Amnesty: Military Courts Still Serve as Political Instruments
Executive Director of Amnesty International Indonesia, Usman Hamid, stated that military courts in Indonesia continue to function as political instruments that protect officials, rather than as independent law enforcement institutions.
Military courts have come under scrutiny again following the attack on human rights activist Andrie Yunus. The case has sparked demands for the allegedly involved officials to be tried in general courts, not military ones, to ensure transparency and accountability and prevent impunity.
Usman explained that the existence of military courts cannot be separated from the context of the birth of the New Order regime, which was supported by military power. He described the regime as a military-backed ruler, namely power supported by the military and placing that institution in various sectors, including law, politics, and the economy. “In such a regime, the military becomes first-class citizens with various privileges, including when committing legal violations,” said Usman during a public discussion ‘Challenging Military Accountability’ on Tuesday, 7 April 2026.
He traced the roots of the problem back to the 1965 Incident, which he said was a momentum for the Army to seize power under the Soeharto faction. During that period, political opposition, especially those accused of being involved in the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), were tried through military courts. “Military courts became political instruments to justify and maintain the regime,” said Usman.
Experience of the Trisakti Case and Activist Abductions
Usman revealed his personal experience in 1998, when the Trisakti Tragedy and the abduction of pro-democracy activists occurred. An alumnus of the Faculty of Law at Trisakti University, he said both cases were handled through military courts, which he assessed as not providing substantive justice.
In the Trisakti case, according to him, the involved officials were only found to have made procedural errors, not criminal acts that caused the deaths of four students and injuries to dozens. “Yet the context was open repression against the student movement,” he said.
Judicial Mechanism Deemed Failed
According to Usman, military courts fail to carry out a corrective function against violations because they tend to protect superiors and only target subordinates. Even in several violence cases, the perpetrators are only given administrative or procedural sanctions.
He assessed that this condition contradicts the principle of equality before the law as stipulated in the constitution. In addition, Article 65 of the TNI Law actually affirms that soldiers who commit general criminal offences must be tried in general courts.
Usman highlighted the existence of transitional provisions in regulations that still maintain the old military court jurisdiction, namely the 1997 Law. “This is what makes military court reform never complete,” he said.
Criticism of the DPR and Constitutional Court
He also highlighted that the 1997 Military Court Law is still in use, even though there are newer regulations such as the 2004 TNI Law and its revision in 2025. According to him, based on the principles of lex posterior and lex superior, or newer and higher rules, they should override the old rules. “Logically in law, the 2004 and 2025 rules cannot be defeated by the 1997 rule,” said Usman.
According to him, the DPR has not completed the revision of that law, while the Constitutional Court has not been firm enough in enforcing the principle of equality before the law. This condition, said Usman, reflects the weak political will of civilian elites in reforming military courts.
Violation of Basic Judicial Principles
Usman mentioned at least three principles violated in the military court system. First, equality before the law, because the jurisdiction and process differ based on rank. Second, the Commanding Officer Punishment Authority (Ankum) mechanism that opens room for command intervention. Third, the role of the Case Submitting Officer (Papera) which can hinder the legal process against high-ranking officers.
He exemplified cases involving high-ranking officers, which are often not brought to military courts, but to internal forums such as the Officers’ Honour Council.
Independence and Accountability
Usman also assessed that the independence of military courts is difficult to realise due to the hierarchical structure within the military. He questioned accountability in resolving human rights violation cases through that mechanism. “There is no human rights violation case that is truly resolved through military courts,” he said.
He emphasised that military courts should be limited only to internal disciplinary violations, such as desertion or indiscipline, not for general criminal offences.
Deemed to Hinder Democracy
Usman assessed the continuation of military courts as a sign that Indonesia’s democratic transition is not yet complete. He even mentioned a tendency towards democratic regression, marked by strong military autonomy and compromises between civilian and military elites.
“Military courts still serve as political instruments to avoid accountability for crimes,” said Usman. “Therefore, criminal cases involving the military should be brought to general courts so they can be thoroughly uncovered.”
Government Response
In a separate opportunity, Human Rights Minister Natalius Pigai affirmed that the government cannot intervene in the legal process of the planned attempted murder case against Kontras activist Andrie Yunus, either through general or military courts.
According to Pigai, the principle of separation of powers or trias politica requires the executive to respect the legislative and judicial powers. In this context, the government can only affirm if the military court process is carried out fairly. “A true state must not intervene in the judiciary. We maintain the honour and dignity of the institution,” said Pigai during a working meeting with Commission XIII of the DPR on Tuesday, 7 April 2026.
Currently, Andrie’s case is being handled by