Arab Businessman Causes War Defeat; Turns Out to Be Israeli Intelligence

A prominent Arab entrepreneur turned out to be an agent of Israel’s Mossad. His identity was disclosed after he leaked Syrian military secrets, and he was executed publicly. The figure is Eli Cohen, who operated under the alias Kamel Amin Thaabet.

Cohen grew up in Egypt. In 1954 he moved to Israel after being recruited as a Mossad agent. He was then tasked with infiltrating Syria as a textile magnate. Here, Cohen began introducing himself under the pseudonym ‘Kamel’.

In the narrative, Kamel is described as a man born and raised in Syria, but in 1949 he moved to Argentina with his family and started a textile business there.

Through this business network, Mossad instructed Kamel to acquaint himself with Syrian dignitaries to obtain state secrets. It is noted that, since its founding in 1948, Israel has faced censure from Arab states, including Syria.

By embedding spies, Israel hoped to stay one step ahead and anticipate Syria’s moves. Thus began Kamel’s espionage as a wealthy textile entrepreneur in 1960.

Infiltrating Syria.

In the book Our Man in Damascus, written by Elie Cohn (1971), the first step for Kamel to enter Syria is via the Syrian military attaché in Argentina, General Amin al-Hafez. To al-Hafez, Kamel expressed his wish to return to his homeland in Syria. As a rich businessman, he claimed he wanted to help rebuild his homeland, especially given the dire situation in Syria, where corruption was rife.

As a nationalist general, al-Hafez’s heart was moved. He subsequently brought Kamel to Syria and introduced him to colleagues as a benevolent entrepreneur. Kamel’s initial friendship with one person grew rapidly into connections with several people—elites in power and within the military. Through this network, Kamel conducted textile business and rose to become one of Syria’s leading entrepreneurs.

Samantha Wilson, in Israel (2011), notes that the Syrian elite were known for their fondness for revelry. Information exchanges often took place in the gaps between dancing and drinking. This habit Kamel exploited. Kamel frequently hosted parties and invited Syrian elites. Through this, he became better known and eventually entered the inner circle of power, all without anyone suspecting that Kamel was an Israeli spy.

Caught.

In 1963, Kamel’s close associate Amin al-Hafez had become president. Al-Hafez trusted Kamel as a businessman who would help him build Syria. He was often invited by the president to strategic and secret locations. It was at this point that Kamel learned about secret military locations, the number of troops and equipment, and Syria’s military plans against Israel.

All this information was later sent by Morse code to Israel at night. This continued for over three years.

Meanwhile, the Syrian president’s trust in Kamel grew. He was offered the post of Deputy Minister of Defence of Syria. In Our Man in Damascus, Elie Cohn (1971) notes that when offered this post, Kamel hesitated and was afraid. After consulting with Mossad, the spy ultimately accepted the offer. However, before he could be sworn in, Kamel made a fatal mistake.

On a night in 1965, Kamel was discovered transmitting Morse code by Syrian forces. By that time, the Syrian military already had information about a spy leaking state secrets. They conducted an investigation and the spy turned out to be the man who was about to become Syria’s Deputy Minister of Defence: Kamel Amin Thaabet.

President al-Hafez was furious. Because of Eli Cohen alias Kamel’s espionage, Syria had to bear defeats in every war against Israel.

From that moment, Kamel was captured and tortured daily. Syrians close to Kamel were also purged. They were deemed to have shamed the country.

His life ended on 18 May 1965. He was hanged in public. His body was discarded and never returned to Israel. Even in death, the secrets had already leaked.

Again, because of Kamel’s actions, Israel was able to know detailed locations of military secrets for the next two years, particularly during the Six-Day War in June 1967. The leak in information was what allowed Israel to win even when attacked by Arab states.