in cooperation with development-oriented non-governmental organizations (NGOs) -- both national and foreign. This more modest proposal may have a greater chance of being accepted by the powers in Jakarta.
The writer is Executive Director of the Jakarta-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
Window A: The idea of a development Authority for East Timor, making use of the precedence created by Batam, should be explored seriously.
Window B: The withdrawal of the special treatment in 1988 does not appear to have had an adverse effect on East Timor's economic growth performance.