Dealing with Aceh rebels

Dealing with Aceh rebels

Siswo Pramono, School of Social Science, The Australian
National University, Canberra

The harsher the state of emergency (i.e. civil or military)
imposed in Aceh, the easier for the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) to
manipulate the corresponding tension. Aceh would become like an
overheated but sealed oxygen tube, with GAM waiting for the
explosion. Some aspects of military strategy must be reviewed.
The government must avoid the fatal trap of GAM's asymmetric
warfare.

"Asymmetric warfare" is a strategy employed by those with
limited forces to exploit the vulnerability of more powerful
adversaries.

In Aceh, GAM reportedly has 2,000 fighters; Indonesia has
25,000 security personnel. The recent security operations have
reduced GAM's control over Aceh, from 60 percent to 30 percent of
the territory, according to a recent summary report by the
International Crisis Group. In no way will GAM survive the
"normal" contest of force-on-force confrontation with the
Indonesian security forces. GAM will attempt to offset the
imbalance by modifying the strategic usage of its very limited
fighting force. Its objective is to destroy Indonesia's
legitimacy, not its military or police forces.

Security planners should have anticipated GAM's intentions. As
the round of talks in Geneva has put the issue of Aceh right in
the middle of the international stage, GAM has tried to provoke
the government to pursue a military approach in Aceh.

GAM has reportedly intensified its attacks upon state
officials and institutions. In the last two months the attacks
have allegedly broadened to include civilian targets, including
the destruction of 42 schools as well as power lines, kidnapping,
and hijacking. These attacks aim for "moral panic"; Jakarta is
expected to overact, rendering special autonomy incoherent.

When the government loses its coherent perspective on Aceh,
its policy will, as GAM has learned from East Timor, rely heavily
on the military approach. And GAM knows too well that the
Indonesia military (TNI) and National Police are not in their
best state of readiness for a long, protracted asymmetric war.

The TNI's troops, exhausted from endless operations to curb
violence across the archipelago, can easily make mistakes. GAM
has learned that the Santa Cruz incident in 1991 undermined
Indonesia's legitimacy in East Timor. And the destruction of Dili
in 1999 marked the end of that legitimacy.

GAM is patiently waiting for such mistakes to be repeated,
sooner or later, in Aceh. In fact, there have already been many
incidents, including the Rumoh Geudong "torture chamber" in
Pidie, even before the issue of Aceh was internationalized. If
such incidents are repeated again, Indonesia will lose its
legitimacy and GAM will win international sympathy.

As such, Indonesia must avoid fatal errors that could imperil
its own political legitimacy, and exploit instead reported
atrocities by GAM to delegitimize its political cause.

The use of force, for one, must be carried out in the course
of law enforcement. Legal action should be taken against anyone
guilty of acts of terror or abuses of human rights, whether they
are from GAM or from the security forces.

Moreover, the police must assume the role as point of contact
between the government and the people -- a role which might need
assistance if this is not the case yet.

Further, the role of the TNI must be focused on combating
GAM's military infrastructure. Such a limited role requires
extensive and effective intelligence. Any collateral damage
inflicted upon civilians will reduce Indonesia's legitimacy in
Aceh. Worse, such damage could be manipulated by GAM to intensify
negative feelings (from "apathy" to "antipathy") on the part of
the locals towards the military.

The extensive counterinsurgency operation must be focused on
winning people's hearts and minds. Social development and
rehabilitation programs run by the security forces (i.e. Bhakti
TNI/ Polri) must be improved in quantity and quality.

Last but not least, Indonesia must take advantage of
diplomatic solutions. In the wake of Sept. 11, no major world
power will tolerate the rise of radicalism in Southeast Asia.
This international support provides leverage for Indonesia in
pursuing dialog with all political and social groups in Aceh,
including GAM.

In short the government should formulate an anti-asymmetric
strategy, encompassing the speedy implementation of special
autonomy, preventive diplomacy, impartial law enforcement, and
effective counterinsurgency operations. Such a complex strategy
requires more focused political will and better coordination.

The writer is also an official at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.