Arranging the Pendulum of Central-Regional Relations
Since the reforms, central-regional relations have swung like a pendulum, initially decentralistic and lately centralistic. The agenda to revise the Regional Government Law must become a momentum to design a long-term legal political framework.
The plan to amend the Regional Government Law (UU), which is included in the 2026 National Legislation Programme (Prolegnas), reopens debates on the direction of central and regional relations. More than a quarter of a century since 1998, the regional autonomy framework has yet to find a point of balance. Each change to the Law intended to address regional governance issues instead reveals a recurring pattern, namely that central-regional relations move like a pendulum continuously swinging between decentralisation and centralisation.
Since the 1998 reforms, the legal framework for regional governance has undergone several changes. It began with Law No. 22 of 1999, which granted broad autonomy to regions as a correction to the centralistic regional governance system in the New Order era. Then came Law No. 32 of 2004, which arranged central-regional relations, up to Law No. 23 of 2014, which strengthened the central role in several strategic affairs. Each change in the Law was born from different political contexts, thus bringing policy orientations that are not always the same.
Changes in the legal framework actually reflect legislators’ efforts to find a balance between the needs of regional autonomy and the interests of maintaining national integration. However, in practice, these changes are often reactive to short-term issues rather than stemming from a long-term legal political design.
TENDING TO BE FLUCTUATING
The impact is that the direction of central-regional relations tends to be fluctuating. When decentralisation is too broad and considered to cause coordination problems and policy fragmentation, it is responded to by pulling back some authorities to the centre. Conversely, when there is a tendency towards recentralisation, demands arise to expand regional autonomy.
In such situations, central-regional relations no longer move stably according to the constitutional design but follow the dynamics of legal politics and the practical needs of the ruling regime from time to time, which are short-term in nature. In fact, if traced further, the constitution provides a clear normative foundation regarding the direction of central-regional relations that is more consistent and permanent.
First, the principle of popular sovereignty affirmed in Article 1 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. This principle places the people as the source of state power legitimacy, so the implementation of governance, both at the centre and in the regions, must be rooted and grow from mechanisms of democracy and accountability to the people as the holders of sovereignty.
Second, the principle of a unitary state as regulated in Article 1 paragraph (1). This principle positions Indonesia as a single unitary state that is not divided like a federation. Thus, the implementation of central and regional governance must be within the framework of a unitary state. This principle demands strong national policy integration between the centre and the regions.
Third, the presidential system as reflected in Article 4, Article 6A, Article 7, and Article 7A of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, which affirms that the president receives a direct mandate from the people, thus holding power and responsibility for the entire implementation of governance both at the centre and in the regions.
These three principles are often read partially in state discourse. However, if understood holistically, they provide a solid normative framework for formulating a more stable and long-term legal political design for central-regional relations.
The principle of popular sovereignty requires a vibrant local democracy. The unitary state demands non-fragmented national governance, while the presidential system demands the integrity and effectiveness of executive leadership. These three are not mutually negating principles but must be woven together in a coherent and whole governance architecture.
It is within this framework that central-regional relations are understood as part of a legal political design called the democratic unitary executive. This design places regional autonomy within a democratic unitary state framework, while ensuring the effectiveness of national governance implementation under the president’s responsibility.
Through this design, regional autonomy is not understood as a fragmented release of central authority to the regions but as part of an integrated national governance. Regional autonomy is not merely an administrative distribution of powers but also an instrument of democracy in a unitary state. At the same time, this design affirms that a unitary state is not identical to the centralisation of power. A unitary state actually requires a central-regional relationship pattern that guarantees national integrity without stifling local democracy.
If the amendment to the Regional Government Law only focuses on redistributing powers, by moving some governance affairs to the centre or vice versa to the regions, the ebb and flow of central-regional relations may continue to recur. The amendment to the Law must become a momentum to re-formulate the constitutional-based legal politics of central-regional relations. Without directed legal politics, every revision of the Law will only shift the pendulum’s position without truly stabilising it.
In the end, the legal politics of central-regional relations is not merely about choosing between extreme centralisation or decentralisation. What is needed is a balanced pendulum that can maintain and realise local democracy, while ensuring integrated and effective national governance.
The momentum of the Regional Government Law amendment must be utilised to transcend the classical discourse on the division of governance affairs or powers. What is more principal and comprehensive is to formulate the legal politics of central-regional relations that is