Bomb attacks could be done by anybody, aim at anyone, anywhere
Bomb attacks could be done by anybody, aim at anyone, anywhere
Abdul Khalik, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta
Following the Sept. 9 bombing outside the Australian Embassy in
Kuningan, South Jakarta, John Douglas, 40, who worked for a U.S.-
based multinational consultancy here, decided to return to Canada
despite unfinished business.
"I was scheduled to stay here for at least three months but I
decided to leave, although I had been here for three weeks only.
The bomb attack terrifies me. From what I read, the terrorists
can attack any place in the country," he told The Jakarta Post a
week after the bombing, which claimed 11 lives, including the
bomber, and injured more than 180 others.
Douglas, who consulted for a mining firm with several
operations across the archipelago, recalled his condition after
the blast. Every night, he was afraid a bomb could explode in
front of him while he was hanging out with colleagues or friends
at a cafe or hotel, even his office.
He said many friends had left the country soon after the bomb
went off.
"Let alone working, I couldn't focus even when I was talking
with my friends. I used to hang out in a place where many other
expatriates gathered because I enjoyed that. I know that the
bombers target places like this," he added.
From conversations with other expatriates, Douglas learned
most of them felt insecure in the city after the Kuningan attack.
The Australian Embassy was the second Western interest in
Jakarta to be targeted by terrorists after the U.S.-run J.W.
Marriott Hotel in the adjacent business district of Mega
Kuningan. The hotel bombing on Aug. 5, 2003, left 12 dead,
including the suicide bomber.
Kusno, 34, who works at a five-star hotel in Jakarta, was also
apprehensive that if the hotel was attacked, low-level employees
like him would suffer the most.
"The hotel I work at can be a target of attack at any time, as
many foreigners stay there. But it is always us who suffer. Look
at the Marriott or the Australian Embassy bombings. Who were the
victims? Who died in the blasts? We, the innocent and ordinary
people," he said.
The prevailing atmosphere of fear and anger did not abate in
the weeks following the Kuningan blast, during which a number of
bomb threats were recorded on a daily basis, although they turned
out to be hoaxes. Meanwhile, the police acknowledged they could
do nothing to stop bomb attacks despite preventive measures,
including the deployment of reinforcements at several potential
targets, including the embassy.
After a quick glance at ground zero in Kuningan, National
Police chief Gen. Da'i Bachtiar concluded that the blast was the
work of terror network Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), known to have links
to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, and Malaysian bomb makers Azahari
bin Husin and Noordin M. Top.
Azahari and Noordin are also believed to have masterminded the
Marriott attack, as well as the 2002 Bali bombing that killed at
least 202 people.
The police hunted down those responsible over the next few
weeks, making arrests almost every day to discover that Azahari
and Noordin had recruited over 100 people across East, West and
Central Java.
In the frenzy to capture the perpetrators, however --
pressured by public demand for justice and in some cases,
vengeance -- several innocent civilians were detained for
questioning and released, only to return to their neighborhood
communities to find that they had been stigmatized by the
terrorist label.
The Kuningan bombing could be said to be different from all
others since 2000 in that it enraged the public and turned them
completely against the terrorists. While Osama bin Laden T-shirts
hit the streets of the capital after Sept. 11, 2001, those that
emerged after the Kuningan blast were emblazoned with "F***
terrorists!"
The police were able to identify the car used in the suicide
bombing as a Daihatsu through the chassis number, and traced the
last owner of the car -- some trails led police back to the
convicted Bali bombers.
Three weeks later, the police arrested Agus Achmad Hidyat and
Mustakin, two close aides of Azahari who had played key roles in
the Kuningan bombing. From the two men, the police extracted much
valuable information, but Azahari and Noordin were still out of
reach.
In mid-October, the police concluded via DNA testing that Heri
Golun, a new recruit of Azahari and Noordin, was the sole suicide
bomber in the case.
After a lull of a couple of weeks, the police raided a rented
house in Cicurug village, Sukabumi, West Java, after a small
explosive device went off and injured one of its tenants.
The incident, however, was an indication as to the slowness of
the police, as well as to the locals' neglect in keeping an eye
out for suspicious characters and activities, particularly terror
suspects.
To their embarrassment, the police discovered that all the
wanted terror suspects, including Azahari and Noordin, had used
the house as a meeting point for several months without
disturbing their neighbors.
Da'i admitted to the sluggish work of his investigators and
vowed that it would not happen again.
Meanwhile, National Police chief of detectives Comr. Gen.
Suyitno Landung Sudjono, who led the Kuningan investigation,
conceded that the terrorists on the run possessed the capability
to launch more attacks.
"Our investigation has found that many suicide bombers were
recruited by the two bomb experts, and that they are scattered
(throughout the country). At the very least, they have a large
box full of explosives," Suyitno said.
He explained that most of the explosive materials used in the
Kuningan bombing, such as potassium chlorate, could be procured
easily at markets, while the TNT used in the Kuningan and
Marriott blasts were either imported or procured through the
military.
"Considering the availability of the materials, anybody with
minimal training can assemble bombs or at least detonate them.
Azahari is the key to their training," he said.
At the end of November, the police announced they had captured
four key members of Azahari's inner circle: Ansori, alias Hasan,
alias Agung, alias Purnomo; Ansori, alias Sogir; Syaiful Bahri,
alias Apuy; and Rois, alias Iwan Darmawan.
Da'i said Rois was closest to the Malaysians and knew their
whereabouts, and was optimistic that Azahari and Noordin could be
captured within the first 100 days of the new government.
However, the readiness and capability of the police to arrest
the two are doubted.
A policeman cited one of the detained suspects, who said
Azahari and Noordin were on a motorbike within the vicinity of
the embassy at the time of the explosion, and were stopped by the
police for a minor traffic violation.
"But the traffic police let them go for a few thousand rupiah
because they didn't recognize the terrorist suspects. How can we
expect citizens to recognize the suspects if the police officers
themselves can't," the policeman told the Post.
A sociologist from the University of Indonesia and a former
police officer, Bambang Widodo, said the recurring bomb attacks
proved that the authorities lacked the intelligence, capability
and coordination to prevent them.
"New suicide bombers can always be recruited because it is
based on faith, economic disparities and injustices. And
eradicating these is the government's job, not the police's.
However, the large number of intelligence bodies has hampered the
early warning system for terror attacks," Bambang told the Post.
He said each institution, including the National Intelligence
Agency (BIN), three military branches and the police, are
authorized to conduct intelligence activities, but did not share
crucial information with each other.
Bambang suggested that intelligence bodies be coordinated, as
terror threats continued.
Prior to the Kuningan bombing, BIN, or the antiterror desk at
the Office of the Coordinating Minister for Political and
Security Affairs, talked to the press about the possibility of a
fresh attack, but which the police were unable to confirm nor
deny.
A week or two before the bombing, at least three countries,
including the U.S. and Australia warned their citizens of
possible attacks on their interests throughout the country.
Although BIN seems to agree with the early warning, on several
occasions, the police has looked surprised in response to the
information.
Given the possibilities of terror threats and institutional
problems within the police, expatriates like Douglas and local
residents like Kusno have reason to feel insecure about living in
Indonesia.