China takes lead in pushing Asian security dialog

Kavi Chongkittavorn, The Nation, Asia News Network, Bangkok

Of late, China has adopted a proactive role in shaping the future security and strategic outlook of Asia, a far cry from the passivity of yesteryear. Beijing hopes this new multilateral approach will enhance peace and stability in the region as well as increase its overall strategic leverage.

These objectives will become clear when China hosts the first ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Security Policy Conference (SPC) later this year.

The ARF SPC, as it is known, is a Chinese brainchild aimed at strengthening the security dialogue in Asia at the official level. This inaugural meeting will be held in Beijing and attended by deputy defense ministry officials from 24 ARF members.

After the first meeting, subsequent ARF SPC meetings will be held back to back with ARF senior official meetings. Among non- Western ARF members, hopes are high that this new forum will enable top defense officials to share their common views and concerns, particularly on security and strategic matters.

Indeed, after 10 years of existence, the ARF still spends most of the time talking.

Some ARF members have become so jaded by the lethargy of the ARF's procedure-oriented approach that they have encouraged their security officials and experts to take part in other regional security dialogues such as the Asian Security Conference -- dubbed the Shangri-la Dialogue. This conference is organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London and the Institute of Strategic and Defense Studies in Singapore.

When it started three years ago, it was touted as "the real" regional security forum because of the attendance of military top brass from the Asia-Pacific region. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, were among previous guest speakers.

China sent a high-level delegation to attend the first meeting but its representatives have been gradually downgraded.

China's growing recalcitrance was partly due to prevailing views, particularly by a preponderance of Western-led security think-tanks, held towards China's strategic outlook.

For decades, Chinese leaders have been responding to security imperatives initiated by the West. As a passive participant, China would normally react to Western overtures.

After the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S., China realized that it had to take the bull by the horns and engage with the international community, near and far.

Beijing is assisting Washington in the renewed six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear crisis. This "offensive" maneuver would allow Beijing to deposit its views and interest more effectively.

Indeed, China perceives the ARF SPC as a "track one" platform for the ARF defense and security ministers. Over time, Beijing hopes it could further develop, along with the annual ARF, into a genuine Asian security forum.

Beijing's latest approach demonstrated the new found enthusiasm on the part of the Chinese defense and security apparatus. Obviously, China would like to be in a position to shape and provide inputs as well influence in the future security configuration.

China has been one of the founders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. With the ARF SPC, Beijing will be able to shape and set agenda for future ARF security cooperation.

That China is a key to any security dialogue in Asia was acknowledged a long time ago. Last year, when China proposed that the ARF defense officials should sit down and discuss issues of common concerns and cooperation, the ARF members, especially the U.S., agreed right away. In fact, they were quite positive towards China's initiative.

It is interesting to note that when the senior officials agreed to set up the ARF in Singapore in 1993, one year before the ARF was officially launched in Bangkok, they concurred unanimously that China's ARF membership was indispensable, albeit that Beijing was not yet a dialogue partner of ASEAN. China first attended the ASEAN meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 1991 as guest of the host, Malaysia.

China's focus on multilateral security dialogue has twin characters. First, it is anchored with ASEAN's conservative global security outlook. For the time being, China and ASEAN identify with one another at the ARF. For example, they want the ARF to proceed at a snail's pace -- a long-term security insurance of sorts -- and stick to the confidence-building measures for the time being.

Other members prefer the ARF to proceed faster to a more tangible security cooperation, especially towards preventive diplomacy.

When ASEAN proposed that an ARF unit should be set up at the Jakarta-based secretariat, China supported the initiative immediately. However, other countries, including Japan, would like to see a separate ARF unit established independently from the ASEAN Secretariat.

At this juncture, nobody knows if the China-ASEAN convergence of strategic interests can be sustained over time, especially against the backdrop of a strong U.S. presence.

Second, it is China's long-standing attempt to draw a parameter of its security and strategic interest in Asia. This is something new. For the first time China will try to take the lead in discussing security matters in the region, beyond the bilateral defense discussion and cooperation. Since 1998, China has signed a comprehensive cooperation agreement with all individual ASEAN members.

Within Asia, China will maintain strategic edge over other powers because it has the trust of ASEAN. Beijing's key strategic concept of self-reliance augurs well with the grouping.