Board of Peace: Peace Diplomacy or New Geopolitical Project?

Jakarta – When an institution claiming to advance peace emerges from the same circle of geopolitical power as the parties involved in conflict, the public is justified in asking: is this genuinely a peace project, or rather a new architecture of global interests? This question arose following the establishment of the Board of Peace (BoP), an international institution initiated by United States President Donald Trump in September 2025 to address stabilisation and reconstruction in Gaza following the war.

In the concept introduced by Trump, BoP is designed to oversee the demilitarisation of armed groups in Gaza, support transitional governance, and coordinate the reconstruction of territories devastated by war. The institution was subsequently formalised in early 2026 with the support of numerous countries and even obtained a limited mandate from the United Nations Security Council to assist with Gaza’s stabilisation for the coming years.

Indonesia, under President Prabowo Subianto, decided to join the initiative. The government described its participation as a strategic diplomatic step to support Palestinian independence and contribute to the peace process in Gaza. However, this decision raised several important questions, particularly when viewed from geopolitical and international organisational governance perspectives.

First, the issue of costs and accountability. BoP’s membership model grants permanent membership status to countries that contribute US$1 billion to the organisation’s fund. Converting this at approximately 17,000 Indonesian rupiah per dollar, this figure equates to roughly 17 trillion rupiah. This sum represents a substantial commitment for a developing nation such as Indonesia.

In international organisational practice, financial contributions are indeed common. However, the problem lies in the absence of clear transparency mechanisms regarding how these funds are managed, who oversees their use, and how accountability is maintained towards member states.

Second, BoP’s leadership structure warrants particular attention. Trump was appointed as the organisation’s chair indefinitely, with no fixed term limit except if he voluntarily relinquishes the position. In modern international organisational governance, such a concentration of power is relatively uncommon. Most international institutions employ leadership rotation or periodic election mechanisms to maintain balance of power and institutional legitimacy.

Third, the composition of BoP’s executive council has sparked debate. Several figures involved possess close political ties to Trump, including Jared Kushner, Marco Rubio, and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Some have strong backgrounds in global investment sectors, including property and infrastructure development.

Within the context of post-war reconstruction, which typically involves projects worth billions of dollars, this composition raises concerns about potential conflicts of interest between the peace agenda and economic opportunities. These concerns are not unfounded. History of post-war reconstruction demonstrates that rebuilding projects in conflict zones frequently become significant investment fields for international companies. In the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance, reconstruction projects worth tens of billions of dollars were largely executed by companies from countries involved in military operations.

In the Gaza context, the potential for reconstruction projects is equally substantial. The World Bank estimates that infrastructural damage from the war in Gaza reaches tens of billions of dollars and will require years for complete recovery. This situation underscores the critical importance of institutional governance to prevent the reconstruction mechanism from becoming an arena for new global economic interests.

Fourth, representation issues merit attention. Palestine itself is not a full member of BoP, despite its territory being the primary focus of the organisation’s programme. Under the current design, Palestinian representation is only involved in technical committees managing Gaza’s daily administration.

This raises a fundamental question: can a peace process be effective if the directly affected party lacks an equal position in strategic decision-making?

Meanwhile, regional geopolitical dynamics show that the Gaza stabilisation process remains far from straightforward. By early 2026, several BoP member countries had indeed pledged over US$5 billion in reconstruction funding. However, regional conflict escalation, particularly heightened tensions between Iran and Israel, has delayed portions of Gaza-related diplomatic processes.

For Indonesia, this situation creates a strategic dilemma. On one hand, involvement in BoP can be understood as an effort to strengthen Indonesia’s diplomatic role in the Palestinian issue, which has remained a central concern of national foreign policy. On the other hand, such involvement risks creating the perception that Indonesia has drawn too close to a particular geopolitical initiative whose legitimacy and effectiveness remain unproven. For decades, Indonesia has pursued a foreign policy of independence and active participation through multilateral forums, particularly in addressing international conflicts through principled and inclusive approaches.