Blame game over the Aceh problem

Blame game over the Aceh problem

Damien Kingsbury, Melbourne

The conflict in Aceh is perhaps Indonesia's most emotive and
divisive. After the 'loss' of East Timor in 1999, the Indonesian
military (TNI) has committed itself to never again suffering such
a 'defeat'.

This is so much the case that it is effectively forbidden, by
the TNI, to hold any view other than that Aceh should remain as a
part of the unitary state.

Genuine autonomy, that is, federalism, is not on the agenda.
The corollary of that is that the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), which
is trying to establish a separate state, must be demonized. This
applies to foreigners at least as much as to Indonesians, at
least if they wish to visit, and especially work in, Indonesia.

To this end, the recent article here by Kirsten Schultz
reflects a view that is entirely in keeping with the TNI's
official line on Aceh. Schultz' article does express one
legitimate concern, on the tragedy of war. Yet Schultz's focus on
the victims of GAM implies a type of equivalence that is
inaccurate.

The Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin once said that the death of
a person is a tragedy, but that the death of a million is a
statistic. He and Schultz are correct to note that for every
person killed, no matter by whom, there will be a grieving
spouse, children and friends. And every person that GAM
kills adds to this tragic list.

As Schultz and I also agree, liberation movements should
behave in as exemplary manner as possible, if they are to
retain the high moral ground their causes imply.

Yet death in greater numbers is not a statistic, but a greater
tragedy. Schultz's focus on the 'crimes' of GAM ignores the
demonstrable fact that it is the TNI that is responsible for the
overwhelming majority of civilian deaths in Aceh, that targeting
civilians is a routine TNI tactic, and that as an institution
that claims legitimacy in Aceh its actions have only further
delegitimized both itself and the state it represents.

Similarly, while GAM raises 'taxes', which can be called
'extortion' or even robbery if one does not wish to comply, GAM
argues that as the legitimate government of the 'state' taxation
is its right, in the same way that the Indonesian state imposes
taxes.

What Schultz neglected to mention,however, was that of the
extortion and robbery that plagues Aceh, members of the TNI
undertake the overwhelming majority of it, with the quasi-
military police taking up most of the rest, including dressing as
civilians and holding up transport along the main roads, along
with illegal logging, 'taxes' on fishing and coffee.

Conversely, while GAM has targeted specific civilians it
considers traitors or opponents to its cause, it does not
systematically target the Acehnese population as such. Indeed, as
a classic guerrilla army, it could not survive without the active
support of the vast majority of Acehnese people, and this cannot
happen if they are alienated.

Based on the TNI's own figures, from GAM's original force in
May 2003, the equivalent to its entire number has been either
killed, captured or surrendered. Yet after more than a year of
the TNI's most concerted campaign ever, GAM's strength in the
field remains at around 80 percent. This reflects both the
support it was able to receive from among Acehnese people, as
well as the TNI's failure to win their 'hearts and minds'.

It is morally impossible to accept the harming of civilians in
any conflict, even if this is a reality of war. But if there is
to be a demand for accountability, it defies logic to not lay it
at the feet of the organization that is responsible for the
overwhelming majority of civilian casualties.

This type of implied impunity for the TNI is expected in Aceh,
and reflects a wider problem of the role of the TNI in politics,
in business and in criminal activity. It may be that in any
conflict no-one is entirely innocent, but by attacking the
victim, in relative terms, Schultz offers no solution to
the Aceh problem or, by extension, for the reform of the TNI upon
which so much of Indonesia's process of democratization rests.

If one is to try to constructively address the Aceh problem,
it might be more useful to look at returning to a ceasefire
between the TNI and GAM, ensuring that the ceasefire holds, and
then using the good will that can be built up over time to re-
open a genuine dialogue about Aceh's future with Indonesia.

Dr. Damien Kingsbury is Senior Lecturer in International
Development at Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia, and is
author of Power Politics and the Indonesian Military.