Anatomy of Indonesia's anxiety about succession
Anatomy of Indonesia's anxiety about succession
A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s;
Adam Schwarz; Published by Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd, Australia,
1994; 370 pages
JAKARTA (JP): This is the latest effort of dissecting the
anatomy of the anxiety in Indonesia today, especially among the
elite and middle classes, pending one of the most crucial moments
of the country's history: the succession of power from President
Soeharto.
Adam Schwarz, who reported on Indonesia for the Far Eastern
Economic Review from 1988 to 1992 and who worked at this paper
for ten months, singles out all the speculations, gossip and
rumors among the various anxious groups of society. He then
systematically arranges them all to produce a clear panorama of
Indonesian politics now and in its highly uncertain future.
At the center of the debate is Soeharto, Indonesia's second
president who has brought the country into the club of emerging
Asian tigers. But the country's economic success has in fact been
accomplished at great expense. All sections of society, except
for the executive branch of the government, remain weak. Soeharto
has deliberately left them this way because of his conviction
that economic development is only possible through political
stability, meaning an all-powerful state, Schwarz says.
While in the past decades Soeharto barely found any barriers
in de-politicizing his people to make his policy run effectively,
he is now dealing with a much changed population. In 1990, the
government granted more freedom of speech to the public under the
name 'keterbukaan' (openness). Excited about the end of the long
winter of fear and silence, the various and often conflicting
groups didn't hesitate to talk out about issues such as human and
political rights. They criticized rampant cronyism, nepotism and
corruption. In brief, they demanded, politely in western
standards, political changes.
Reneging on their promise, says Schwarz, the government tried
to dam the bulging democratic stream. The public, however, were
no longer willing to be put under total control as was proved by
the Indonesian Democratic Party stubbornly choosing a leader not
agreeable to the government.
Schwarz states: "To the outside world, the veneer of
Indonesian politics appears smooth and is largely bereft of
meaning. But below this smooth surface, the political waters are
a good deal more active."
The succession of power is imminent and uncertain. No one can
predict how and when it will take place.
Indonesia has experienced at least two moments in its history
of the same decisiveness: one in the struggle for independence
from the Dutch in the 1940s; another one in the transition of
power from the country's first president, Sukarno, to Soeharto in
the 1960s. Both were painful episodes, and cost hundreds of
thousands of lives. Indonesians of all political ideologies hope
that the next transition will be smoother. But how, given the
fact that even public discussion of the issue is quickly
dismissed by the government as "unethical"?
Two issues
Schwarz argues that current political debate in Indonesia has
two components. One is the succession issue, the other is
political change. The debate is complicated because the two are
tightly interconnected.
"...it may not be possible to arrange a smooth succession
without first changing the prevailing political approach. And it
also may not be possible to make any meaningful political changes
while Soeharto remains in power," contends Schwarz.
Aggravating the uncertainty of the future is the fact that all
components of Indonesian elite involved in the debate conflict
with each other over their stances, goals and expectations.
The business community is divided into two groups. One group
is a modicum of Chinese businessmen who have amassed great wealth
through their links with the palace's family. The other group is
native business people who are unhappy about being out of favor
with the New Order administration. However, most of this native
business group prefer a strong executive (mutatis mutandis) than
the more democratic one, for protection.
The country's Islamic groups seem more united even though the
government sponsored Moslem intellectuals organization (ICMI) is
actually fragmented. Its members range from soft-liners who want
economic and social betterment for Moslems; to the hard-liners
who long for Islam to gain political power through the ICMI.
There is also Abdurrahman Wahid, the NU chief who lobbies against
the ambitious section of the ICMI. He believes the organization
wants to use religion as a political weapon.
On the other side is the group of democracy advocates,
including civilian politicians, intellectuals, artists and the
press. They are concerned about the big issues of human rights,
justice, freedom of speech, military domination, etc.
Schwarz also spends quite some time on East Timor, a stubborn
issue with an international dimension he believes might only be
solved by a post-Soeharto administration.
Next is the Armed Forces (ABRI). Although it looks weakened by
the recent "civilianization" in Golkar, it remains the most
powerful institution in the country -- a status it surely will
keep even after Soeharto has left the scene. Certain groups
within ABRI side with the democratization advocates, while others
stick with a conservative, secure approach because of a lingering
fear of sectarian impulses.
Schwarz can't name any potential successors amidst the
political jumble. What he does is guess at some succession
scenarios. His coalition scenario: Any component of the
Indonesian elite -- democracy advocates, Islamic groups -- should
coalesce with the indispensable ABRI to make a "smooth"
succession possible. Yet, admits Schwarz, none of the coalition
scenarios is feasible due to the internal disunity of each group
and the long-rooted prejudices and sentiments the groups have
toward one another.
Schwarz deduces that Soeharto has accomplished a great deal
for the country, for which Indonesians must thank him. His feats
outweigh his flaws.
Indonesian anxiety lies in the future: whoever succeeds the
President cannot be as powerful as he is, and must deal with
conflicting interests Soeharto has deliberately and acutely
preserved and manipulated to keep power. Unless he successfully
prepares a smooth succession, "history books may well write of
him that the worst aspect of his rule was the way in which he
left," Schwarz concludes.
Schwarz's book provides new, valuable information to many non-
Indonesian readers. To Indonesians, especially the educated
elite, many facts and stories in the book are surely not new.
They have long been the topic of their hushed, private
conversations. The book's strength is that it sheds light on the
current political climate and allows us to see it more clearly.
-- Johannes Simbolon