East Timor after independence

Paulo Gorjco, Lusmada University, Portugal, paulogorjao@yahoo.com

After more than two years and six months, the legacy of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) is still marred by several structural problems.

First, East Timor became independent while conflicting claims on land and property ownership remained unresolved. By itself, this was already a significant underachievement. Yet without clear land and property rules, foreign investment could not flow to the territory. This reality was recognized by the UNTAET administrator himself, Sergio Vieira de Mello.

Second, UNTAET wasted much time in its dealing with the future of the National Liberation Armed Forces of East Timor (Falintil), another problem it acknowledged.

Moreover, when UNTAET was compelled to act due to the threat of mutiny among Falintil's ranks, the integration of its former members into the new East Timorese Defense Forces (FDTL) was left to personal loyalties, instead of clear and transparent criteria.

Third, UNTAET was incapable to establish and maintain a functioning justice system. Indeed, it is a miracle that there were a few convictions for crimes committed during 1999. At the same time, intra-East Timorese reconciliation did not occur, while refugees in East Nusa Tenggara returned to the territory at snails' pace. The idea of amnesty towards perpetrators of violence has been always in the air, but without clarity.

Fourth, the "Timorization", i.e. the incorporation of the local population at all levels of the public administration, only progressed under pressure from the East Timorese. It was only later on that the international "experts" working for UNTAET started to teach local citizens how to do what they were doing.

Fifth, UNTAET left East Timor with a Constitution drafted according to Fretilin's wishes and with a parliament controlled entirely by the Fretilin (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor). Again, this was short-sighted.

UNTAET could have chosen to select several East Timorese representatives from different parties, religious groups, non government organizations and minority groups. Then, with UNTAET support, they would draft an inclusive and widely representative Constitution, which would certainly have more political legitimacy than the current one.

The interim Assembly elected in August 2001 should not have been allowed to automatically become the new parliament. Fresh elections should have been scheduled in the near future.

Various East Timorese also cite the above examples, though they are also partially responsible for shortcomings.

None of the above problems have been resolved in the past six months.

Uncertainty continues to face former Falintil members. They are at least two veterans' associations, which reveal different loyalties within the East Timorese political system. The justice system is seriously understaffed and almost paralyzed, while the established Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation is taking too long to start functioning.

Moreover, the amnesty law to be approved by the parliament continues under careful and long study.

There are several explanations for the apparent executive and legislative paralysis that took place in the last six months. The lack of a competent bureaucracy is one of them.

Also, in the same way that the National Council did not suggest or prepare any legislative draft regulation to submit to the UN Transitional Administrator, a similar process is occurring with the new parliament vis-a-vis the government.

When the members of the parliament are not absent -- which many of them repeatedly are without any justification -- they spend most of their time dealing with minor details which do not result in any substantive legislative outcome. Indeed, they have not come forward with any relevant legislation in the last six months, despite Fretilin's clear majority.

In turn, this fact is related with the third reason why democratic governance has been so poor thus far. The East Timorese have no prior democratic experience and the last six months have been a learning experience in every way. The presidency, the government, and the parliament are still looking for the right balance of power among them.

Institution-building is probably the greatest challenge that East Timor will experience in the forthcoming years. Like elsewhere, institution-building is always a protracted process, with many pitfalls in its path.

In the last six months, the East Timorese had a first taste of how hard the exercise of self-ruling can be. The results have not been brilliant. For the sake of democratic legitimacy in East Timor, we can only look forward to see a more performing political system in the forthcoming months.

The writer is also a Visiting Fellow at the Australian Defense Studies Center.