China's aspirations in SE Asia<\/p>\n
By Hilman Adil<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Although Jakarta does not see China's claims on
\nthe gas field 250 kilometers northeast of the Natuna Islands as a
\nthreat, China's occupation of Mischief Reef in the Spratly, seems
\nto trigger some concern. (Far Eastern Economic Review, April 27,
\n1995)<\/p>\n
Apprehension about China's intentions in Southeast Asia
\ndominates the thinking among Association of Southeast Asian
\nNations (ASEAN) official circles. The territorial dimension is
\nChina's overlapping claims of sovereignty and jurisdiction with
\nASEAN states in the South China Sea. The possible flash points
\nare the Spratly Islands, with a seabed rich in oil and gas
\nreserves, and the Natuna gas field, with an estimated 45 trillion
\ncubic feet in reserves, which is one of the world's largest gas
\nfields.<\/p>\n
China's claims of sovereignty and jurisdiction should be
\nplaced in the framework of a significant readjustment in the form
\nof a \"world peace and development line\" strategy, which was
\nintroduced in mid-1984. This strategy, in essence, meant a shift
\nfrom the preparation of general nuclear war to the preparation
\nfor local and regional wars adjacent to China's borders. In other
\nwords, it means a readjustment in Chinese strategic thinking in
\nterms of a gradual process of decoupling local and regional
\nconflicts from superpower rivalry.<\/p>\n
Despite China's remarkable achievements in developing the
\ncountry's economy, it cannot be characterized as a satisfied
\n\"status quo\" power. China is still beholden by the holy trinity
\nof state sovereignty, state status, and state security.<\/p>\n
This could be translated into a concern for ready and assured
\naccess to a variety of essential materials available in Southeast
\nAsia and the South China Sea; a preoccupation with the national
\nimperative to protect territorial sovereignty; and a security
\nassessment that conceived control over all matters of
\ngeostrategic importance. Therefore, contested maritime
\nterritories and associated economic potential in the South China
\nSea have been, and remain, so important to China that it is
\napparently prepared to jeopardize other interests.<\/p>\n
If one would debate the argument that, in the past, Beijing
\nhas demonstrated its readiness to use armed force to establish
\nits control over disputed territories, the pivotal question
\nrelated to this argument is whether any employment of military
\nmeans would cost Beijing more than it might hope to gain.<\/p>\n
One school of thought among Western sinologists is to discount
\nthe possibility of Chinese military initiatives in disputed
\nterritories, like those in the South China Sea. This is based on
\nthe consideration that economics now constitutes the prevailing
\nelement in the relations between states. And as far as China is
\nconcerned, it can be argued that China needs the capital and
\ntechnology from the West, and, therefore, would be hesitant to
\njeopardize its relations with these countries.<\/p>\n
Another school of thought, on the other hand, maintains that
\ngiven China's erratic shifts in foreign policy behavior over the
\nyears, one would be hesitant to discount such a possibility. The
\nfact is that China has shown on a number of occasions to be ready
\nto gamble on its relationship with Western countries. The
\nTiananmen incident in June 1989 is the latest example.<\/p>\n
Another factor, which would substantiate such an assertion, is
\nChina's perennial difficulties with energy. As reported in Inside
\nChina Mainland (April 1991), China faces energy shortages which
\nproves to be one of the most serious constraints on its economic
\ngrowth. As David G. Muller, in his book China as a Maritime
\nPower, (1983) states: \"... the demarcation of an exclusive
\neconomic zone in the South China Sea takes an unusual importance
\nand urgency from the Chinese point of view. Equally essential
\nwill be China's ability to police the zone, to keep other nations
\nfrom drilling for oil without Chinese authorization, and to
\nprotect Chinese oil fields... China's need for an inexpensive
\ndomestic source of energy is thus providing a major motivation
\nfor naval deployment to support its goal of controlling the
\neconomic exploitation of the South China Sea\".<\/p>\n
China's historical claim was officially expressed by foreign
\nminister Zhou Enlai as early in August 1951, insisting upon the
\n\"inviolable sovereignty of the People's Republic of China over
\nSpratly Island and the Paracel Archipelago\" and to claim \"the
\nwhole Spratly Archipelago, the Macclesfield Bank and the Pratas
\nArchipelago\".<\/p>\n
In 1974, a Chinese official stated that \"China hereby
\nreiterates that all seabed resources in China's coastal sea areas
\nand those off her islands belong to China. China alone has the
\nright to prospect and exploit those seabed resources\".<\/p>\n
On Feb. 25, 1992, China's National People's Congress adopted a
\nformal legislation, which was not only to govern the exploitation
\nof maritime and subsea resources in the South China Sea, but also
\ntransit rights through the region as well. This legislation,
\nwhich was called \"The Law of the PRC on Its Territorial Waters
\nand Their Contigues Areas\", according to Article 1, will give the
\nright to China \"to exercise its sovereignty over its territorial
\nwaters and its right to control over their adjacent areas, and to
\nsafeguard state security, as well as its maritime rights and
\ninterests\". It further states that the legislation gives China
\nthe right to repel by force any foreign incursion into these
\nareas.<\/p>\n
After Tiananmen, the quest for national identity-come-national
\nunification may have suffered a setback. China is still besieged
\nby increasing domestic political instability. Should instability
\npersist or increase, Beijing might well seek to unite an
\nalienated people, and a military ridden with factions, by
\nembarking on military aggression in the South China Sea.<\/p>\n
Chinese combined forces, since 1988, have undertaken exercises
\nin the coastal waters of its southeastern provinces, indicating
\npreparations for force projection into the South China Sea. This
\nindicates an attempt to put together combined arms rapid
\ndeployment forces, thereby enhancing its capabilities to meet the
\nrequirements of a \"limited war\" strategy in the South China Sea
\nby building up its naval and air power that threatens the
\ninterests of Southeast Asian states.<\/p>\n
China's official military spending in 1992, compared to 1989,
\nwent up to 52 percent and has probably now increased after
\nreports have indicated that China is interested in buying
\nadvanced weapons systems in Russia and Ukraine.<\/p>\n
With the end of superpower conflict and the breaking out of
\npeace, one might expect that the Southeast Asian region would
\nfeel more secure. In fact, states in the region, particularly
\nASEAN, still perceives a threatening regional security
\nenvironment, made even more dangerous by the changed role of the
\nUnited States, in the absence of a threat from the Soviet Union,
\nand a U.S. security policy in the post-cold war era driven by
\nbudget cuts and value-oriented issues such as human rights,
\nrather than a realistic appraisal of common interests.<\/p>\n
In facing such a threatening security environment, ASEAN
\nstates have tried to engage China in a network of relationships
\nthrough which China's interests are better served by peaceful
\ncooperation than conflict. But, on the other hand, ASEAN also
\nrealizes that, while trying to accommodate China in such a
\nnetwork, it might provide the U.S. with another reason to
\ndecrease its presence in the region. Therefore, in the absence of
\na counter-vailing deterrence, it now seems that the military
\nbalance in the South China Sea has been fundamentally altered.
\nChina has now more incentive to embark on military aggression
\nthan in the past.<\/p>\n
However, that there are disincentives, for example to preserve
\nits relations with Western countries and to focus on its economic
\ndevelopment, is equally evident. The question remains whether
\nthey might outweigh the very real incentives, which only Beijing
\ncan assess, is difficult to determine. Whatever the case, the
\nfact remains that China constitutes a regional threat of
\nsignificant magnitude, which will not diminish in the foreseeable
\nfuture.<\/p>\n
Dr. Hilman Adil, is director at the Center of Social and
\nCultural Studies of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences.<\/p>",
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