Building new regional arrangements

Building new regional arrangements

Ralf Emmers, The Straits Times, Asia News Network/Singapore

The inaugural meeting of the East Asia Summit (EAS) early this
month in Kuala Lumpur is an important event for the region.

As a new grouping of 16 members, the EAS is a distinct
institutional expression that may complement the activities of
ASEAN, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Plus Three (APT).

Besides its raison d'etre and its potential relevance in the
coming years, the creation of a new regional arrangement forces
us to reflect on the kind of institutional architecture being
developed in East Asia today.

Some trends characterize the East Asian multilateral
architecture when examined from a security perspective.

First, the region now accommodates a great variety of security
structures, ranging from bilateral to multilateral arrangements.
The nature of such arrangements varies from military alliances to
institutional expressions of cooperative and comprehensive
security.

Second, East Asia has seen the emergence of new multilateral
institutions since the end of the Cold War, such as APEC, the ARF
and the EAS, as well as groupings operating at track two levels
like the Shangri-La Dialog and the Council for Security
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. East Asia has therefore moved
from being under-institutionalized, as argued by Aaron Friedberg
in his International Security article, to having a variety of
overlapping multilateral structures.

Third, particularly since the Asian financial crisis, there
has been a growing recognition of the close relationship between
economics and security. The APT has sought to incorporate
economic-security linkages as part of its cooperative structures.
ASEAN perceives the construction of security and economic
communities in Southeast Asia as complementary and mutually
reinforcing. The objective is to move towards deeper economic
integration while developing a region free from military
conflict.

Fourth, existing institutions in East Asia have taken on "new"
security roles since Sept. 11 and the 2002 Bali bombings. ASEAN,
the ARF and even APEC, originally formed to encourage trade and
investment liberalization, have been accorded a role in the
campaign against terrorism. Health concerns, transnational crimes
and other issues are also increasingly discussed at the
multilateral level.

Finally, despite the presence of a growing number of
overlapping structures, institutionalism in East Asia continues
to suffer from weak structural capacities that limit their
ability to respond to security challenges.

The ARF has enjoyed some success in confidence-building but it
is questionable whether it will succeed in moving towards
preventive diplomacy. The APT does not have the capabilities to
address security challenges and the complex relations between
China and Japan will probably continue to undermine its
effectiveness. The EAS should in the short to medium term be
expected to be another confidence-building exercise in the
region.

In light of these trends, what will be the driving forces for
change in East Asian institutionalism in the coming years?
Institution building in the region should continue to be
influenced by three primary factors: U.S. participation, the
nature of China's involvement and regionalism in Southeast Asia.

The United States has generally been supportive of
multilateral initiatives in East Asia. The long-term relevance of
multilateral structures may be undermined, however, by U.S.
unilateralism.

China has added a new diplomatic activism to its growing
economic and military growth. The Chinese "charm offensive"
towards Southeast Asia, including its offer of a free trade area
with ASEAN and its support for the EAS, is in contrast to China's
previous suspicion of multilateralism.

Will China continue to be an accommodating power or might it
adopt an assertive position in regional arrangements in the
coming years? Assertiveness could consist of Beijing pressing for
change in the norms of cooperation, adopting a restrictive
position on the agenda setting, and/or pushing for a more
exclusive approach in membership.

The U.S. would most likely refuse to be excluded from regional
institution-building. Washington has already indicated its
concern about the exclusive model of the EAS. The Southeast Asian
countries would be particularly uncomfortable with an assertive
Chinese leadership. An ongoing accommodative Chinese
participation would contribute to the development of an
institutional framework where multilateral arrangements
complement one another to promote peace and stability.

Finally, the future of East Asian institutionalism will be
influenced by the strength of regionalism in Southeast Asia.

For more than a decade, ASEAN has been driving multilateral
cooperation in East Asia -- whether in the form of the ARF, the
APT and now the EAS. ASEAN's assigned managerial role derives as
much from its unparalleled institutional experience in East Asia
as from the lack of an alternative source of leadership
acceptable to all.

As long as it succeeds in being innovative, ASEAN should play
a leading role in institution-building in East Asia. Whether
ASEAN moves towards a new era of legalization and regionalism as
suggested by recent initiatives will therefore have an impact on
East Asian institutionalism.

Strong regionalism in Southeast Asia combined with an active
U.S. participation and an accommodative Chinese foreign policy
would be the best scenario for East Asian institutionalism.

It could lead to a stronger ARF and APEC complemented by
arrangements more limited in their participation and geographical
scope like ASEAN, the APT and the EAS. The region should also be
aware, however, of the consequences of less beneficial scenarios
where regional institutions might compete with and cancel each
other out.

The writer is Assistant Professor and Deputy Head of Studies
at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies.