A day before the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) named six\nsuspects, including the Rector and Vice Rector III, in an alleged\nextortion and gratification case related to new student admissions at\nJenderal Soedirman University, the KPK and the Council of Rectors of\nIndonesian State Universities formulated seven recommendations to\nstrengthen campus integrity. One of these recommendations was to\nreinforce anti-manipulation systems in the independent admissions\npathway.<\/p>\n
The presumption of innocence must, of course, be respected. However,\nthis case is too important to be read merely as the moral failure of a\nfew individuals. This is especially true given that the corruption case\ninvolving student admissions at Lampung University is still recent.\nThere is a more fundamental issue: the power of universities to manage\nmoney has grown, but oversight has not always grown proportionally.\nAutonomy is slowly acquiring a new meaning. Universities are not only\ngiven the freedom to manage themselves but are also increasingly\nencouraged to be able to finance themselves. When the pressure to\ngenerate revenue meets broad discretion and weak accountability, the\nrisk of corruption also grows.<\/p>\n
From Fiscal Pressure to Corruption Risk<\/p>\n
In our system, state universities operate under three management\nmodels: PTN Satuan Kerja (Satker), PTN Badan Layanan Umum (BLU), and PTN\nBadan Hukum (PTN-BH). The closer an institution moves towards PTN-BH\nstatus, the greater its academic, organisational, and financial\nautonomy. PTN-BH revenue is not even classified as Non-Tax State Revenue\n(PNBP) and can be managed more independently.<\/p>\n
This pressure is felt when budget efficiency measures are implemented\nand the fiscal space for education is also used for other priority\nprogrammes, including the Free Nutritious Meals programme. At the same\ntime, universities are still required to pursue excellent accreditation,\ninternationalisation, publications, research commercialisation, and\ndigital transformation. All of these require funding. When state support\ndoes not grow in proportion to these demands, universities must find\ntheir own money. The easiest route is through students: Single Tuition\nFees (UKT), Institutional Development Fees (IPI), independent admission\npathways, international classes, professional education, and\npostgraduate programmes.<\/p>\n
In 2023, the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) found problems in the\ndetermination and collection of UKT and IPI at six PTN-BH\ninstitutions\u2014UI, UGM, USU, UB, ITB, and Undip\u2014that were not in\naccordance with regulations, with a potential excess collection of\nRp742.67 billion. The Lampung University case, and now the student\nadmissions case at Unsoed, show that discretion in student admissions\ncan become a corruption-prone point. This does not mean every PTN-BH is\nexpensive or that independent admission pathways are inherently corrupt.\nThe problem is structural: students are the nearest source of revenue\nand, at the same time, the party with the weakest bargaining power.<\/p>\n
More advanced universities choose other routes through hospitals,\nresearch, patents, industrial cooperation, asset utilisation, and\nbusiness entities. However, the risk of corruption does not disappear.\nIt merely shifts to procurement, asset management, investment,\nremuneration of officials, affiliated transactions, and conflicts of\ninterest. The 2024 Education Integrity Assessment Survey conducted by\nthe KPK found that 68 percent of universities select goods and services\nproviders based on personal relationships. Vendor commissions were found\nat 68 percent of campuses, while non-transparent procurement was\nrecorded at 87 percent of universities. The freedom to manage money\nwithout transparency will only expand the dark spaces within\ncampuses.<\/p>\n
When Positions Become a Source of Power<\/p>\n
There is another paradox: universities are required to become\nincreasingly adept at generating revenue, but the people who carry out\ntheir primary functions are not necessarily prospering. In her opinion\npiece \u2018Buruh Dosen\u2019, Professor Sulistyowati Irianto described how\nlecturers often agree to be paid cheaply so that education can continue.\nA qualitative survey by Kompas of 36 state university lecturers in 2025\npainted a similar picture: many lecturers have a base salary of Rp3\nmillion to Rp4 million and must seek additional work.<\/p>\n
PTN-BH status does provide room to improve the situation through\nremuneration. UGM, for example, explained at the Constitutional Court\nthat there are payment components based on individual, position, and\nperformance. Additional payments for officials who bear greater\nresponsibility are certainly reasonable. The problem arises when holding\na position becomes a more certain path to prosperity than academic work,\nthe results of which only become visible years later. Lecturers who are\ndiligent in the laboratory, library, and research field can fall behind\nthose who are close to the centre of power and budget distribution.\nPositions then acquire economic value: remuneration, facilities,\nnetworks, and influence over resources.<\/p>\n
It is at this point that economics meets campus politics.\nContestation for positions can give rise to coalitions, reciprocal\nfavours, and the placement of close associates. The KPK has included the\nselection of leaders and officials as one of the corruption risk areas\nin higher education. Research on the politicisation of academic senates\nalso shows a relationship between power imbalances, conflicts of\ninterest, and corrupt behaviour. Campus corruption therefore does not\nalways begin with money in a suitcase. It can begin when close\nassociates are placed in strategic positions, oversight is weakened,\nbudgets are closed off, and criticism is considered disloyalty.<\/p>\n
Autonomy then risks being enjoyed more by those who control the\nstructure, while lecturers who choose to teach, research, and supervise\nstudents find themselves on the periphery of resource distribution. This\ninequality is also visible in the administrative consequences borne by\nordinary lecturers. Civil servant lecturers at Brawijaya University, for\nexample, receive two tax withholding slips after the campus became a\nPTN-BH: one from the government for income as civil servants and one\nfrom the university for income paid by the PTN-BH. When these two\nincomes are combined in the annual tax return, a tax underpayment can\narise even though the lecturer\u2019s income has not increased significantly.\nThe campus gains institutional flexibility, but the economic benefits\nare not necessarily felt evenly. For those holding structural positions,\nthis flexibility can be accompanied by remuneration and greater access\nto resources; for ordinary lecturers, it can mean additional\nadministrative burdens.<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/campus-autonomy-and-the-risk-of-corruption-1787626306", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }