Addressing Indonesia's Strategic Position in Global Maritime Routes

The contestation over access and control of strategic maritime routes has always been a primary battleground in hegemonic conflicts. The Danish Strait during the First and Second World Wars, for instance, saw Allied and Axis forces fiercely competing for control.

Similarly, during the 1956 Suez Crisis, Britain acted aggressively to secure its energy supplies. In recent Middle East conflicts, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is not new, having occurred in the mid-1980s.

However, developments increasingly underscore the crucial nature of these maritime routes to a nation’s existence. For Indonesia, situated between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, similar desires could emerge at any time.

For example, on 8 April, during a cabinet meeting in Jakarta, President Prabowo Subianto emphasised the importance of maritime routes passing through Indonesian waters. The Malacca Strait, for instance, is traversed by 82,000 ships annually, carrying more than 40% of global trade.

The economies and vital needs of East Asian countries are heavily dependent on the Malacca Strait. Following this, on 21 April, Finance Minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa proposed imposing levies on ships passing through the Malacca Strait.

Not long after, the statement drew widespread rejections, including from regional countries. Calls emerged to adhere to transit passage rights as stipulated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Foreign Minister Sugiono then stated that Indonesia never intended to impose such levies and would continue to guarantee freedom of navigation. Amid rising criticism, Purbaya clarified that his statement was not meant seriously and that he was fully aware of the applicable legal rules.

Nevertheless, he still opened the possibility of “monetising” the Malacca Strait through various value-added services. This essentially shows that the statement stemmed from considerable fiscal pressures rather than geopolitical considerations.

Besides national political dynamics, foreign interest in access to the region is also increasingly evident. From 6 to 20 April, three underwater objects were found in the Lombok Strait, Tanakeke Island, and Kangean Island.

These discoveries add to the list of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) found in Indonesia. Although the origins of these objects cannot yet be confirmed, one bore markings from the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC).

Furthermore, the object found at Kangean Island bears significant similarity to a sea glider discovered in Philippine waters last year. Regardless, the characteristics and functions of UUVs always point towards seabed mapping and hydrographic survey activities that can be used for military purposes—particularly for submarine operations.

Indeed, every conflict among major powers in the Indo-Pacific will ultimately contest access and control over these sea routes and straits. It must also be acknowledged that the conflicting parties will almost inevitably pass through or be near Indonesia’s sovereign territory.

What position Indonesia will take in such a scenario remains unknown until the time comes. However, as illustrated in previous cases, keeping sea routes open is Indonesia’s best interest. Moreover, during wartime, Indonesia cannot suspend transit passage rights or passage rights in the Archipelagic Sea Lanes (ALKI) for the conflicting parties under international law.

If neutrality is chosen, the ability to protect the maritime domain from military exploitation while ensuring shipping lanes remain open will be the primary test. However, neutrality is more than mere intent. Neutrality requires consistency and impartial policies, without regard to any party.

More importantly, neutrality also requires the capability to maintain and enforce that stance. This is because it must be accepted from the outset that not all actors will easily comply with the established status quo. This is where the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) play a role in safeguarding national sovereignty and neutrality during regional conflicts.

The 2022 State Defence Strategy document has identified preventing the use of Indonesian territory by warring parties en route to their operational theatres as one of the strategic priorities during wartime.

Then, in Presidential Regulation No. 111 of 2025 on the General State Defence Policy (Jakumhanneg), it is also emphasised that building integrated and network-centric TNI capabilities must be prioritised. This series of doctrines and strategic policies aims to ensure that the TNI is capable of operating within the framework of Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) to create deterrence in Indonesia’s vast territory.

In recent years, TNI modernisation has been accelerated through the Optimum Essential Force (OEF) framework. OEF combines TNI organisational validation and enhancements to weaponry capabilities. These efforts are supported by substantial funding, with the defence budget reaching Rp335 trillion (US$20 billion) this year alone.

Nevertheless, interoperability and integration—which are key elements in MDO—will remain difficult to achieve due to procurement steps and diversification of defence equipment that are not carefully managed. Diversification itself often becomes the scapegoat, and fundamentally, it is unavoidable.

However, that does not mean diversification should be used as an excuse. Diversification policies for defence equipment must be implemented in a disciplined and transparent manner with thorough planning, including lifecycle cost calculations.