China's subtle moves in the Spratlys<\/p>\n
By Bilveer Singh<\/p>\n
SINGAPORE (JP): The end of the Cold War has brought no real
\nrespite or peace dividends to Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n
Today, the South China Sea dispute represents the single most
\nimportant flash point in Southeast Asia and developments in the
\ncontentious sea since 1991 have not been encouraging. The problem
\nis essentially China and China-related.<\/p>\n
To date, there have been two major military conflicts in the
\nSouth China Sea, both initiated by China as part of its island-
\ngrabbing policy in the region. First, in January 1974, China
\nevicted South Vietnamese forces from the Paracels followed by the
\nMarch 1988 attack when, Chinese forces evicted Vietnamese forces
\nfrom seven islands in the Spratlys.<\/p>\n
While the Paracels conflict is between China and Vietnam, the
\ndispute over the Spratlys is more dangerous, involving six
\nparties, namely, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the
\nPhilippines. There is also the burgeoning conflict between China
\nand Indonesia over the waters around the Natunas.<\/p>\n
China's policy of grabbing land and maritime space has
\ncontinued unabated with the Panganiban Reef in the Philippines-
\nclaimed Kalayaan group of islands the latest target of Beijing's
\nacquisition. In late January 1995, the Philippines government
\ndiscovered that China had sent nine warships and had started
\nbuilding permanent structure at four areas on the reef. Manila
\nattempted to persuade the Chinese to depart through \"quiet
\ndiplomacy\". When this failed, on Feb. 15, President Ramos, at a
\nNational Security Council's meeting, protested publicly at the
\n\"Chinese incursion\".<\/p>\n
What is significant about the Chinese move is that it
\nrepresents the first ever directed at an Association of Southeast
\nAsian Nations (ASEAN) member, indicating a new sense of
\nconfidence and brinkmanship, as far as contests in the South
\nChina Sea are concerned. When Vietnam was targeted in the past,
\nthis was somewhat tolerated as Hanoi was a \"delinquent state\" in
\nthe region. However, the occupation of the Philippines-claimed
\nreef represents a new ball game altogether with ominous
\nconsequences for the security of the region.<\/p>\n
The timing of the dispute, erupting a few months after the
\ncoming into force of the United Nations Conference on the Law of
\nthe Sea is in itself interesting. However, more important and
\nrevealing have been the constancy of the Chinese position with
\nregard to their claims to the entire South China Sea.<\/p>\n
A number of developments makes the Chinese action worrisome
\nand where lessons should be drawn in anticipation for future
\nmoves:<\/p>\n
First, China claims the entire South China Sea, based on
\nhistory and where she is not prepared to negotiate her
\nsovereignty away.<\/p>\n
Second, China has boosted her sovereignty through various
\nforms of presence and activities, including undertaking
\nexpeditions, operating meteorological stations as well as
\ngranting oil exploration concessions to local and foreign
\ncompanies.<\/p>\n
Third, China has consistently projected military power into
\nthe region as evident by the military expansion and occupation of
\nvarious islands in the region since 1974. China's economic growth
\nhas allowed her military budget to rise dramatically, thereby
\nboosting its power projection capabilities in the region.<\/p>\n
Today, China leads the South China Sea region in every
\ncategory of naval armaments. Her air power, boosted by the
\nacquisition of 26 Sukhoi-27 fighters from Russia in 1993, as well
\nas the presence of more than 4,000 combat aircraft, makes her the
\nundisputed air power in the region. Since 1987, China has also
\nregularly conducted large scale military exercises in the region,
\ndemonstrating her capability to project its \"war fighting\" assets
\naway from its shores.<\/p>\n
Fourth, and finally, China has undertaken various legal
\nmeasures to justify its military actions in the region. In July
\n1987, the Spratlys were incorporated as part of the Hainan
\nProvince. More significantly, on Feb. 25, 1992, China passed a
\nmaritime law to buttress its sovereignty claims over the whole
\nmaritime region.<\/p>\n
In view of these developments, China's action in Panganiban
\nReef was important, testing the \"political waters\" and reading
\nrightly that no major action would be taken against her.<\/p>\n
The Americans, on whom much hope had been placed in the past
\nto help maintain a balance of power favorable to the ASEAN
\ncountries as well as its allies in Northeast Asia pleaded
\nneutrality. While the Vietnamese reinforced their military
\ngarrison on the various islands, Malaysia's Defense Minister
\nannounced that \"we have no plans to get involved in the present
\nsituation\". The message was clear: despite being the victim at
\nthe hands of the regional superpower, the Philippines had to face
\nChina alone. The Chinese knew and calculated well that they could
\nget away, as in the past, and they succeeded.<\/p>\n
In the light of the protests from President Ramos, the
\nEuropean Union was the first to react, reaffirming its support
\nfor the July 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea and
\ncalled on \"all parties concerned to show restraint and to abstain
\nfrom any measures which may make its implementation more
\ndifficult\".<\/p>\n
It would appear that the Americans are prepared to accept a
\nChinese hegemony over the region as long as freedom of passage is
\npermitted. Washington would also prefer to deal with one dominant
\npower rather than many contending states with regard to the
\nsecurity of the sea-lanes in the region. Collectively, ASEAN
\nreacted rather slowly and the Foreign Ministers only came up with
\na joint statement on March 18, more than a month after President
\nRamos had made his plight public. This too was mildly worded,
\nexpressing \"serious concern over recent developments in the South
\nChina Sea\" and urged the parties to refrain from actions that
\ncould destabilize the region. The only pressure which ASEAN seems
\nto have applied was the need to bring up the issue at the coming
\nASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Brunei, something which could
\nembarrass Beijing.<\/p>\n
The consequence of the \"Panganiban Reef affair\", despite
\nChinese attempts to downplay it remains to be seen. Already, it
\nhas forced to Philippines to quickly arm itself with the
\ncountry's Congress approving a US$2 billion program for the next
\nfive years.<\/p>\n
Second, it has shown up that despite the United States
\ndecision to maintain its troops in the Asia-Pacific region, it
\nlacks the political will to involve itself, as in the past, in
\nany dispute in the South China Sea region. This would mean that
\ncountries in the region would have to fend for themselves,
\nleading to more resources being devoted to arms purchases in
\norder to deter the Chinese and prevent the Philippines
\nhelplessness from repeating itself.<\/p>\n
However, the most important consequence of the incident would
\nbe the uncertainty as to who will be the next target and how
\ncountries in the region would come to terms with either a de
\nfacto or de jure \"Chinese sovereignty\" in the South China Sea
\nregion. In view of the sheer imbalance of military power from the
\nlittoral states and the lack of political will of other great
\npowers to counter China's salami tactics in the region, it is
\nonly a matter of time before it become a \"Chinese Lake\".<\/p>\n
Dr. Bilveer Singh is a political scientist from the Singapore
\nNational University. The views expressed in this article are
\nentirely his own.<\/p>",
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