Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Inspectorate General's Core Functions for Corruption Prevention
If the function of the Inspectorate General (Itjen) as an internal supervisory instrument to prevent corruption is no longer effective in carrying out its core duties and functions (Tupoksi), the culture and practices of corruption will continue to grow and persist.
Enforcement actions or hand-catching operations (OTT) against alleged corruptors only indicate that corruption practices are still occurring across various levels of state and regional bureaucracy due to weak or minimal prevention.
The public is continually presented with facts about OTT results up to the most recent months, even as commitments and real actions to combat corruption have been underway for decades. When nearly all communities agree that corruption is increasingly rampant lately, it is a cry of concern over the minimal progress in eradicating corruption.
However, all such enforcement actions or OTT results remain worthy of appreciation. Because mere concern does not solve the problem.
The urgency of corruption prevention is not a new theme. As one of the most important aspects, preventing corruption has frequently been a topic of discussion and deliberation from the past until now. In essence, steps and strategies for preventing corruption begin from within the organisation or institution itself. Every individual as a member of the work unit is demanded to always prioritise good intentions in their service.
For that reason, organisations or institutions continue to conduct supervision to prevent errors by individuals or work groups.
Instruments for supervision and corruption prevention already exist in all ministries and agencies (K/L) up to regional governments (Pemda). That instrument is the Itjen. Not a new sub-agency, the Itjen consists of government internal supervisory apparatus (APIP) at the K/L and Pemda levels.
According to its Tupoksi, the Itjen carries out internal supervision; from audits, reviews, evaluations, and monitoring to ensure the accountability of performance, finances, and governance of the agency so that it is clean and effective. In 2024, the Tupoksi of APIP was strengthened by a joint circular from the Minister of Home Affairs, KPK, and BPKP Number 11 of 2024 on Strengthening APIP in K/L-Pemda. The focus of this strengthening is on enhancing capabilities.
In the context of preventing corruption in K/L-Pemda, all hope that the effectiveness of the Itjen’s Tupoksi with its APIP continues to be improved, strengthened, and its independence maintained. Conversely, the Itjen and APIP in all K/L-Pemda must not be passive or idle when faced with facts of increasingly rampant corruption over the last decade.
According to the 2024 Integrity Assessment Survey (SPI) published by the KPK, it was found that tendencies of corruption practices, bribery, and gratuities occur in more than 90 percent of K/L and Pemda.
Based on those SPI findings, it is reasonable that questions arise about the performance of Itjen-APIP in all K/L-Pemda. Naturally, the questions will focus on the competence, credibility, and capability of APIP in preventing corruption, bribery, and gratuities in each K/L-Pemda.
In that context, it becomes relevant to confront those questions about Itjen-APIP performance with Indonesia’s Corruption Perceptions Index (IPK). According to Transparency International, Indonesia’s IPK as of 2025 is ranked 109 out of 180 countries. That ranking explains the declining effectiveness of corruption prevention and eradication efforts.
As an indicator, Indonesia’s IPK ranking aligns with public perceptions of increasingly rampant corruption in the country in recent years.
As one of the 1998 Reform agendas, the spirit to prevent and eradicate corruption must not fade. Strategies for prevention and eradication of corruption must continue to be strengthened over time. There must be courage and willingness to conduct studies on strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats or SWOT. Continuous SWOT is very necessary because corruption methods continue to evolve. In that context, inter-institutional cooperation becomes a necessity.
Because, with the scale of Indonesia’s central-regional government organisation, prevention and eradication of corruption is indeed impossible to rely solely on the KPK.
Prevention and eradication of corruption can be realised if there is sincerity in building synergy among institutions. That is why the effectiveness of the Itjen-APIP Tupoksi in all K/L-Pemda becomes very important.
In addition to enhancing the effectiveness of corruption prevention internally in each K/L-Pemda, no less important is formulating maximum deterrent effects to make anyone afraid to commit corruption. The deterrent effect from prison sanctions so far appears very minimal. Because, besides being increasingly rampant, current corruption practices are often carried out openly and without shame.
Like the aspect of corruption prevention, the spirit and desire to foster deterrent effects for committing corruption have been frequently discussed since long ago. In many discussion forums, various ideas have been put forward. From the most maximal and extreme legal sanctions to ideas for confiscating corruptors’ assets that continue to be discussed and attract attention from many communities lately.
Since the establishment and operation of the KPK in 2002, corruption cases handled to date approach 1,900 cases, with around 1,600 suspects. Preliminary records indicate that the number of OTTs conducted by the KPK is around 170 times. The KPK’s first OTT was carried out on 8 April 2005, capturing a KPU member and a BPK auditor in a bribery case for the procurement of ballot boxes for the 2004 General Elections.
Profiles of suspects from all those OTTs are always publicised. Of course, that publication fosters shame for the families and relatives of the suspects. However, it has been proven that shame and actual prison sentences fail to create a deterrent effect for committing corruption.
There has emerged an impression that corruption eradication in Indonesia so far has been too focused on enforcement, while conversely paying minimal attention to prevention aspects and formulating sanctions that can foster deterrent effects. Another impression is that the enforcement knife has not yet been directed in all directions.
Facts and tendencies certainly