Awaiting the Results of the National Police Reform Commission's Work

Based on the latest information—since its establishment on 7 November 2025—the Commission for Accelerating National Police Reform has reportedly completed its main mandate and is preparing to submit its work results to the President. However, as this commission is ad hoc in nature, the end of its substantive work does not stop at the submission of documents, but rather at how far those strategic recommendations are accepted, decided upon, and implemented by the President as the highest political authority in the government system. It is at this point that the public places both hope and caution. Police reform is not merely about formulating ideas, but ensuring that those ideas transform into operational policies with real impact. The commission has compiled comprehensive recommendations in 10 books, summarising societal aspirations and internal study results. At least eight Police Regulations (Perpol) and 24 Chief of Police Regulations (Perkap) are proposed for revision as the foundation for long-term improvements. This indicates that the problems in the National Police are not only at the level of individual behaviour, but also in the architecture of regulations and institutional governance. First, regarding the position of the National Police and the Chief of Police, who are directly under the President. Constitutionally, this design places the police in the orbit of executive power, which on one hand guarantees civilian control, but on the other hand has the potential to create a concentration of power without adequate oversight. Second, the mechanism for selecting the Chief of Police, which involves the President and the DPR, is in essence a form of checks and balances, but in practice it often gets trapped in political compromises that may not align with the institutional reform agenda. Third, and this is a crucial point, is the strengthening of the role of the National Police Commission (Kompolnas) as an external oversight body. In the perspective of civilian oversight, the existence of a civilian oversight institution is not an administrative complement, but a main pillar in ensuring police accountability. Without independent external oversight, internal police reform risks being trapped in a weak self-correcting mechanism—where the institution supervises itself with standards that are not always transparent to the public. Fourth, the issue of assigning police members to civilian positions has resurfaced. In the framework of a democratic rule-of-law state, there needs to be a clear boundary between security functions and civilian functions. Overlapping roles not only have the potential to blur professionalism, but also open up room for conflicts of interest. Therefore, synchronisation between the National Police Law, the Civil Service Law, and Constitutional Court decisions is an absolute prerequisite. The urgency of this reform does not arise in a vacuum.