An alliance is always a two-way street

An alliance is always a two-way street

By Robyn Lim

The United States continues to need allies in the Post-Cold
War era.

Southeast Asians will have noted that no ASEAN state was
included in the definition of American strategic anchors in the
Western Pacific at the Australia-U.S. ministerial talks in July
1996. The omission of Thailand and the Philippines from this
definition reflects the fact that both states have recently shown
unwillingness to help the U.S. maintain a balance of power in
East Asia and the Middle East.

Yet, many in Southeast Asia continue to assume that the U.S.
is "obliged" to defend both countries under the terms of the 1954
Manila Pact and the 1951 Philippines-U.S. bilateral security
treaty. They believe that America would suffer damage to its
standing and influence as a great power if it declined to meet
such "obligations". These assumptions misperceive the nature of
alliances.

It's easy to see why small states seek allies. In a dog-eat-
dog world, an alliance with a distant great power is one way a
small country can hope to escape domination by potentially
hostile neighbors. But America's need for allies is not as
obvious. The United States is by far the world's predominant
military power. It is protected by broad oceans, and its navy
rules the seas. America dominates its hemisphere and has one of
two of the largest arsenals of nuclear weapons. But the U.S. does
continue to need allies.

Despite the end of the Cold War, America still needs to
maintain a balance of power both in Europe and in Asia. Three
times this century, the U.S. has had to intervene to help redress
the balance -- in both world wars, and the Cold War -- because it
knew that its own security would be at risk if a hostile great
power, or combination of powers, succeeded in controlling the
whole of Eurasia. Post-Cold War, it is still vastly preferable
for America to retain forces in Europe and Asia to help maintain
the balance of power, rather than have to come back in again in
much less propitious circumstances if that balance breaks down.

Although a stable equilibrium now exists in Europe, East Asia
is the focus of unresolved great power tension. Freed from Soviet
pressure on its northern frontiers, China is sensing new
opportunities. The U.S. hopes that China's increased power and
influence will afford the PRC a growing stake in the global
system, and give it incentives to play by the rules -- which
means above all abjuring the use and threat of force. But China
may refuse to play by the rules, and only "power checking power"
can restrain the use of force. So the U.S. needs allies to help
sustain maritime mobility, forward deployments and thus its
capacity to shape the balance of power.

The core strategic interest Australia shares with America is
to see a balance of power preserved in East Asia. Although remote
from the sources of tension, Australia has learned from its
history that events far from its shores can lead to attacks on
its territory. (In 1941, Japan seized opportunities created by
the breakdown of the global balance of power and struck
southwards.)

Australia enjoys U.S. nuclear protection, as do Japan and
South Korea. This greatly enhances Australia's security because
it would vastly complicate the calculations of any potential
aggressor. Such protection is no unqualified guarantee. Much
depends on the smaller state's continuing willingness to
contribute to the alliance from which it benefits.

During the Cold War, Australia's contributions included steps
that strengthened deterrence and U.S. strategic mobility, such as
hosting U.S. intelligence-gathering facilities and ship visits.
Australia also contributed to regional security; by doing so, it
strengthened broader security.

Post-Cold War, Australia believes that an alliance with the
U.S. will continue to complement its own defense efforts. New
arrangements concluded this year include a significantly upgraded
program of joint military exercises to be held on Australian
territory, and an extension of arrangements concerning the joint
intelligence-gathering facility at Pine Gap in central Australia.

At the end of the Cold War, the Philippines made a different
choice from Australia's. Left-wing and "anti-nuclear" groups
there had long opposed the presence of American bases, and the
security environment seemed benign. So the Filipinos sought
"independence" by inviting the U.S. to remove its bases. They
thereby removed the chief means by which America could defend
them, with important strategic consequences. U.S. maritime
mobility has been reduced, and China emboldened. (It is doubtful
whether China would have seized the Philippine-claimed Mischief
Reef in the Spratlys had the U.S. Navy still been in Subic Bay.)

Yet, the Philippines continues to seek to embroil the U.S. in
its territorial claims in the South China Sea. The Filipinos have
failed to comprehend that alliances are a two-way street; they
incur costs and risks for both parties.

Because of its Vietnam experience, the U.S. is reluctant to
risk casualties in foreign wars. It is hard to see U.S. official
or congressional opinion being willing to wage war on behalf of
the Philippines unless a compelling U.S. interest were at stake.
The same goes for Thailand, which in 1994 turned down a U.S.
request to station a navy depot flotilla in the Gulf of Thailand.

The Philippines and Thailand, having denied themselves access
to countervailing support, will find their policy choices
increasingly constricted by the need to avoid offending China.
For Thailand, this may not seem so important because the Thais
still look to China to guarantee their strategic security vis-a-
vis Vietnam. No such consolation is available to the Philippines,
for whom China is a likely threat rather than a guarantor.

The Philippines recently joined the U.S. and some other ASEAN
countries in protesting China's proclamations of baselines in the
South China Sea which greatly increase the area subject to
China's claims. But the Philippines' refusal of visas for pro-
Tibetan activists points to future lessons in realpolitik. Nor
can the Filipinos feel secure in their offshore archipelago, even
though for decades China will lack the capability to invade, even
if it had the intent. Long before any blunt threat were needed,
China's accumulation of uncontested power would bring the
Philippines to heel.

Dr. Robyn Lim is professor of international relations at
Hiroshima Shudo University, Japan.