Drama of RI's economic crisis
Drama of RI's economic crisis
By Mar'ie Muhammad
The following is an excerpt from a paper presented by former
finance minister Mar'ie Muhammad at the Asia Research Center,
Murdoch University, in Perth, Western Australia, on Aug. 20. This
is the first of two articles.
PERTH, Australia: The Soeharto administration, founded in 1966
in the ruins of political and economic disorder, adopted at the
outset an economic policy that was more pragmatic, more market-
friendly and employed a more technocratic approach.
Unfortunately, subsequent economic policies and implementation
became distorted due to practices of nepotism and cronyism. Such
practices were becoming even more pronounced when the political
system became materially less democratic and, in this respect,
was not very different from the era of the previous president
Sukarno.
There are various types and forms of crises. They can take the
form of a currency crisis, such as that experienced within the
exchange rate mechanism of Western European countries in 1992 and
1993. Or they can take the shape of a banking crisis, which can
also frequently ignite a currency crisis, such as the one which
occurred in Argentina and Chile in 1981 and 1982. The crisis in
Southeast Asian countries is, in fact, a combination of banking,
currency and debt crises, similar to what occurred in Mexico in
1994 and 1995.
In reality, the crisis in Southeast Asia is not only deeper
than previously anticipated, but it also continues at this time.
There is no single agency, including the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), that knows or can predict with any degree of
certainty just when it will come to an end. Nor is the crisis
confined to Southeast Asia; it has even engulfed South Korea, a
member state of the Organization for Economic and Cultural
Development (OECD). The Japanese economy is also in a state of
crisis, one which is essentially an internal problem rooted in a
singularly troubled financial sector.
Were there no warning signals pointing to the possibility of
such a multidimensional crisis, transforming into a terrifying
earthquake with the force to demolish the highest mountains
previously considered capable of withstanding major shocks?
Although warning signals emerged, the governments, business
communities and general publics of the Southeast and East Asian
countries had not only fallen into the trap of satisfaction, but
had also become overconfident about the strength of their
economies as measured by fundamentals alone, the reality of which
subsequently boomeranged on them. This sense of satisfaction was
also prolonged by the World Bank and international agencies
which, in their official reports and publications, cited the
successful economies of East Asia as a "miracle".
Encouraged by the commendations, foreign investors and
creditors swarmed to provide loans to the private sector in a
number of Southeast Asian countries and South Korea.
In truth, the crises in South East Asia and Latin America were
preceded by various warning signals, such as follows:
* Extremely swift growth and development of the banking
sector, unaccompanied by adequate prudential regulation.
* A lending boom on the part of the banking sector, including
the financing of highly speculative ventures, such as property
development.
* Private sector foreign debt which not only displayed rapid
expansion, but was also frequently used to fund less than
feasible projects, even though such debt was largely unhedged.
* Rapid growth in the formal and modern sectors on a massive
scale, frequently followed by an increase in various forms of
irregularities and waste, both on the part of the government and
the private sector.
A further aspect with a significant impact was the creation,
through globalization, of an almost perfect money market, which
indeed strengthens international capitalism. Daily global
financial transactions in various forms now reach in excess of
US$1 trillion, which monetary authorities, including the IMF, are
quite unable to monitor, let alone control. Capital movements on
such a scale are not without their problems and, like a global
casino, rotate 24 hours a day.
International money trading with highly speculative
characteristics which is not accompanied by a global safety net
will always constitute a threat of the highest order for
developing countries, whose economic structures and financial
sectors, including banking, are not fully established. The
consequent negative impact will only serve to widen the
development gap between developed and developing economies.
In such circumstances, it is understandable if there should be
increased criticism pointed at the IMF, since the main task of
this agency is: "To promote exchange stability, to maintain
orderly exchange arrangements among members and to avoid
competitive exchange depreciation".
Indonesia initially adopted a managed floating rate system
that was suitable on the one hand to maintain a stable exchange
rate and, on the other, could be adjusted to the market
mechanism.
In confronting the contingent effect from the devaluation of
the Thai baht in early July 1997, the intervention band of Bank
Indonesia, the central bank, was widened from 8 percent to 12
percent.
Unfortunately, after Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and
Singapore floated their currencies, Indonesia became a target of
money speculation. Bank Indonesia could not maintain further the
intervention band without sacrificing a huge amount of its
international reserves. Finally, on Aug. 14, Indonesia floated
the rupiah as the latest currency to take that path in Southeast
Asia.
After the rupiah was floated, there was no significant
volatility in its value through the remainder of the month. On
Aug. 13, the rupiah stood at Rp 2,645 to the U.S. dollar. The
next day, the rate was Rp 2,775. A slightly steeper fall brought
the rate to Rp 2,950 on Aug. 18. On Sept. 2, the currency was
trading at slightly over Rp 3,000 to the dollar.
The monetary and fiscal authorities responded by raising
interest rates on Bank Indonesia's promissory notes (SBI) and
reduced the money supply through both monetary and fiscal
instruments. These policy measures resulted in the strengthening
of the rupiah to under Rp 3,000 per dollar. Unfortunately, the
measures were short-lived, since they were not only strongly
challenged by the business community but, in the end, they also
failed to receive support from the then president, Soeharto.
Subsequently, the rupiah displayed a weakening trend,
triggered in part by deep trouble in the banking sector and
private external debt due for payment.
The closure of 16 insolvent banks under a financial reform
package of the IMF -- aimed at restoring confidence -- ran
contrary to expectations.
It demonstrated the low trust of the society in the banking
sector and the high fragility of the latter in Indonesia.
Other contributing factors were the attitude of Soeharto, who
was inconsistent in implementation of the economic reform agreed
upon with the IMF, speculation expecting the rupiah to weaken or
the dollar to strengthen, a loss of confidence of foreign
investors in Indonesia as well as noneconomic factors and several
riots.
Confidence in Indonesia declined because of the more than
sufficient evidence that Indonesian firms had become involved in
remitting capital overseas which, without doubt, would be
followed by the flight of foreign capital. This occurred even
before the major riots on May 13 and May 14 this year. It is
noteworthy that domestic capital flight has not occurred in
Thailand or Malaysia.
Among noneconomic factors, political stability played a
crucial role and it would appear difficult to expect a truly
stable political situation to emerge in the short term. Apart
from that, criminal activities are increasing as a result of the
growing problems of poverty and unemployment, with the
consequence that the economic recession will be prolonged.
More from 1 September 1998 โ
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/drama-of-ris-economic-crisis-1447893297-1376121)
Originally published by The Jakarta Post