Dealing with Aceh rebels<\/p>\n
Siswo Pramono, School of Social Science, The Australian
\nNational University, Canberra<\/p>\n
The harsher the state of emergency (i.e. civil or military)
\nimposed in Aceh, the easier for the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) to
\nmanipulate the corresponding tension. Aceh would become like an
\noverheated but sealed oxygen tube, with GAM waiting for the
\nexplosion. Some aspects of military strategy must be reviewed.
\nThe government must avoid the fatal trap of GAM's asymmetric
\nwarfare.<\/p>\n
\"Asymmetric warfare\" is a strategy employed by those with
\nlimited forces to exploit the vulnerability of more powerful
\nadversaries.<\/p>\n
In Aceh, GAM reportedly has 2,000 fighters; Indonesia has
\n25,000 security personnel. The recent security operations have
\nreduced GAM's control over Aceh, from 60 percent to 30 percent of
\nthe territory, according to a recent summary report by the
\nInternational Crisis Group. In no way will GAM survive the
\n\"normal\" contest of force-on-force confrontation with the
\nIndonesian security forces. GAM will attempt to offset the
\nimbalance by modifying the strategic usage of its very limited
\nfighting force. Its objective is to destroy Indonesia's
\nlegitimacy, not its military or police forces.<\/p>\n
Security planners should have anticipated GAM's intentions. As
\nthe round of talks in Geneva has put the issue of Aceh right in
\nthe middle of the international stage, GAM has tried to provoke
\nthe government to pursue a military approach in Aceh.<\/p>\n
GAM has reportedly intensified its attacks upon state
\nofficials and institutions. In the last two months the attacks
\nhave allegedly broadened to include civilian targets, including
\nthe destruction of 42 schools as well as power lines, kidnapping,
\nand hijacking. These attacks aim for \"moral panic\"; Jakarta is
\nexpected to overact, rendering special autonomy incoherent.<\/p>\n
When the government loses its coherent perspective on Aceh,
\nits policy will, as GAM has learned from East Timor, rely heavily
\non the military approach. And GAM knows too well that the
\nIndonesia military (TNI) and National Police are not in their
\nbest state of readiness for a long, protracted asymmetric war.<\/p>\n
The TNI's troops, exhausted from endless operations to curb
\nviolence across the archipelago, can easily make mistakes. GAM
\nhas learned that the Santa Cruz incident in 1991 undermined
\nIndonesia's legitimacy in East Timor. And the destruction of Dili
\nin 1999 marked the end of that legitimacy.<\/p>\n
GAM is patiently waiting for such mistakes to be repeated,
\nsooner or later, in Aceh. In fact, there have already been many
\nincidents, including the Rumoh Geudong \"torture chamber\" in
\nPidie, even before the issue of Aceh was internationalized. If
\nsuch incidents are repeated again, Indonesia will lose its
\nlegitimacy and GAM will win international sympathy.<\/p>\n
As such, Indonesia must avoid fatal errors that could imperil
\nits own political legitimacy, and exploit instead reported
\natrocities by GAM to delegitimize its political cause.<\/p>\n
The use of force, for one, must be carried out in the course
\nof law enforcement. Legal action should be taken against anyone
\nguilty of acts of terror or abuses of human rights, whether they
\nare from GAM or from the security forces.<\/p>\n
Moreover, the police must assume the role as point of contact
\nbetween the government and the people -- a role which might need
\nassistance if this is not the case yet.<\/p>\n
Further, the role of the TNI must be focused on combating
\nGAM's military infrastructure. Such a limited role requires
\nextensive and effective intelligence. Any collateral damage
\ninflicted upon civilians will reduce Indonesia's legitimacy in
\nAceh. Worse, such damage could be manipulated by GAM to intensify
\nnegative feelings (from \"apathy\" to \"antipathy\") on the part of
\nthe locals towards the military.<\/p>\n
The extensive counterinsurgency operation must be focused on
\nwinning people's hearts and minds. Social development and
\nrehabilitation programs run by the security forces (i.e. Bhakti
\nTNI\/ Polri) must be improved in quantity and quality.<\/p>\n
Last but not least, Indonesia must take advantage of
\ndiplomatic solutions. In the wake of Sept. 11, no major world
\npower will tolerate the rise of radicalism in Southeast Asia.
\nThis international support provides leverage for Indonesia in
\npursuing dialog with all political and social groups in Aceh,
\nincluding GAM.<\/p>\n
In short the government should formulate an anti-asymmetric
\nstrategy, encompassing the speedy implementation of special
\nautonomy, preventive diplomacy, impartial law enforcement, and
\neffective counterinsurgency operations. Such a complex strategy
\nrequires more focused political will and better coordination.<\/p>\n
The writer is also an official at the Ministry of Foreign
\nAffairs.<\/p>",
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