Anatomy of Indonesia's anxiety about succession<\/p>\n
A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s;
\nAdam Schwarz; Published by Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd, Australia,
\n1994; 370 pages<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): This is the latest effort of dissecting the
\nanatomy of the anxiety in Indonesia today, especially among the
\nelite and middle classes, pending one of the most crucial moments
\nof the country's history: the succession of power from President
\nSoeharto.<\/p>\n
Adam Schwarz, who reported on Indonesia for the Far Eastern
\nEconomic Review from 1988 to 1992 and who worked at this paper
\nfor ten months, singles out all the speculations, gossip and
\nrumors among the various anxious groups of society. He then
\nsystematically arranges them all to produce a clear panorama of
\nIndonesian politics now and in its highly uncertain future.<\/p>\n
At the center of the debate is Soeharto, Indonesia's second
\npresident who has brought the country into the club of emerging
\nAsian tigers. But the country's economic success has in fact been
\naccomplished at great expense. All sections of society, except
\nfor the executive branch of the government, remain weak. Soeharto
\nhas deliberately left them this way because of his conviction
\nthat economic development is only possible through political
\nstability, meaning an all-powerful state, Schwarz says.<\/p>\n
While in the past decades Soeharto barely found any barriers
\nin de-politicizing his people to make his policy run effectively,
\nhe is now dealing with a much changed population. In 1990, the
\ngovernment granted more freedom of speech to the public under the
\nname 'keterbukaan' (openness). Excited about the end of the long
\nwinter of fear and silence, the various and often conflicting
\ngroups didn't hesitate to talk out about issues such as human and
\npolitical rights. They criticized rampant cronyism, nepotism and
\ncorruption. In brief, they demanded, politely in western
\nstandards, political changes.<\/p>\n
Reneging on their promise, says Schwarz, the government tried
\nto dam the bulging democratic stream. The public, however, were
\nno longer willing to be put under total control as was proved by
\nthe Indonesian Democratic Party stubbornly choosing a leader not
\nagreeable to the government.<\/p>\n
Schwarz states: \"To the outside world, the veneer of
\nIndonesian politics appears smooth and is largely bereft of
\nmeaning. But below this smooth surface, the political waters are
\na good deal more active.\"<\/p>\n
The succession of power is imminent and uncertain. No one can
\npredict how and when it will take place.<\/p>\n
Indonesia has experienced at least two moments in its history
\nof the same decisiveness: one in the struggle for independence
\nfrom the Dutch in the 1940s; another one in the transition of
\npower from the country's first president, Sukarno, to Soeharto in
\nthe 1960s. Both were painful episodes, and cost hundreds of
\nthousands of lives. Indonesians of all political ideologies hope
\nthat the next transition will be smoother. But how, given the
\nfact that even public discussion of the issue is quickly
\ndismissed by the government as \"unethical\"?<\/p>\n
Two issues<\/p>\n
Schwarz argues that current political debate in Indonesia has
\ntwo components. One is the succession issue, the other is
\npolitical change. The debate is complicated because the two are
\ntightly interconnected.<\/p>\n
\"...it may not be possible to arrange a smooth succession
\nwithout first changing the prevailing political approach. And it
\nalso may not be possible to make any meaningful political changes
\nwhile Soeharto remains in power,\" contends Schwarz.<\/p>\n
Aggravating the uncertainty of the future is the fact that all
\ncomponents of Indonesian elite involved in the debate conflict
\nwith each other over their stances, goals and expectations.<\/p>\n
The business community is divided into two groups. One group
\nis a modicum of Chinese businessmen who have amassed great wealth
\nthrough their links with the palace's family. The other group is
\nnative business people who are unhappy about being out of favor
\nwith the New Order administration. However, most of this native
\nbusiness group prefer a strong executive (mutatis mutandis) than
\nthe more democratic one, for protection.<\/p>\n
The country's Islamic groups seem more united even though the
\ngovernment sponsored Moslem intellectuals organization (ICMI) is
\nactually fragmented. Its members range from soft-liners who want
\neconomic and social betterment for Moslems; to the hard-liners
\nwho long for Islam to gain political power through the ICMI.
\nThere is also Abdurrahman Wahid, the NU chief who lobbies against
\nthe ambitious section of the ICMI. He believes the organization
\nwants to use religion as a political weapon.<\/p>\n
On the other side is the group of democracy advocates,
\nincluding civilian politicians, intellectuals, artists and the
\npress. They are concerned about the big issues of human rights,
\njustice, freedom of speech, military domination, etc.<\/p>\n
Schwarz also spends quite some time on East Timor, a stubborn
\nissue with an international dimension he believes might only be
\nsolved by a post-Soeharto administration.<\/p>\n
Next is the Armed Forces (ABRI). Although it looks weakened by
\nthe recent \"civilianization\" in Golkar, it remains the most
\npowerful institution in the country -- a status it surely will
\nkeep even after Soeharto has left the scene. Certain groups
\nwithin ABRI side with the democratization advocates, while others
\nstick with a conservative, secure approach because of a lingering
\nfear of sectarian impulses.<\/p>\n
Schwarz can't name any potential successors amidst the
\npolitical jumble. What he does is guess at some succession
\nscenarios. His coalition scenario: Any component of the
\nIndonesian elite -- democracy advocates, Islamic groups -- should
\ncoalesce with the indispensable ABRI to make a \"smooth\"
\nsuccession possible. Yet, admits Schwarz, none of the coalition
\nscenarios is feasible due to the internal disunity of each group
\nand the long-rooted prejudices and sentiments the groups have
\ntoward one another.<\/p>\n
Schwarz deduces that Soeharto has accomplished a great deal
\nfor the country, for which Indonesians must thank him. His feats
\noutweigh his flaws.<\/p>\n
Indonesian anxiety lies in the future: whoever succeeds the
\nPresident cannot be as powerful as he is, and must deal with
\nconflicting interests Soeharto has deliberately and acutely
\npreserved and manipulated to keep power. Unless he successfully
\nprepares a smooth succession, \"history books may well write of
\nhim that the worst aspect of his rule was the way in which he
\nleft,\" Schwarz concludes.<\/p>\n
Schwarz's book provides new, valuable information to many non-
\nIndonesian readers. To Indonesians, especially the educated
\nelite, many facts and stories in the book are surely not new.
\nThey have long been the topic of their hushed, private
\nconversations. The book's strength is that it sheds light on the
\ncurrent political climate and allows us to see it more clearly.<\/p>\n
-- Johannes Simbolon<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/anatomy-of-indonesias-anxiety-about-succession-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }