China takes lead in pushing Asian security dialog

China takes lead in pushing Asian security dialog

Kavi Chongkittavorn, The Nation, Asia News Network, Bangkok

Of late, China has adopted a proactive role in shaping the
future security and strategic outlook of Asia, a far cry from the
passivity of yesteryear. Beijing hopes this new multilateral
approach will enhance peace and stability in the region as well
as increase its overall strategic leverage.

These objectives will become clear when China hosts the first
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Security Policy Conference (SPC) later
this year.

The ARF SPC, as it is known, is a Chinese brainchild aimed at
strengthening the security dialogue in Asia at the official
level. This inaugural meeting will be held in Beijing and
attended by deputy defense ministry officials from 24 ARF
members.

After the first meeting, subsequent ARF SPC meetings will be
held back to back with ARF senior official meetings. Among non-
Western ARF members, hopes are high that this new forum will
enable top defense officials to share their common views and
concerns, particularly on security and strategic matters.

Indeed, after 10 years of existence, the ARF still spends most
of the time talking.

Some ARF members have become so jaded by the lethargy of the
ARF's procedure-oriented approach that they have encouraged their
security officials and experts to take part in other regional
security dialogues such as the Asian Security Conference --
dubbed the Shangri-la Dialogue. This conference is organized by
the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London and
the Institute of Strategic and Defense Studies in Singapore.

When it started three years ago, it was touted as "the real"
regional security forum because of the attendance of military top
brass from the Asia-Pacific region. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, were among previous
guest speakers.

China sent a high-level delegation to attend the first meeting
but its representatives have been gradually downgraded.

China's growing recalcitrance was partly due to prevailing
views, particularly by a preponderance of Western-led security
think-tanks, held towards China's strategic outlook.

For decades, Chinese leaders have been responding to security
imperatives initiated by the West. As a passive participant,
China would normally react to Western overtures.

After the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S., China
realized that it had to take the bull by the horns and engage
with the international community, near and far.

Beijing is assisting Washington in the renewed six-party talks
on the North Korean nuclear crisis. This "offensive" maneuver
would allow Beijing to deposit its views and interest more
effectively.

Indeed, China perceives the ARF SPC as a "track one" platform
for the ARF defense and security ministers. Over time, Beijing
hopes it could further develop, along with the annual ARF, into a
genuine Asian security forum.

Beijing's latest approach demonstrated the new found
enthusiasm on the part of the Chinese defense and security
apparatus. Obviously, China would like to be in a position to
shape and provide inputs as well influence in the future security
configuration.

China has been one of the founders of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization. With the ARF SPC, Beijing will be able to shape and
set agenda for future ARF security cooperation.

That China is a key to any security dialogue in Asia was
acknowledged a long time ago. Last year, when China proposed that
the ARF defense officials should sit down and discuss issues of
common concerns and cooperation, the ARF members, especially the
U.S., agreed right away. In fact, they were quite positive
towards China's initiative.

It is interesting to note that when the senior officials
agreed to set up the ARF in Singapore in 1993, one year before
the ARF was officially launched in Bangkok, they concurred
unanimously that China's ARF membership was indispensable, albeit
that Beijing was not yet a dialogue partner of ASEAN. China first
attended the ASEAN meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 1991 as guest of
the host, Malaysia.

China's focus on multilateral security dialogue has twin
characters. First, it is anchored with ASEAN's conservative
global security outlook. For the time being, China and ASEAN
identify with one another at the ARF. For example, they want the
ARF to proceed at a snail's pace -- a long-term security
insurance of sorts -- and stick to the confidence-building
measures for the time being.

Other members prefer the ARF to proceed faster to a more
tangible security cooperation, especially towards preventive
diplomacy.

When ASEAN proposed that an ARF unit should be set up at the
Jakarta-based secretariat, China supported the initiative
immediately. However, other countries, including Japan, would
like to see a separate ARF unit established independently from
the ASEAN Secretariat.

At this juncture, nobody knows if the China-ASEAN convergence
of strategic interests can be sustained over time, especially
against the backdrop of a strong U.S. presence.

Second, it is China's long-standing attempt to draw a
parameter of its security and strategic interest in Asia. This is
something new. For the first time China will try to take the lead
in discussing security matters in the region, beyond the
bilateral defense discussion and cooperation. Since 1998, China
has signed a comprehensive cooperation agreement with all
individual ASEAN members.

Within Asia, China will maintain strategic edge over other
powers because it has the trust of ASEAN. Beijing's key strategic
concept of self-reliance augurs well with the grouping.