Anatomy of conflicts in post-Soeharto Indonesia
Anatomy of conflicts in post-Soeharto Indonesia
Sidney Jones, Indonesia Project Director, International Crisis Group,
Jakarta
Finally we come to terrorism. For a long time I resisted even
the use of the word because I knew from my human rights
background how easily it was misused, and how easily the term fit
into sometimes dubious political agendas. After Bali, I was more
willing to use it here but I still think it's dangerously
emotive. In any case, it's less easy to trace the development of
some of the networks around Jamaah Islamiyah to specific policies
of the New Order, but covert support to the revival of the Darul
Islam movement in the mid-1970s laid the groundwork for some of
what followed, and suppression of certain kinds of Muslim
political discourse was probably a factor.
None of this is to let the post-Soeharto governments off the
hook. It is too facile to say everything is the fault of the
ancient regime. There have been more missed opportunities than
one can count since May 1998 to bolster this country's political
institutions and reduce conflict. Jusuf Kalla deserves a lot of
credit for putting together the Malino accords in Poso and Maluku
and making them more or less stick, despite enormous obstacles.
But if some of causes of violence are to be addressed, Indonesia
will need more such risk-takers with a vision of Indonesia that
goes beyond the city limits of Jakarta -- and fewer spoilers. The
factors that brought Soeharto down -- KKN or corruption,
cronyism, and nepotism are alive and well as never before.
The genuine post-Soeharto successes that Indonesia can point
to, such as restoration of basic civil rights, constitutional
changes leading to a direct election, the realignment of powers
between executive and legislative branches of government, the big
bang decentralization initiative -- a success despite all the
obvious problems -- and popular excitement, once you get outside
Jakarta, at the possibility of genuine political participation,
should not be taken for granted. These gains have to be protected
and nurtured, and it's not happening.
With all this in mind, let me turn to one success of this
government that has been deservedly hailed as a major
achievement-the agreement in Aceh on cessation of hostilities.
The roots of this conflict may lie in the distant past-Hasan
di Tiro, leader of the rebel movement GAM, inevitably comes up
with a letter from U.S. President Ulysses S. Grant from 1864 to
the Sultan of Aceh to prove the U.S. once acknowledged Aceh as an
independent country. Elements of the conflict go back to the
Indonesian revolution and to the Darul Islam rebellion of the
1950s.
But much of the problem, and certainly its seeming
intractability up until now, had its origins during the Soeharto
years, and in particular, as a result of the counterinsurgency
operations conducted from 1990 to 1998. The operations were a
response to a real security threat -- over a hundred GAM fighters
had returned to Aceh from Libya and were making sporadic assaults
on police and army posts.
But the heavy-handedness of the government response touched
virtually everyone in Aceh, and led to a resentment against
Jakarta that goes far beyond whatever support there is, and
there's a lot, for independence. I remember talking to one kyai
in Uleeglee in 1991 who believed that it would be better for the
guerrillas to surrender, and believed that if they did so, the
government would make good on its offer of amnesty. He persuaded
one young man from a family he was close to turn himself in. The
man did so, and disappeared the next day. The kyai was anguished
about the young man and felt thoroughly betrayed by the
government.
After Soeharto fell, many Acehnese were convinced that some
accounting for the DOM period would take place. Military and
civilian officials apologized to the Acehnese for their
suffering, promised justice, and nothing happened. And with
newfound political freedoms, the anger and disappointment at the
lack of concrete action led to organizing of proindependence
groups, some of them close to GAM, in a way that we'd never seen
before. GAM also found the atmosphere more conducive and sent
hundreds of fighters back from Malaysia. The military and police
responded, and instead of the conflict easing, it worsened.
Now, thanks to incredible persistence of the Henry Dunant
Centre, the support of the international community, the work of
Hassan Wirayuda, Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono and their colleagues,
and the general war-weariness of the Acehnese, there is a genuine
chance for peace.
But it's only a chance, it's not guaranteed, and many of the
factors that have contributed to conflict elsewhere in Indonesia
will have to be overcome in Aceh. These include the many vested
economic interests in the conflict, and those who are making the
most profit from the war are unlikely to see the promised
reconstruction aid as an incentive to make peace.
Signatures on a peace of paper do not wipe out decades of
distrust. Many GAM members see their weapons as their only
bargaining chip, and to turn them in is to lose that leverage;
moreover, it remains very unclear what incentives the agreement
gives GAM to participate in a political system that is as corrupt
as the one in Aceh.
The huge concession made by the Indonesian government to allow
international monitors is absolutely vital to the plan's success,
and the Thai and Filipino soldiers will be warmly welcomed. (In
East Timor, the Thai soldiers were a huge hit, not only because
they provided medical services and ran a wonderful canteen, but
because they taught kick-boxing to local youths!) But the
agreement is unclear on what ultimately happens if a serious
violation is reported to the monitors, and what kind of efforts
will be made to bring violators to justice.
The first few months of this agreement are going to be
critical, as the implementing institutions are being set up.
Expectations will be at their highest, and could fall the
furthest if disgruntled parties make efforts, as they surely
will, to undermine this accord. It is going to take an enormous
amount of goodwill, attention, skill, resources, and leadership,
on the part of all parties involved, to ensure that hostilities
really do cease so that a process of peace-building can take
place.
The issue of accountability for past human rights abuses has
been rightly deferred for the moment; the priority has got to be
on ending the violence. But it can't be deferred forever. As we
know from one conflict after another, if these issues are pushed
to the side or buried, sooner or later they will come back to
haunt us.
In closing, let me return to the issue of nostalgia for the
Soeharto era. Indonesia is beset by more problems than any
country in the world deserves, and it would take a miracle worker
to solve them. But the biggest tragedy this country could face
would be to turn its back on political and military reform.
Democracy is not the culprit here, and freedom is not the cause
of conflict. The best strategy to protect this country from more
sectarian strife, rebellions, and vigilante violence is to get
reform back on track.
The article was a speech presented on Tuesday at the 2002
Panglaykim Memorial Lecture in Jakarta.