East Asia and bumpy Sino-Taiwanese relations

East Asia and bumpy Sino-Taiwanese relations

Jusuf Wanandi, Jakarta

Not since 1958, when the U.S. Seventh Fleet intervened to
prevent China from taking over the islands of Kinmen and Matsu,
located off Fujian province, have relations between China and
Taiwan been so dangerously close to war. This may not be obvious
to the region or the world at large because it is taken for
granted that China will not attack Taiwan except if it explicitly
and blatantly declares its independence.

This assumption is based on the importance China places on her
modernization and development programs. A military conflict would
cause long-term damage for her. In addition, Taiwan's huge
investment in China and intense people-to-people relations make
the Taiwan economy highly dependent on China. This is to China's
long-term advantage.

However, this is a dependency that Chen Sui Bian is loathe to
permit. What Chen is trying to achieve is a step-by-step
"salami"-style independence achieved through "democratic" means.
That will be either achieved through a constitutional amendment
produced by the Constituent Assembly or directly by the people
through a referendum.

To be able to avail of one of these two ways, he hopes to get
a majority in the December 2004 parliamentary elections through
which he can legislate for a referendum in 2006. He also hopes to
gain a majority in the mid-2005 elections for the Constituent
Assembly through which he could amend the constitution at will.
He believes that if everything proceeds democratically, the U.S.
cannot oppose this.

In addition, he believes that China is a "toothless tiger"
that is not going to attack Taiwan because of the realization
that the U.S. will defend Taiwan. Therefore, he is preparing
seriously for a referendum in 2006, and to have a new
constitution in place in 2008.

Chen is very confident that he can get away with this
strategy, especially after he has committed the country to buying
US$18 billion worth of advanced weaponry over the next five
years, and agreed on joint training and exercises with U.S.
troops, including as regards control and command so as to ensure
the inter-operability of U.S. and Taiwanese forces.

These developments in Taiwan and Chen's strategy are
completely anathema to China. China consistently rejects every
move that is seen as another step towards independence. Chinese
leaders are struggling to maintain the status quo as much as
possible.

They understand that Deng Xiaoping's paradigm of one country
and two systems is no longer possible. They have urged the
acceptance of one China in the future consisting of both sides of
the Straits as a precondition for talks and negotiations, direct
contact and relations, as well as CBM (confidence-building
measures) at the military level.

This has been rejected by Chen, who is also unwilling to
promise not to declare independence even if China does not use
military force against Taiwan.

For China's fourth generation leadership, which has just come
to power, there is no possibility of compromise on Taiwan's
independence efforts, be they blatant or step by step. They are
going to be rejected by the Chinese people if they lose Taiwan.

That is why they are prepared to accept a setback in their
modernization and development program of one decade or more if in
the end an armed resolution is necessary to prevent Taiwan's
independence. And if due to this they could not prevent a
conflict with the U.S., they appear willing to take the necessary
risk. I personally believe that this assessment is not excessive
or overblown.

The danger is real. The most worrying factor is the lack of
direct contact between the two parties at the official level, not
even informally or at the lower levels. That is why the East Asia
region and the world have to be concerned about this potentially
dangerous, complex and emotional divide across the Straits.

ASEAN, and the ASEAN+3, should give political support for a
peaceful resolution of the conflict. It is important that the
region reiterates its support for China's One China Policy, which
all have recognized and accepted.

They could do this through diplomatic statements of support as
has been done by ASEAN's foreign ministers in Qingdao on June 21,
or through personal contacts with Taiwanese figures that have a
role and influence in Taiwan. To be able to do that effectively,
Taiwanese scholars and academics, as well as business and civil
society leaders, have to be given some space and flexibility by
China to meet with their East Asian counterparts.

ASEAN and ASEAN+3 could help and assist in ensuring a peaceful
resolution to the conflict that otherwise will engulf the whole
region and mean a dramatic setback to East Asia's achievements
and its future development. But China also has to regularly
provide information on and, to a certain extent, discuss
developments across the Straits and her policies toward them.
With such strong support for the One-China Policy, Chen's moves
internally would have a very limited impact regionally.

The U.S. should pay greater attention to this potential
conflict because she could be dragged into it. Her prevailing
policy of "strategic ambiguity" in preventing both sides from
stepping over the red line might become irrelevant.

A more pro-active U.S., nudging both sides toward contacts,
talks and negotiation, might be more appropriate in the near
future. And since the U.S., as the only superpower and arbiter in
the East Asian region, has a special position and involvement in
the conflict, she could certainly do more to maintain peace and
stability in the region.

The writer is a co-founder and member of the Board of Trustees
of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).