An alliance is always a two-way street

An alliance is always a two-way street

By Robyn Lim

The United States continues to need allies in the Post-Cold War era.

Southeast Asians will have noted that no ASEAN state was included in the definition of American strategic anchors in the Western Pacific at the Australia-U.S. ministerial talks in July 1996. The omission of Thailand and the Philippines from this definition reflects the fact that both states have recently shown unwillingness to help the U.S. maintain a balance of power in East Asia and the Middle East.

Yet, many in Southeast Asia continue to assume that the U.S. is "obliged" to defend both countries under the terms of the 1954 Manila Pact and the 1951 Philippines-U.S. bilateral security treaty. They believe that America would suffer damage to its standing and influence as a great power if it declined to meet such "obligations". These assumptions misperceive the nature of alliances.

It's easy to see why small states seek allies. In a dog-eat- dog world, an alliance with a distant great power is one way a small country can hope to escape domination by potentially hostile neighbors. But America's need for allies is not as obvious. The United States is by far the world's predominant military power. It is protected by broad oceans, and its navy rules the seas. America dominates its hemisphere and has one of two of the largest arsenals of nuclear weapons. But the U.S. does continue to need allies.

Despite the end of the Cold War, America still needs to maintain a balance of power both in Europe and in Asia. Three times this century, the U.S. has had to intervene to help redress the balance -- in both world wars, and the Cold War -- because it knew that its own security would be at risk if a hostile great power, or combination of powers, succeeded in controlling the whole of Eurasia. Post-Cold War, it is still vastly preferable for America to retain forces in Europe and Asia to help maintain the balance of power, rather than have to come back in again in much less propitious circumstances if that balance breaks down.

Although a stable equilibrium now exists in Europe, East Asia is the focus of unresolved great power tension. Freed from Soviet pressure on its northern frontiers, China is sensing new opportunities. The U.S. hopes that China's increased power and influence will afford the PRC a growing stake in the global system, and give it incentives to play by the rules -- which means above all abjuring the use and threat of force. But China may refuse to play by the rules, and only "power checking power" can restrain the use of force. So the U.S. needs allies to help sustain maritime mobility, forward deployments and thus its capacity to shape the balance of power.

The core strategic interest Australia shares with America is to see a balance of power preserved in East Asia. Although remote from the sources of tension, Australia has learned from its history that events far from its shores can lead to attacks on its territory. (In 1941, Japan seized opportunities created by the breakdown of the global balance of power and struck southwards.)

Australia enjoys U.S. nuclear protection, as do Japan and South Korea. This greatly enhances Australia's security because it would vastly complicate the calculations of any potential aggressor. Such protection is no unqualified guarantee. Much depends on the smaller state's continuing willingness to contribute to the alliance from which it benefits.

During the Cold War, Australia's contributions included steps that strengthened deterrence and U.S. strategic mobility, such as hosting U.S. intelligence-gathering facilities and ship visits. Australia also contributed to regional security; by doing so, it strengthened broader security.

Post-Cold War, Australia believes that an alliance with the U.S. will continue to complement its own defense efforts. New arrangements concluded this year include a significantly upgraded program of joint military exercises to be held on Australian territory, and an extension of arrangements concerning the joint intelligence-gathering facility at Pine Gap in central Australia.

At the end of the Cold War, the Philippines made a different choice from Australia's. Left-wing and "anti-nuclear" groups there had long opposed the presence of American bases, and the security environment seemed benign. So the Filipinos sought "independence" by inviting the U.S. to remove its bases. They thereby removed the chief means by which America could defend them, with important strategic consequences. U.S. maritime mobility has been reduced, and China emboldened. (It is doubtful whether China would have seized the Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef in the Spratlys had the U.S. Navy still been in Subic Bay.)

Yet, the Philippines continues to seek to embroil the U.S. in its territorial claims in the South China Sea. The Filipinos have failed to comprehend that alliances are a two-way street; they incur costs and risks for both parties.

Because of its Vietnam experience, the U.S. is reluctant to risk casualties in foreign wars. It is hard to see U.S. official or congressional opinion being willing to wage war on behalf of the Philippines unless a compelling U.S. interest were at stake. The same goes for Thailand, which in 1994 turned down a U.S. request to station a navy depot flotilla in the Gulf of Thailand.

The Philippines and Thailand, having denied themselves access to countervailing support, will find their policy choices increasingly constricted by the need to avoid offending China. For Thailand, this may not seem so important because the Thais still look to China to guarantee their strategic security vis-a- vis Vietnam. No such consolation is available to the Philippines, for whom China is a likely threat rather than a guarantor.

The Philippines recently joined the U.S. and some other ASEAN countries in protesting China's proclamations of baselines in the South China Sea which greatly increase the area subject to China's claims. But the Philippines' refusal of visas for pro- Tibetan activists points to future lessons in realpolitik. Nor can the Filipinos feel secure in their offshore archipelago, even though for decades China will lack the capability to invade, even if it had the intent. Long before any blunt threat were needed, China's accumulation of uncontested power would bring the Philippines to heel.

Dr. Robyn Lim is professor of international relations at Hiroshima Shudo University, Japan.