An alliance is always a two-way street<\/p>\n
By Robyn Lim<\/p>\n
The United States continues to need allies in the Post-Cold
\nWar era.<\/p>\n
Southeast Asians will have noted that no ASEAN state was
\nincluded in the definition of American strategic anchors in the
\nWestern Pacific at the Australia-U.S. ministerial talks in July
\n1996. The omission of Thailand and the Philippines from this
\ndefinition reflects the fact that both states have recently shown
\nunwillingness to help the U.S. maintain a balance of power in
\nEast Asia and the Middle East.<\/p>\n
Yet, many in Southeast Asia continue to assume that the U.S.
\nis \"obliged\" to defend both countries under the terms of the 1954
\nManila Pact and the 1951 Philippines-U.S. bilateral security
\ntreaty. They believe that America would suffer damage to its
\nstanding and influence as a great power if it declined to meet
\nsuch \"obligations\". These assumptions misperceive the nature of
\nalliances.<\/p>\n
It's easy to see why small states seek allies. In a dog-eat-
\ndog world, an alliance with a distant great power is one way a
\nsmall country can hope to escape domination by potentially
\nhostile neighbors. But America's need for allies is not as
\nobvious. The United States is by far the world's predominant
\nmilitary power. It is protected by broad oceans, and its navy
\nrules the seas. America dominates its hemisphere and has one of
\ntwo of the largest arsenals of nuclear weapons. But the U.S. does
\ncontinue to need allies.<\/p>\n
Despite the end of the Cold War, America still needs to
\nmaintain a balance of power both in Europe and in Asia. Three
\ntimes this century, the U.S. has had to intervene to help redress
\nthe balance -- in both world wars, and the Cold War -- because it
\nknew that its own security would be at risk if a hostile great
\npower, or combination of powers, succeeded in controlling the
\nwhole of Eurasia. Post-Cold War, it is still vastly preferable
\nfor America to retain forces in Europe and Asia to help maintain
\nthe balance of power, rather than have to come back in again in
\nmuch less propitious circumstances if that balance breaks down.<\/p>\n
Although a stable equilibrium now exists in Europe, East Asia
\nis the focus of unresolved great power tension. Freed from Soviet
\npressure on its northern frontiers, China is sensing new
\nopportunities. The U.S. hopes that China's increased power and
\ninfluence will afford the PRC a growing stake in the global
\nsystem, and give it incentives to play by the rules -- which
\nmeans above all abjuring the use and threat of force. But China
\nmay refuse to play by the rules, and only \"power checking power\"
\ncan restrain the use of force. So the U.S. needs allies to help
\nsustain maritime mobility, forward deployments and thus its
\ncapacity to shape the balance of power.<\/p>\n
The core strategic interest Australia shares with America is
\nto see a balance of power preserved in East Asia. Although remote
\nfrom the sources of tension, Australia has learned from its
\nhistory that events far from its shores can lead to attacks on
\nits territory. (In 1941, Japan seized opportunities created by
\nthe breakdown of the global balance of power and struck
\nsouthwards.)<\/p>\n
Australia enjoys U.S. nuclear protection, as do Japan and
\nSouth Korea. This greatly enhances Australia's security because
\nit would vastly complicate the calculations of any potential
\naggressor. Such protection is no unqualified guarantee. Much
\ndepends on the smaller state's continuing willingness to
\ncontribute to the alliance from which it benefits.<\/p>\n
During the Cold War, Australia's contributions included steps
\nthat strengthened deterrence and U.S. strategic mobility, such as
\nhosting U.S. intelligence-gathering facilities and ship visits.
\nAustralia also contributed to regional security; by doing so, it
\nstrengthened broader security.<\/p>\n
Post-Cold War, Australia believes that an alliance with the
\nU.S. will continue to complement its own defense efforts. New
\narrangements concluded this year include a significantly upgraded
\nprogram of joint military exercises to be held on Australian
\nterritory, and an extension of arrangements concerning the joint
\nintelligence-gathering facility at Pine Gap in central Australia.<\/p>\n
At the end of the Cold War, the Philippines made a different
\nchoice from Australia's. Left-wing and \"anti-nuclear\" groups
\nthere had long opposed the presence of American bases, and the
\nsecurity environment seemed benign. So the Filipinos sought
\n\"independence\" by inviting the U.S. to remove its bases. They
\nthereby removed the chief means by which America could defend
\nthem, with important strategic consequences. U.S. maritime
\nmobility has been reduced, and China emboldened. (It is doubtful
\nwhether China would have seized the Philippine-claimed Mischief
\nReef in the Spratlys had the U.S. Navy still been in Subic Bay.)<\/p>\n
Yet, the Philippines continues to seek to embroil the U.S. in
\nits territorial claims in the South China Sea. The Filipinos have
\nfailed to comprehend that alliances are a two-way street; they
\nincur costs and risks for both parties.<\/p>\n
Because of its Vietnam experience, the U.S. is reluctant to
\nrisk casualties in foreign wars. It is hard to see U.S. official
\nor congressional opinion being willing to wage war on behalf of
\nthe Philippines unless a compelling U.S. interest were at stake.
\nThe same goes for Thailand, which in 1994 turned down a U.S.
\nrequest to station a navy depot flotilla in the Gulf of Thailand.<\/p>\n
The Philippines and Thailand, having denied themselves access
\nto countervailing support, will find their policy choices
\nincreasingly constricted by the need to avoid offending China.
\nFor Thailand, this may not seem so important because the Thais
\nstill look to China to guarantee their strategic security vis-a-
\nvis Vietnam. No such consolation is available to the Philippines,
\nfor whom China is a likely threat rather than a guarantor.<\/p>\n
The Philippines recently joined the U.S. and some other ASEAN
\ncountries in protesting China's proclamations of baselines in the
\nSouth China Sea which greatly increase the area subject to
\nChina's claims. But the Philippines' refusal of visas for pro-
\nTibetan activists points to future lessons in realpolitik. Nor
\ncan the Filipinos feel secure in their offshore archipelago, even
\nthough for decades China will lack the capability to invade, even
\nif it had the intent. Long before any blunt threat were needed,
\nChina's accumulation of uncontested power would bring the
\nPhilippines to heel.<\/p>\n
Dr. Robyn Lim is professor of international relations at
\nHiroshima Shudo University, Japan.<\/p>",
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