China's aspirations in SE Asia

China's aspirations in SE Asia

By Hilman Adil

JAKARTA (JP): Although Jakarta does not see China's claims on
the gas field 250 kilometers northeast of the Natuna Islands as a
threat, China's occupation of Mischief Reef in the Spratly, seems
to trigger some concern. (Far Eastern Economic Review, April 27,
1995)

Apprehension about China's intentions in Southeast Asia
dominates the thinking among Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) official circles. The territorial dimension is
China's overlapping claims of sovereignty and jurisdiction with
ASEAN states in the South China Sea. The possible flash points
are the Spratly Islands, with a seabed rich in oil and gas
reserves, and the Natuna gas field, with an estimated 45 trillion
cubic feet in reserves, which is one of the world's largest gas
fields.

China's claims of sovereignty and jurisdiction should be
placed in the framework of a significant readjustment in the form
of a "world peace and development line" strategy, which was
introduced in mid-1984. This strategy, in essence, meant a shift
from the preparation of general nuclear war to the preparation
for local and regional wars adjacent to China's borders. In other
words, it means a readjustment in Chinese strategic thinking in
terms of a gradual process of decoupling local and regional
conflicts from superpower rivalry.

Despite China's remarkable achievements in developing the
country's economy, it cannot be characterized as a satisfied
"status quo" power. China is still beholden by the holy trinity
of state sovereignty, state status, and state security.

This could be translated into a concern for ready and assured
access to a variety of essential materials available in Southeast
Asia and the South China Sea; a preoccupation with the national
imperative to protect territorial sovereignty; and a security
assessment that conceived control over all matters of
geostrategic importance. Therefore, contested maritime
territories and associated economic potential in the South China
Sea have been, and remain, so important to China that it is
apparently prepared to jeopardize other interests.

If one would debate the argument that, in the past, Beijing
has demonstrated its readiness to use armed force to establish
its control over disputed territories, the pivotal question
related to this argument is whether any employment of military
means would cost Beijing more than it might hope to gain.

One school of thought among Western sinologists is to discount
the possibility of Chinese military initiatives in disputed
territories, like those in the South China Sea. This is based on
the consideration that economics now constitutes the prevailing
element in the relations between states. And as far as China is
concerned, it can be argued that China needs the capital and
technology from the West, and, therefore, would be hesitant to
jeopardize its relations with these countries.

Another school of thought, on the other hand, maintains that
given China's erratic shifts in foreign policy behavior over the
years, one would be hesitant to discount such a possibility. The
fact is that China has shown on a number of occasions to be ready
to gamble on its relationship with Western countries. The
Tiananmen incident in June 1989 is the latest example.

Another factor, which would substantiate such an assertion, is
China's perennial difficulties with energy. As reported in Inside
China Mainland (April 1991), China faces energy shortages which
proves to be one of the most serious constraints on its economic
growth. As David G. Muller, in his book China as a Maritime
Power, (1983) states: "... the demarcation of an exclusive
economic zone in the South China Sea takes an unusual importance
and urgency from the Chinese point of view. Equally essential
will be China's ability to police the zone, to keep other nations
from drilling for oil without Chinese authorization, and to
protect Chinese oil fields... China's need for an inexpensive
domestic source of energy is thus providing a major motivation
for naval deployment to support its goal of controlling the
economic exploitation of the South China Sea".

China's historical claim was officially expressed by foreign
minister Zhou Enlai as early in August 1951, insisting upon the
"inviolable sovereignty of the People's Republic of China over
Spratly Island and the Paracel Archipelago" and to claim "the
whole Spratly Archipelago, the Macclesfield Bank and the Pratas
Archipelago".

In 1974, a Chinese official stated that "China hereby
reiterates that all seabed resources in China's coastal sea areas
and those off her islands belong to China. China alone has the
right to prospect and exploit those seabed resources".

On Feb. 25, 1992, China's National People's Congress adopted a
formal legislation, which was not only to govern the exploitation
of maritime and subsea resources in the South China Sea, but also
transit rights through the region as well. This legislation,
which was called "The Law of the PRC on Its Territorial Waters
and Their Contigues Areas", according to Article 1, will give the
right to China "to exercise its sovereignty over its territorial
waters and its right to control over their adjacent areas, and to
safeguard state security, as well as its maritime rights and
interests". It further states that the legislation gives China
the right to repel by force any foreign incursion into these
areas.

After Tiananmen, the quest for national identity-come-national
unification may have suffered a setback. China is still besieged
by increasing domestic political instability. Should instability
persist or increase, Beijing might well seek to unite an
alienated people, and a military ridden with factions, by
embarking on military aggression in the South China Sea.

Chinese combined forces, since 1988, have undertaken exercises
in the coastal waters of its southeastern provinces, indicating
preparations for force projection into the South China Sea. This
indicates an attempt to put together combined arms rapid
deployment forces, thereby enhancing its capabilities to meet the
requirements of a "limited war" strategy in the South China Sea
by building up its naval and air power that threatens the
interests of Southeast Asian states.

China's official military spending in 1992, compared to 1989,
went up to 52 percent and has probably now increased after
reports have indicated that China is interested in buying
advanced weapons systems in Russia and Ukraine.

With the end of superpower conflict and the breaking out of
peace, one might expect that the Southeast Asian region would
feel more secure. In fact, states in the region, particularly
ASEAN, still perceives a threatening regional security
environment, made even more dangerous by the changed role of the
United States, in the absence of a threat from the Soviet Union,
and a U.S. security policy in the post-cold war era driven by
budget cuts and value-oriented issues such as human rights,
rather than a realistic appraisal of common interests.

In facing such a threatening security environment, ASEAN
states have tried to engage China in a network of relationships
through which China's interests are better served by peaceful
cooperation than conflict. But, on the other hand, ASEAN also
realizes that, while trying to accommodate China in such a
network, it might provide the U.S. with another reason to
decrease its presence in the region. Therefore, in the absence of
a counter-vailing deterrence, it now seems that the military
balance in the South China Sea has been fundamentally altered.
China has now more incentive to embark on military aggression
than in the past.

However, that there are disincentives, for example to preserve
its relations with Western countries and to focus on its economic
development, is equally evident. The question remains whether
they might outweigh the very real incentives, which only Beijing
can assess, is difficult to determine. Whatever the case, the
fact remains that China constitutes a regional threat of
significant magnitude, which will not diminish in the foreseeable
future.

Dr. Hilman Adil, is director at the Center of Social and
Cultural Studies of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences.