China's subtle moves in the Spratlys

China's subtle moves in the Spratlys

By Bilveer Singh

SINGAPORE (JP): The end of the Cold War has brought no real respite or peace dividends to Southeast Asia.

Today, the South China Sea dispute represents the single most important flash point in Southeast Asia and developments in the contentious sea since 1991 have not been encouraging. The problem is essentially China and China-related.

To date, there have been two major military conflicts in the South China Sea, both initiated by China as part of its island- grabbing policy in the region. First, in January 1974, China evicted South Vietnamese forces from the Paracels followed by the March 1988 attack when, Chinese forces evicted Vietnamese forces from seven islands in the Spratlys.

While the Paracels conflict is between China and Vietnam, the dispute over the Spratlys is more dangerous, involving six parties, namely, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines. There is also the burgeoning conflict between China and Indonesia over the waters around the Natunas.

China's policy of grabbing land and maritime space has continued unabated with the Panganiban Reef in the Philippines- claimed Kalayaan group of islands the latest target of Beijing's acquisition. In late January 1995, the Philippines government discovered that China had sent nine warships and had started building permanent structure at four areas on the reef. Manila attempted to persuade the Chinese to depart through "quiet diplomacy". When this failed, on Feb. 15, President Ramos, at a National Security Council's meeting, protested publicly at the "Chinese incursion".

What is significant about the Chinese move is that it represents the first ever directed at an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member, indicating a new sense of confidence and brinkmanship, as far as contests in the South China Sea are concerned. When Vietnam was targeted in the past, this was somewhat tolerated as Hanoi was a "delinquent state" in the region. However, the occupation of the Philippines-claimed reef represents a new ball game altogether with ominous consequences for the security of the region.

The timing of the dispute, erupting a few months after the coming into force of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea is in itself interesting. However, more important and revealing have been the constancy of the Chinese position with regard to their claims to the entire South China Sea.

A number of developments makes the Chinese action worrisome and where lessons should be drawn in anticipation for future moves:

First, China claims the entire South China Sea, based on history and where she is not prepared to negotiate her sovereignty away.

Second, China has boosted her sovereignty through various forms of presence and activities, including undertaking expeditions, operating meteorological stations as well as granting oil exploration concessions to local and foreign companies.

Third, China has consistently projected military power into the region as evident by the military expansion and occupation of various islands in the region since 1974. China's economic growth has allowed her military budget to rise dramatically, thereby boosting its power projection capabilities in the region.

Today, China leads the South China Sea region in every category of naval armaments. Her air power, boosted by the acquisition of 26 Sukhoi-27 fighters from Russia in 1993, as well as the presence of more than 4,000 combat aircraft, makes her the undisputed air power in the region. Since 1987, China has also regularly conducted large scale military exercises in the region, demonstrating her capability to project its "war fighting" assets away from its shores.

Fourth, and finally, China has undertaken various legal measures to justify its military actions in the region. In July 1987, the Spratlys were incorporated as part of the Hainan Province. More significantly, on Feb. 25, 1992, China passed a maritime law to buttress its sovereignty claims over the whole maritime region.

In view of these developments, China's action in Panganiban Reef was important, testing the "political waters" and reading rightly that no major action would be taken against her.

The Americans, on whom much hope had been placed in the past to help maintain a balance of power favorable to the ASEAN countries as well as its allies in Northeast Asia pleaded neutrality. While the Vietnamese reinforced their military garrison on the various islands, Malaysia's Defense Minister announced that "we have no plans to get involved in the present situation". The message was clear: despite being the victim at the hands of the regional superpower, the Philippines had to face China alone. The Chinese knew and calculated well that they could get away, as in the past, and they succeeded.

In the light of the protests from President Ramos, the European Union was the first to react, reaffirming its support for the July 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea and called on "all parties concerned to show restraint and to abstain from any measures which may make its implementation more difficult".

It would appear that the Americans are prepared to accept a Chinese hegemony over the region as long as freedom of passage is permitted. Washington would also prefer to deal with one dominant power rather than many contending states with regard to the security of the sea-lanes in the region. Collectively, ASEAN reacted rather slowly and the Foreign Ministers only came up with a joint statement on March 18, more than a month after President Ramos had made his plight public. This too was mildly worded, expressing "serious concern over recent developments in the South China Sea" and urged the parties to refrain from actions that could destabilize the region. The only pressure which ASEAN seems to have applied was the need to bring up the issue at the coming ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Brunei, something which could embarrass Beijing.

The consequence of the "Panganiban Reef affair", despite Chinese attempts to downplay it remains to be seen. Already, it has forced to Philippines to quickly arm itself with the country's Congress approving a US$2 billion program for the next five years.

Second, it has shown up that despite the United States decision to maintain its troops in the Asia-Pacific region, it lacks the political will to involve itself, as in the past, in any dispute in the South China Sea region. This would mean that countries in the region would have to fend for themselves, leading to more resources being devoted to arms purchases in order to deter the Chinese and prevent the Philippines helplessness from repeating itself.

However, the most important consequence of the incident would be the uncertainty as to who will be the next target and how countries in the region would come to terms with either a de facto or de jure "Chinese sovereignty" in the South China Sea region. In view of the sheer imbalance of military power from the littoral states and the lack of political will of other great powers to counter China's salami tactics in the region, it is only a matter of time before it become a "Chinese Lake".

Dr. Bilveer Singh is a political scientist from the Singapore National University. The views expressed in this article are entirely his own.