Equal treatment for E. Timor<\/p>\n
By Hadi Soesastro<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Jakarta's view of East Timor's economic
\ndevelopment is a subject of debate because it is believed to
\ndiffer markedly from the perspective of the East Timorese.<\/p>\n
It is inevitable that the view from Jakarta differs from the
\nlocal viewpoint, be it East Timor, Bengkulu or Central
\nKalimantan. This problem is shared by all Indonesian provinces,
\nespecially those which are geographically distant from Jakarta.
\nBut this is also a problem for Jakarta itself.<\/p>\n
The problem is perhaps most seriously felt in East Timor,
\nbecause of the geographical distance and also the historical,
\ncultural and psychological distance from Jakarta. Most certainly
\nbecause of the circumstances under which the province was
\nintegrated into Indonesia.<\/p>\n
Seen from Jakarta, the \"East Timor Problem\" poses a major
\ndilemma. There is the basic fear that if the youngest province is
\ntreated much differently from the rest it will become much
\ndifferent from the rest. But then, how can \"equal treatment\" be
\napplied to a province which doesn't share the nation's history
\nand is economically so far behind the other provinces?<\/p>\n
Since 1988, Jakarta's policy on economic development in East
\nTimor has been based on equal treatment with the rest of the
\ncountry. This is distinct from the kind of \"special treatment\" it
\nwas accorded during the 12 years following its integration. This
\nspecial treatment was manifested in the establishment of an Inter
\nMinisterial Coordinating Secretariat for East Timor Affairs
\n(TPP). Its task was to plan and oversee East Timor's economic
\ndevelopment. The operational management of this province's
\ndevelopment was carried out by the Central Team for Development
\nImplementation, under the coordination of the Secretary General
\nof the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Regional Team for
\nDevelopment Implementation (TPD).<\/p>\n
The financing of East Timor's development by the central
\ngovernment was undertaken through \"budget item 16\" in the budget
\nof the Ministry of Home Affairs. The termination of this special
\ntreatment means the discontinuation of the coordinating
\nsecretariat and the dissolution of both the TPP and the TPD. The
\ncentral government's development projects are now financed
\nthrough the sectorial budget of the many technical government
\nministries. The allocation of these development resources is by
\nand large decided in Jakarta. This practice reflects the highly
\ncentralized nature of Indonesia's development planning and
\nimplementation and has created a lot of resentment in the
\nregions. This practice, however, was justified on the basis of
\nthe need to re-allocate resources among the 27 provinces to
\nguarantee the transfer of resources to poorer provinces.
\nBappenas, the national planning board, has now introduced a
\nscheme called sarlita (five-year goals) to attempt to match the
\nsectorial projects with regional needs and aspirations.<\/p>\n
Initially the special treatment accorded East Timor was
\njustified on the belief that economic development was the key to
\nsolving the East Timor Problem. In other words, economic
\ndevelopment was seen as the principal instrument for integrating
\nEast Timor into Indonesia, economically as well as politically.<\/p>\n
There may have been various reasons for the discontinuation
\nof the special treatment in 1988. One argument is that such
\nspecial treatment only attest to the central government's
\ninability to solve the East Timor Problem. The \"logical\" argument
\nis that the East Timor Problem is essentially a political problem
\nand thus, should be solved politically.<\/p>\n
Economic development should not -- and perhaps cannot -- be
\nseen as an instrument to obtain a number of objectives. Joao
\nMariano de Sousa Saldanha (1994) has observed that economic
\ndevelopment failed to win the hearts of the East Timorese people.
\nWhile economic development may not produce an economic solution
\nthat would lead to a political solution, economic development is
\ndesirable in itself. However, Saldanha (1994) has argued for the
\nneed to design a new economic development strategy. As
\nimplemented today, economic development is seen to aggravate the
\nproblem further; it has become part of the problem rather than
\npart of the solution.<\/p>\n
He proposed a new economic development strategy as part of a
\npackage of policies which includes political negotiations with
\nPortugal and the granting of greater autonomy (or a \"special
\nstatus\") to the province. It is unlikely that a political
\nsolution can be found soon, and perhaps the central government is
\nready to consider the issue of greater autonomy only as a \"last
\nresort\". If so, economic development becomes even more important
\nfor East Timor. It is not sufficient -- but definitely necessary
\n-- to solve the East Timor Problem, or at least prevent the
\nproblem from getting out of hand.<\/p>\n
The withdrawal of the special treatment in 1988 does not
\nappear to have had an adverse effect on East Timor's economic
\ngrowth performance.<\/p>\n
The political economic issue of East Timor's development center
\non the question of whether the decision to withdraw the \"special
\ntreatment\" and adopt an \"equal treatment\" approach should be
\nreversed and introduce a new kind of special treatment.<\/p>\n
Various ideas have been proposed in the past few years and they
\nhave been reviewed by Saldanha (1994), Saldanha himself has outlined
\nthe elements of a new kind of special treatment or special status
\nfor East Timor. He acknowledged that the acceptability of his
\nproposal by the central government might be a function of
\nintensive consultations and discussions and, of course, a
\nfunction of time. The increased calls for greater \"autonomy\"
\nappear to have taken the central government by surprise. It is
\nimportant that any proposed formula be precisely defined. In his
\ncall for greater autonomy, Governor Abilio Jose Osorio Soares
\nargued that centralistic policies would make it impossible to
\neradicate poverty in East Timor and other eastern regions (The
\nJakarta Post, Nov. 22, 1993,) However, it is too simplistic to
\nexpect that autonomy would automatically save the problem.<\/p>\n
At a recent hearing in the House of Representatives, Foreign
\nMinister Ali Alatas stated that East Timor already enjoys more
\nprivileges than other provinces and argued that East Timor has
\nautonomy in the substantive sense of the word but demands seem to
\nhave focused on \"the non-essential, such as the status of special
\nterritory.\" (The Jakarta Post, Sept. 16, 1994). President
\nSoeharto has also reacted to those calls and has annunciated the
\ngovernment's policy of not granting special autonomy to East
\nTimor, meaning a kind of autonomy which is different from the
\nautonomy enjoyed by other provinces (Suara Pembaruan, Nov. 18,
\n1994).<\/p>\n
In designing a new special treatment for East Timor, it
\nappears highly inappropriate to make reference to the special
\nregions of Yogyakarta and Aceh, both politically and
\nsubstantively. Politically because such a status was granted 50
\nyears ago under a particular historical context. Substantively,
\nbecause the special status given to this region has no real
\nmeaning.<\/p>\n
A more appropriate reference would be Batam and its
\nDevelopment Authority. Lessons could also be drawn from Batam's
\nexperience on what not to do. One needs to realize that the
\nmanagement of Batam is faced with many bureaucratic and
\nadministrative problems, at the policy level and the
\nimplementation level. However, the idea of a Development
\nAuthority for East Timor, making use of the precedence created by
\nBatam, should be explored seriously.<\/p>\n
The \"special treatment of the second kind\" for East Timor can
\nbe built on the idea of a Development Authority involving the
\nOffice of the Governor and the Regional Planning Agency (Bappeda)
\nin a policy and administrative role, to a special division within
\nthe National Planning Board (Bappenas). The delivery system
\nshould be based on the local government apparatus, assisted by
\nexperts from the technical departments in their capacity as
\n\"hired consultants\", and in cooperation with development-oriented
\nnon-governmental organizations (NGOs) -- both national and
\nforeign. This more modest proposal may have a greater chance of
\nbeing accepted by the powers in Jakarta.<\/p>\n
The writer is Executive Director of the Jakarta-based Centre
\nfor Strategic and International Studies.<\/p>\n
Window A: The idea of a development Authority for East Timor,
\nmaking use of the precedence created by Batam, should be explored
\nseriously.<\/p>\n
Window B: The withdrawal of the special treatment in 1988 does not
\nappear to have had an adverse effect on East Timor's economic
\ngrowth performance.<\/p>",
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