Assessing the Position of Kompolnas in the Civilian Oversight Ecosystem
Jakarta (ANTARA) - The discourse on police reform continues alongside the completion of the National Police Reform Acceleration Commission (KPRP)’s work, which brings four agendas of recommendations for improvements due to the decline in public trust towards the Bhayangkara Corps.
The Ombudsman, in the last five years, has received approximately 3,308 public complaints related to police services. This number places the Indonesian National Police (Polri) in the top 10 institutions with the most complaint reports.
The Ombudsman’s findings align with the National Police Commission’s (Kompolnas) 2023 records, which noted 1,150 reports concerning the Polri institution.
The most highlighted issues are the quality of Polri services (1,098 reports) and 45 reports regarding abuse of authority. Meanwhile, there is one report of alleged corruption, four reports of discriminatory treatment, and two reports of misuse of discretion.
From the above data, the fundamental question to pose is no longer just what needs to be fixed, but how the oversight architecture can be built sustainably.
In this context, the discourse on strengthening Kompolnas, as recommended by the KPRP, so that Kompolnas is not merely an administrative complement but a strategic node in the design of civilian oversight over armed apparatus, invites a deep examination.
Civilian Oversight
Theoretically, the concept of civilian oversight (civilian control of armed forces) over armed apparatus is the main foundation in a democratic state. American political expert Samuel P. Huntington, in his book titled The Soldier and the State (1957), distinguishes between objective civilian control and subjective civilian control.
That expert emphasises that the first is the professionalism of the apparatus with strong institutional oversight, while the second tends to place the apparatus under the dominance of certain politics.
In the Indonesian context, the challenge of Polri reform lies in the suboptimal institutionalisation of independent, accountable, and effective objective civilian control.
It is here that the position of Kompolnas becomes important. As an institution normatively mandated to provide advice and considerations to the President and to oversee Polri’s performance, this commission’s function should truly be maximised to become a bridge between public interests and the police institution.
However, in practice, Kompolnas’s authority remains limited, both in terms of access to information, the binding power of recommendations, and institutional independence. As a result, the oversight function carried out by Kompolnas currently tends to be reactive and symbolic, not yet touching deeper structural dimensions.