Anatomy of Indonesia's anxiety about succession

Anatomy of Indonesia's anxiety about succession

A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s; Adam Schwarz; Published by Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd, Australia, 1994; 370 pages

JAKARTA (JP): This is the latest effort of dissecting the anatomy of the anxiety in Indonesia today, especially among the elite and middle classes, pending one of the most crucial moments of the country's history: the succession of power from President Soeharto.

Adam Schwarz, who reported on Indonesia for the Far Eastern Economic Review from 1988 to 1992 and who worked at this paper for ten months, singles out all the speculations, gossip and rumors among the various anxious groups of society. He then systematically arranges them all to produce a clear panorama of Indonesian politics now and in its highly uncertain future.

At the center of the debate is Soeharto, Indonesia's second president who has brought the country into the club of emerging Asian tigers. But the country's economic success has in fact been accomplished at great expense. All sections of society, except for the executive branch of the government, remain weak. Soeharto has deliberately left them this way because of his conviction that economic development is only possible through political stability, meaning an all-powerful state, Schwarz says.

While in the past decades Soeharto barely found any barriers in de-politicizing his people to make his policy run effectively, he is now dealing with a much changed population. In 1990, the government granted more freedom of speech to the public under the name 'keterbukaan' (openness). Excited about the end of the long winter of fear and silence, the various and often conflicting groups didn't hesitate to talk out about issues such as human and political rights. They criticized rampant cronyism, nepotism and corruption. In brief, they demanded, politely in western standards, political changes.

Reneging on their promise, says Schwarz, the government tried to dam the bulging democratic stream. The public, however, were no longer willing to be put under total control as was proved by the Indonesian Democratic Party stubbornly choosing a leader not agreeable to the government.

Schwarz states: "To the outside world, the veneer of Indonesian politics appears smooth and is largely bereft of meaning. But below this smooth surface, the political waters are a good deal more active."

The succession of power is imminent and uncertain. No one can predict how and when it will take place.

Indonesia has experienced at least two moments in its history of the same decisiveness: one in the struggle for independence from the Dutch in the 1940s; another one in the transition of power from the country's first president, Sukarno, to Soeharto in the 1960s. Both were painful episodes, and cost hundreds of thousands of lives. Indonesians of all political ideologies hope that the next transition will be smoother. But how, given the fact that even public discussion of the issue is quickly dismissed by the government as "unethical"?

Two issues

Schwarz argues that current political debate in Indonesia has two components. One is the succession issue, the other is political change. The debate is complicated because the two are tightly interconnected.

"...it may not be possible to arrange a smooth succession without first changing the prevailing political approach. And it also may not be possible to make any meaningful political changes while Soeharto remains in power," contends Schwarz.

Aggravating the uncertainty of the future is the fact that all components of Indonesian elite involved in the debate conflict with each other over their stances, goals and expectations.

The business community is divided into two groups. One group is a modicum of Chinese businessmen who have amassed great wealth through their links with the palace's family. The other group is native business people who are unhappy about being out of favor with the New Order administration. However, most of this native business group prefer a strong executive (mutatis mutandis) than the more democratic one, for protection.

The country's Islamic groups seem more united even though the government sponsored Moslem intellectuals organization (ICMI) is actually fragmented. Its members range from soft-liners who want economic and social betterment for Moslems; to the hard-liners who long for Islam to gain political power through the ICMI. There is also Abdurrahman Wahid, the NU chief who lobbies against the ambitious section of the ICMI. He believes the organization wants to use religion as a political weapon.

On the other side is the group of democracy advocates, including civilian politicians, intellectuals, artists and the press. They are concerned about the big issues of human rights, justice, freedom of speech, military domination, etc.

Schwarz also spends quite some time on East Timor, a stubborn issue with an international dimension he believes might only be solved by a post-Soeharto administration.

Next is the Armed Forces (ABRI). Although it looks weakened by the recent "civilianization" in Golkar, it remains the most powerful institution in the country -- a status it surely will keep even after Soeharto has left the scene. Certain groups within ABRI side with the democratization advocates, while others stick with a conservative, secure approach because of a lingering fear of sectarian impulses.

Schwarz can't name any potential successors amidst the political jumble. What he does is guess at some succession scenarios. His coalition scenario: Any component of the Indonesian elite -- democracy advocates, Islamic groups -- should coalesce with the indispensable ABRI to make a "smooth" succession possible. Yet, admits Schwarz, none of the coalition scenarios is feasible due to the internal disunity of each group and the long-rooted prejudices and sentiments the groups have toward one another.

Schwarz deduces that Soeharto has accomplished a great deal for the country, for which Indonesians must thank him. His feats outweigh his flaws.

Indonesian anxiety lies in the future: whoever succeeds the President cannot be as powerful as he is, and must deal with conflicting interests Soeharto has deliberately and acutely preserved and manipulated to keep power. Unless he successfully prepares a smooth succession, "history books may well write of him that the worst aspect of his rule was the way in which he left," Schwarz concludes.

Schwarz's book provides new, valuable information to many non- Indonesian readers. To Indonesians, especially the educated elite, many facts and stories in the book are surely not new. They have long been the topic of their hushed, private conversations. The book's strength is that it sheds light on the current political climate and allows us to see it more clearly.

-- Johannes Simbolon