China's aspirations in SE Asia
China's aspirations in SE Asia
By Hilman Adil
JAKARTA (JP): Although Jakarta does not see China's claims on the gas field 250 kilometers northeast of the Natuna Islands as a threat, China's occupation of Mischief Reef in the Spratly, seems to trigger some concern. (Far Eastern Economic Review, April 27, 1995)
Apprehension about China's intentions in Southeast Asia dominates the thinking among Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) official circles. The territorial dimension is China's overlapping claims of sovereignty and jurisdiction with ASEAN states in the South China Sea. The possible flash points are the Spratly Islands, with a seabed rich in oil and gas reserves, and the Natuna gas field, with an estimated 45 trillion cubic feet in reserves, which is one of the world's largest gas fields.
China's claims of sovereignty and jurisdiction should be placed in the framework of a significant readjustment in the form of a "world peace and development line" strategy, which was introduced in mid-1984. This strategy, in essence, meant a shift from the preparation of general nuclear war to the preparation for local and regional wars adjacent to China's borders. In other words, it means a readjustment in Chinese strategic thinking in terms of a gradual process of decoupling local and regional conflicts from superpower rivalry.
Despite China's remarkable achievements in developing the country's economy, it cannot be characterized as a satisfied "status quo" power. China is still beholden by the holy trinity of state sovereignty, state status, and state security.
This could be translated into a concern for ready and assured access to a variety of essential materials available in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea; a preoccupation with the national imperative to protect territorial sovereignty; and a security assessment that conceived control over all matters of geostrategic importance. Therefore, contested maritime territories and associated economic potential in the South China Sea have been, and remain, so important to China that it is apparently prepared to jeopardize other interests.
If one would debate the argument that, in the past, Beijing has demonstrated its readiness to use armed force to establish its control over disputed territories, the pivotal question related to this argument is whether any employment of military means would cost Beijing more than it might hope to gain.
One school of thought among Western sinologists is to discount the possibility of Chinese military initiatives in disputed territories, like those in the South China Sea. This is based on the consideration that economics now constitutes the prevailing element in the relations between states. And as far as China is concerned, it can be argued that China needs the capital and technology from the West, and, therefore, would be hesitant to jeopardize its relations with these countries.
Another school of thought, on the other hand, maintains that given China's erratic shifts in foreign policy behavior over the years, one would be hesitant to discount such a possibility. The fact is that China has shown on a number of occasions to be ready to gamble on its relationship with Western countries. The Tiananmen incident in June 1989 is the latest example.
Another factor, which would substantiate such an assertion, is China's perennial difficulties with energy. As reported in Inside China Mainland (April 1991), China faces energy shortages which proves to be one of the most serious constraints on its economic growth. As David G. Muller, in his book China as a Maritime Power, (1983) states: "... the demarcation of an exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea takes an unusual importance and urgency from the Chinese point of view. Equally essential will be China's ability to police the zone, to keep other nations from drilling for oil without Chinese authorization, and to protect Chinese oil fields... China's need for an inexpensive domestic source of energy is thus providing a major motivation for naval deployment to support its goal of controlling the economic exploitation of the South China Sea".
China's historical claim was officially expressed by foreign minister Zhou Enlai as early in August 1951, insisting upon the "inviolable sovereignty of the People's Republic of China over Spratly Island and the Paracel Archipelago" and to claim "the whole Spratly Archipelago, the Macclesfield Bank and the Pratas Archipelago".
In 1974, a Chinese official stated that "China hereby reiterates that all seabed resources in China's coastal sea areas and those off her islands belong to China. China alone has the right to prospect and exploit those seabed resources".
On Feb. 25, 1992, China's National People's Congress adopted a formal legislation, which was not only to govern the exploitation of maritime and subsea resources in the South China Sea, but also transit rights through the region as well. This legislation, which was called "The Law of the PRC on Its Territorial Waters and Their Contigues Areas", according to Article 1, will give the right to China "to exercise its sovereignty over its territorial waters and its right to control over their adjacent areas, and to safeguard state security, as well as its maritime rights and interests". It further states that the legislation gives China the right to repel by force any foreign incursion into these areas.
After Tiananmen, the quest for national identity-come-national unification may have suffered a setback. China is still besieged by increasing domestic political instability. Should instability persist or increase, Beijing might well seek to unite an alienated people, and a military ridden with factions, by embarking on military aggression in the South China Sea.
Chinese combined forces, since 1988, have undertaken exercises in the coastal waters of its southeastern provinces, indicating preparations for force projection into the South China Sea. This indicates an attempt to put together combined arms rapid deployment forces, thereby enhancing its capabilities to meet the requirements of a "limited war" strategy in the South China Sea by building up its naval and air power that threatens the interests of Southeast Asian states.
China's official military spending in 1992, compared to 1989, went up to 52 percent and has probably now increased after reports have indicated that China is interested in buying advanced weapons systems in Russia and Ukraine.
With the end of superpower conflict and the breaking out of peace, one might expect that the Southeast Asian region would feel more secure. In fact, states in the region, particularly ASEAN, still perceives a threatening regional security environment, made even more dangerous by the changed role of the United States, in the absence of a threat from the Soviet Union, and a U.S. security policy in the post-cold war era driven by budget cuts and value-oriented issues such as human rights, rather than a realistic appraisal of common interests.
In facing such a threatening security environment, ASEAN states have tried to engage China in a network of relationships through which China's interests are better served by peaceful cooperation than conflict. But, on the other hand, ASEAN also realizes that, while trying to accommodate China in such a network, it might provide the U.S. with another reason to decrease its presence in the region. Therefore, in the absence of a counter-vailing deterrence, it now seems that the military balance in the South China Sea has been fundamentally altered. China has now more incentive to embark on military aggression than in the past.
However, that there are disincentives, for example to preserve its relations with Western countries and to focus on its economic development, is equally evident. The question remains whether they might outweigh the very real incentives, which only Beijing can assess, is difficult to determine. Whatever the case, the fact remains that China constitutes a regional threat of significant magnitude, which will not diminish in the foreseeable future.
Dr. Hilman Adil, is director at the Center of Social and Cultural Studies of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences.