DPD set to play important role in political system

DPD set to play important role in political system

Anton Doni, Head, Research and Development Unit, The Jakarta Post

Sarwono Kusumaatmadja, who served as minister and secretary-
general of the then ruling party Golkar, during the Soeharto era,
was very confident that the new Regional Representatives Council
(DPD) would play key role in the country's political system
despite its weak legal position.

Sarwono, who is still highly regarded by the public despite
his role during the Soeharto era, argues that the fact that DPD
members are directly elected by the people and their independence
from political parties will give them strong legitimacy and
greater freedom in serving the public.

Sarwono himself will run as one of Jakarta's 38 candidates.
Each of the country's 32 provinces will have four DPD members.
Very few, at least for the moment, agree with Sarwono's optimism.

The People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) -- with the full
endorsement of the major political parties -- in its annual
session in 2002 made a historic decision through the passing of
the fourth amendment to the 1945 Constitution by bowing to the
public demand for a direct presidential election. Starting this
year, in July the country will hold its first direct presidential
election.

The Assembly also changed the composition of the Assembly
which previously comprised the members of the House of
Representatives (DPR) and the appointed Assembly members. The
appointed MPR members will now be replaced by the Regional
Representatives Council (DPD). The new system will take effect
after the legislative elections on April 5.

The major political parties, however, only halfheartedly
supported the establishment of the DPD and over-jealously
attempted to restrict its powers and functions. Its membership
must not exceed one third of the total membership of the House
(550 members), and all provinces are to be represented by an
equal number of DPD members.

According to Article 22D of the fourth amendment to the
Constitution, the Council has the right to propose and discuss
with the House bills on regional autonomy, central-local
government relations, the formation, expansion and merging of
regions, natural resources management, and inter-governmental
fiscal balance.

The Council, however, is only allowed to put forward opinions
and considerations in the case of bills on the state budget,
taxation, education and religion.

But despite the perceived limited role provided by the legal
framework as mentioned above, it is important to note the hidden
significance and powers of this new institution.

One aspect is related to long-term prospect. With equal
representation for all regions within this body -- each province
has four representatives regardless of the size of the province
-- we may hope that this will compensate for the imbalanced
representation of the regions within the House.

This means that while its position in relation to the DPR and
other state institutions is weak for the moment and a proper role
is still something that will have to be struggled for, early work
by this Council in alleviating the representation balance problem
could be quite significant.

The results of these early exercises will be capable of
highlighting to the public the differences in performance between
directly elected representatives (DPD) and the "indirectly
selected" DPR members (political parties still have the final say
on the members of the House). A good performance by the DPD will
help to convince the public that the direct selection of
legislators is much better than using the current system.

In the short run, the Council's significance will lie in its
providing a bridge between the people, or at least their
constituencies, and the government. As the Council members do not
have links to the political parties, they will be much freer than
the House members in voicing the wishes of the public.

Another significance corresponds precisely to the limited role
of this institution. This limited role implies there will be a
lack of equality with the executive in the policy-making
processes. The DPD has none of the privileges enjoyed by the DPR
in summoning officials of the executive, for instance.

On the one hand, this is a weakness, but from another
perspective it could be considered positive in the sense that it
could prevent the DPD members from becoming involved in horse-
trading and corruption. Thus, they will be able to work more
consistently in serving the public interest.

Considering the significance of the DPD as described above,
there are various reasons for strengthening this institution.

Several measures may be considered, taking into account the
DPD's current weaknesses.

The first is establishing full access to information. As
mentioned, the DPD has limited powers to acquire information from
the executive. The DPD itself, however, could also create its own
ways to obtain information from the government.

The second measure involves opening up more access to the
media. The DPD's limited role can be compensated for by forging
good relations with the media to get public support.

The third involves capacity building. The Council's members
should be supported by experts as House members are.

Fourth, to support its long-run legitimacy, a code of conduct
needs to be instituted right from the very start. A violation of
the code of conduct should be followed by expulsion or censure in
accordance with the set procedures.

In addition, the code of conduct should include measurable
standards of accountability to constituents so as to ensure that
this institution always remains close to the real owners of power
-- the people.