Direct Regional Elections: A Symbol of Power from the People
The debate regarding the model for Regional Head Elections (Pilkada) has never truly concluded. Following reform that corrected the elitist practice of indirect elections, Pilkada has again become contested territory, with arguments over whether it should be maintained as direct election by the people or reduced in the name of administrative efficiency and political stability.
In this debate, one principle is often forgotten: local democracy is only meaningful if the people directly determine their leaders.
Pilkada represents the heart of local democracy. It is there that popular sovereignty is exercised concretely, not through representation that does not genuinely represent. Democracy, as emphasised by Harris G. Warren, places the control of government in the hands of the governed people.
If the people do not directly determine who leads their region, then local democracy becomes a procedure devoid of substance, mere elite compromise.
Indonesian history offers a stern lesson. During the era of Law No. 5 of 1974, regional heads were selected by the Regional Representative Body (DPRD) and controlled by the central government. This mechanism was nominally termed democratic, but in practice it produced closed, elitist regional governments with minimal accountability.
Regional heads were more loyal to the centre of power and political elites than to the people in their regions. Consequently, the distance between regional government and society grew wider. The recruitment of regional heads occurred behind closed doors and was fraught with political transactions. Various studies demonstrated low objectivity in regional government administration and rampant corruption among regional heads during that era. When the people were excluded from the selection process, the legitimacy of power became fragile.
The 1998 Reform marked a turning point. The constitution was amended, various laws were revised, and various institutions were established in the name of democracy. One such development, through Law No. 32 of 2004, saw Indonesia adopt direct Pilkada. Since its implementation in 2005, direct Pilkada has returned to the people the basic right to choose their own leaders.
Regional heads obtain a direct mandate from voters, not from elite compromise. This represents a fundamental correction of the distortion of local democracy that had persisted for decades.
An attempt to restore indirect Pilkada occurred through Law No. 22 of 2014, but it failed following massive demonstrations, prompting the government to issue Presidential Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 2014, which subsequently became Law No. 1 of 2015. Therefore, this experience must serve as a warning to the government to proceed cautiously should it wish to promote similar proposals.
Constitutionally, direct Pilkada finds its foundation in Article 18, paragraph (4) of the 1945 Indonesian Constitution, which states that governors, regents, and mayors are elected democratically. Admittedly, this phrase does not explicitly mention direct elections. However, historical experience demonstrates that indirect elections failed to produce responsive and accountable regional government.
The debate concerning Pilkada’s position within the state system—whether it falls under the electoral regime or the regional government regime—has often caused confusion. Inconsistency in Constitutional Court decisions has muddied the waters, with some decisions placing Pilkada within the regional government regime whilst others placing it within the electoral regime.
However, consistent with K.C. Wheare’s theory of constitutional amendment, the meaning or provisions of a constitution are not static; changes can occur through judicial interpretation by the judiciary and be reflected in court decisions.
Therefore, as the ultimate interpreter of the constitution, the Constitutional Court, through Decision No. 85/PUU-XX/2022, affirmed the integration of the Pilkada regime with the electoral regime, based on considerations of administrative efficiency by the same institution, thereby eliminating the existing regime distinction. With this decision, the meaning of “elected democratically” now clearly refers to direct election by the people. One person, one vote, one value.
The main problem with Pilkada is not its legal classification, but rather who holds the sovereignty to choose. Whatever the regime, Pilkada must be conducted directly by the people, because this principle forms the foundation of local democracy.
Negotiation over this principle risks weakening the legitimacy and accountability of regional heads, and therefore direct elections remain the principal pillar of democratic regional administration.
In this context, arguments are often raised regarding asymmetrical Pilkada in certain regions, such as the Special Region of Yogyakarta and Jakarta. This fact cannot be denied. However, asymmetrical Pilkada should not be interpreted as justification for negating direct Pilkada generally.
Yogyakarta’s special status stems from historical and constitutional factors expressly recognised by the 1945 Constitution, whilst Jakarta has distinctive characteristics as an area with strategic national functions. Both are exceptions of a restrictive nature, not norms of local democracy that can be generalised.
Indeed, the existence of asymmetrical Pilkada affirms an important point: exceptions are only valid if expressly established constitutionally and strictly limited. Without such limits, discourse on asymmetrical Pilkada risks becoming a gateway for weakening popular sovereignty in other regions under the guise of efficiency or political stability. Democracy must not be sacrificed merely for administrative convenience.
The argument that direct Pilkada is expensive and prone to conflict can be countered with the fact that indirect Pilkada is also expensive, only with a much more restricted scope involving elites. However, democracy has never been inexpensive. The cost of democracy should be viewed as a long-term investment. Conversely, democracy that drifts away from the people actually generates greater social and political costs: diminished public trust, strengthened local oligarchies, and rampant corruption.