China's subtle moves in the Spratlys

China's subtle moves in the Spratlys

By Bilveer Singh

SINGAPORE (JP): The end of the Cold War has brought no real
respite or peace dividends to Southeast Asia.

Today, the South China Sea dispute represents the single most
important flash point in Southeast Asia and developments in the
contentious sea since 1991 have not been encouraging. The problem
is essentially China and China-related.

To date, there have been two major military conflicts in the
South China Sea, both initiated by China as part of its island-
grabbing policy in the region. First, in January 1974, China
evicted South Vietnamese forces from the Paracels followed by the
March 1988 attack when, Chinese forces evicted Vietnamese forces
from seven islands in the Spratlys.

While the Paracels conflict is between China and Vietnam, the
dispute over the Spratlys is more dangerous, involving six
parties, namely, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the
Philippines. There is also the burgeoning conflict between China
and Indonesia over the waters around the Natunas.

China's policy of grabbing land and maritime space has
continued unabated with the Panganiban Reef in the Philippines-
claimed Kalayaan group of islands the latest target of Beijing's
acquisition. In late January 1995, the Philippines government
discovered that China had sent nine warships and had started
building permanent structure at four areas on the reef. Manila
attempted to persuade the Chinese to depart through "quiet
diplomacy". When this failed, on Feb. 15, President Ramos, at a
National Security Council's meeting, protested publicly at the
"Chinese incursion".

What is significant about the Chinese move is that it
represents the first ever directed at an Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) member, indicating a new sense of
confidence and brinkmanship, as far as contests in the South
China Sea are concerned. When Vietnam was targeted in the past,
this was somewhat tolerated as Hanoi was a "delinquent state" in
the region. However, the occupation of the Philippines-claimed
reef represents a new ball game altogether with ominous
consequences for the security of the region.

The timing of the dispute, erupting a few months after the
coming into force of the United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea is in itself interesting. However, more important and
revealing have been the constancy of the Chinese position with
regard to their claims to the entire South China Sea.

A number of developments makes the Chinese action worrisome
and where lessons should be drawn in anticipation for future
moves:

First, China claims the entire South China Sea, based on
history and where she is not prepared to negotiate her
sovereignty away.

Second, China has boosted her sovereignty through various
forms of presence and activities, including undertaking
expeditions, operating meteorological stations as well as
granting oil exploration concessions to local and foreign
companies.

Third, China has consistently projected military power into
the region as evident by the military expansion and occupation of
various islands in the region since 1974. China's economic growth
has allowed her military budget to rise dramatically, thereby
boosting its power projection capabilities in the region.

Today, China leads the South China Sea region in every
category of naval armaments. Her air power, boosted by the
acquisition of 26 Sukhoi-27 fighters from Russia in 1993, as well
as the presence of more than 4,000 combat aircraft, makes her the
undisputed air power in the region. Since 1987, China has also
regularly conducted large scale military exercises in the region,
demonstrating her capability to project its "war fighting" assets
away from its shores.

Fourth, and finally, China has undertaken various legal
measures to justify its military actions in the region. In July
1987, the Spratlys were incorporated as part of the Hainan
Province. More significantly, on Feb. 25, 1992, China passed a
maritime law to buttress its sovereignty claims over the whole
maritime region.

In view of these developments, China's action in Panganiban
Reef was important, testing the "political waters" and reading
rightly that no major action would be taken against her.

The Americans, on whom much hope had been placed in the past
to help maintain a balance of power favorable to the ASEAN
countries as well as its allies in Northeast Asia pleaded
neutrality. While the Vietnamese reinforced their military
garrison on the various islands, Malaysia's Defense Minister
announced that "we have no plans to get involved in the present
situation". The message was clear: despite being the victim at
the hands of the regional superpower, the Philippines had to face
China alone. The Chinese knew and calculated well that they could
get away, as in the past, and they succeeded.

In the light of the protests from President Ramos, the
European Union was the first to react, reaffirming its support
for the July 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea and
called on "all parties concerned to show restraint and to abstain
from any measures which may make its implementation more
difficult".

It would appear that the Americans are prepared to accept a
Chinese hegemony over the region as long as freedom of passage is
permitted. Washington would also prefer to deal with one dominant
power rather than many contending states with regard to the
security of the sea-lanes in the region. Collectively, ASEAN
reacted rather slowly and the Foreign Ministers only came up with
a joint statement on March 18, more than a month after President
Ramos had made his plight public. This too was mildly worded,
expressing "serious concern over recent developments in the South
China Sea" and urged the parties to refrain from actions that
could destabilize the region. The only pressure which ASEAN seems
to have applied was the need to bring up the issue at the coming
ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Brunei, something which could
embarrass Beijing.

The consequence of the "Panganiban Reef affair", despite
Chinese attempts to downplay it remains to be seen. Already, it
has forced to Philippines to quickly arm itself with the
country's Congress approving a US$2 billion program for the next
five years.

Second, it has shown up that despite the United States
decision to maintain its troops in the Asia-Pacific region, it
lacks the political will to involve itself, as in the past, in
any dispute in the South China Sea region. This would mean that
countries in the region would have to fend for themselves,
leading to more resources being devoted to arms purchases in
order to deter the Chinese and prevent the Philippines
helplessness from repeating itself.

However, the most important consequence of the incident would
be the uncertainty as to who will be the next target and how
countries in the region would come to terms with either a de
facto or de jure "Chinese sovereignty" in the South China Sea
region. In view of the sheer imbalance of military power from the
littoral states and the lack of political will of other great
powers to counter China's salami tactics in the region, it is
only a matter of time before it become a "Chinese Lake".

Dr. Bilveer Singh is a political scientist from the Singapore
National University. The views expressed in this article are
entirely his own.