Campus Autonomy and the Risk of Corruption
A day before the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) named six suspects, including the Rector and Vice Rector III, in an alleged extortion and gratification case related to new student admissions at Jenderal Soedirman University, the KPK and the Council of Rectors of Indonesian State Universities formulated seven recommendations to strengthen campus integrity. One of these recommendations was to reinforce anti-manipulation systems in the independent admissions pathway.
The presumption of innocence must, of course, be respected. However, this case is too important to be read merely as the moral failure of a few individuals. This is especially true given that the corruption case involving student admissions at Lampung University is still recent. There is a more fundamental issue: the power of universities to manage money has grown, but oversight has not always grown proportionally. Autonomy is slowly acquiring a new meaning. Universities are not only given the freedom to manage themselves but are also increasingly encouraged to be able to finance themselves. When the pressure to generate revenue meets broad discretion and weak accountability, the risk of corruption also grows.
From Fiscal Pressure to Corruption Risk
In our system, state universities operate under three management models: PTN Satuan Kerja (Satker), PTN Badan Layanan Umum (BLU), and PTN Badan Hukum (PTN-BH). The closer an institution moves towards PTN-BH status, the greater its academic, organisational, and financial autonomy. PTN-BH revenue is not even classified as Non-Tax State Revenue (PNBP) and can be managed more independently.
This pressure is felt when budget efficiency measures are implemented and the fiscal space for education is also used for other priority programmes, including the Free Nutritious Meals programme. At the same time, universities are still required to pursue excellent accreditation, internationalisation, publications, research commercialisation, and digital transformation. All of these require funding. When state support does not grow in proportion to these demands, universities must find their own money. The easiest route is through students: Single Tuition Fees (UKT), Institutional Development Fees (IPI), independent admission pathways, international classes, professional education, and postgraduate programmes.
In 2023, the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) found problems in the determination and collection of UKT and IPI at six PTN-BH institutions—UI, UGM, USU, UB, ITB, and Undip—that were not in accordance with regulations, with a potential excess collection of Rp742.67 billion. The Lampung University case, and now the student admissions case at Unsoed, show that discretion in student admissions can become a corruption-prone point. This does not mean every PTN-BH is expensive or that independent admission pathways are inherently corrupt. The problem is structural: students are the nearest source of revenue and, at the same time, the party with the weakest bargaining power.
More advanced universities choose other routes through hospitals, research, patents, industrial cooperation, asset utilisation, and business entities. However, the risk of corruption does not disappear. It merely shifts to procurement, asset management, investment, remuneration of officials, affiliated transactions, and conflicts of interest. The 2024 Education Integrity Assessment Survey conducted by the KPK found that 68 percent of universities select goods and services providers based on personal relationships. Vendor commissions were found at 68 percent of campuses, while non-transparent procurement was recorded at 87 percent of universities. The freedom to manage money without transparency will only expand the dark spaces within campuses.
When Positions Become a Source of Power
There is another paradox: universities are required to become increasingly adept at generating revenue, but the people who carry out their primary functions are not necessarily prospering. In her opinion piece ‘Buruh Dosen’, Professor Sulistyowati Irianto described how lecturers often agree to be paid cheaply so that education can continue. A qualitative survey by Kompas of 36 state university lecturers in 2025 painted a similar picture: many lecturers have a base salary of Rp3 million to Rp4 million and must seek additional work.
PTN-BH status does provide room to improve the situation through remuneration. UGM, for example, explained at the Constitutional Court that there are payment components based on individual, position, and performance. Additional payments for officials who bear greater responsibility are certainly reasonable. The problem arises when holding a position becomes a more certain path to prosperity than academic work, the results of which only become visible years later. Lecturers who are diligent in the laboratory, library, and research field can fall behind those who are close to the centre of power and budget distribution. Positions then acquire economic value: remuneration, facilities, networks, and influence over resources.
It is at this point that economics meets campus politics. Contestation for positions can give rise to coalitions, reciprocal favours, and the placement of close associates. The KPK has included the selection of leaders and officials as one of the corruption risk areas in higher education. Research on the politicisation of academic senates also shows a relationship between power imbalances, conflicts of interest, and corrupt behaviour. Campus corruption therefore does not always begin with money in a suitcase. It can begin when close associates are placed in strategic positions, oversight is weakened, budgets are closed off, and criticism is considered disloyalty.
Autonomy then risks being enjoyed more by those who control the structure, while lecturers who choose to teach, research, and supervise students find themselves on the periphery of resource distribution. This inequality is also visible in the administrative consequences borne by ordinary lecturers. Civil servant lecturers at Brawijaya University, for example, receive two tax withholding slips after the campus became a PTN-BH: one from the government for income as civil servants and one from the university for income paid by the PTN-BH. When these two incomes are combined in the annual tax return, a tax underpayment can arise even though the lecturer’s income has not increased significantly. The campus gains institutional flexibility, but the economic benefits are not necessarily felt evenly. For those holding structural positions, this flexibility can be accompanied by remuneration and greater access to resources; for ordinary lecturers, it can mean additional administrative burdens.