Aceh's disaster could herald political change

Aceh's disaster could herald political change

Damien Kingsbury, Melbourne, Australia

It is a truism in politics that a cathartic experience can
result in unrelated change. Conflict, chaos or natural disaster
has been the handmaiden to many political changes, not least
Indonesia's monetary crisis producing democratization.

So too, Aceh's disaster could herald political change. The
announcement by the Indonesian government that it may hold talks
with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) at the end of the month is,
perhaps, the breakthrough that could be the beginning of the end
of Aceh's almost three decade old conflict.

In part, the push for a settlement to the Aceh conflict builds
on the electoral promise of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to
find a solution to the conflict there. In part, too, it is based
on the failure of an escalated military campaign, started in May
2003, to crush GAM, and an inability to keep funding that
campaign at what has been an unsustainable level.

But in greatest part, the rising tide of support for a
settlement comes from domestic and international recognition that
the people of Aceh have suffered more than enough.

However, there are many competing voices over what type of
future Aceh could or should have, and how to achieve peace. These
competing voices present what appear to be five basic options for
Aceh.

The first option, which has been presented by the government
as its starting point, is that the fighters of the Free Aceh
Movement (GAM) should take up a government amnesty, lay down
their weapons, and accept their place and that of Aceh in the
Indonesian state. This offer amounts to little more than GAM's
surrender, and this has already been rejected.

Similarly, the second option of the Indonesian government
acceding to GAM's demand for either independence or a referendum
on independence, has also already been rejected.

The third option, which reflects the first two, is for the
Indonesian military (TNI) to destroy GAM militarily. The problem
with this option is that the TNI shown that is cannot eradicate
GAM, and this tactic has proven to be counter-productive.

The greater the military response, the greater the popular
support for GAM. Unless the TNI intends to destroy the population
of Aceh, this policy cannot succeed.

The fourth option, expressed by Vice President Jusuf Kalla, is
an immediate ceasefire that at the same time includes an
immediate resolution of all outstanding claims. Unless this means
an all or nothing resolution, the gulf between the government and
GAM is too great, and there is too little trust, to reach a quick
resolution.

The fifth option, then, is for a ceasefire between the TNI and
GAM, with full attention and resources being given to the
reconstruction effort. Such a ceasefire should, over time, build
a sense of "normalization" and trust, allowing a meaningful
dialogue over Aceh's longer-term future.

The question is, what will that future hold? If the future is
to avoid a relapse into conflict, it will need to address most of
the key claims being made not just by GAM, but by large sections
of Acehnese civil society. Similarly, it will need to accommodate
the bottom line in Indonesian, which is the physical integrity of
the state.

When Indonesia achieved independence in 1949 it was
constructed as a federation, a political model which reflected
the aspirations of many anti-colonialists who never the less did
not wish to be dominated by their neighbors. Aceh was prime among
these aspirants, and the participation of Aceh in the War of
Independence was intended to secure Aceh's autonomous place
within such a structure.

It was the unilateral ending of this arrangement, and the loss
of Aceh's provincial status, that propelled it to join the Darul
Islam Rebellion. That only ended with the promise of "special
autonomy". Yet that promise was hollow, and the rapaciousness of
the New Order government and its disregard for local sentiment
propelled Aceh into a new claim for separation.

The declaration of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) was
intended, at least in rhetoric, to address this claim. But NAD
has been even more hollow a promise than the earlier "special
autonomy". A genuine autonomy, however, might work.

Genuine autonomy is not for the politically faint-hearted. It
would require that Aceh become a self-governing state in all
matters but foreign affairs, aspects of external defense, and
elements of taxation. It would also require locally-based
political parties, including GAM. More than anything, it would
require that Aceh alone be responsible for the imposition of its
own, locally defined, law (be that sharia or otherwise).

But most importantly, genuine autonomy would mean the
dissolution of all combatant parties within Aceh. That is, GAM
would cease to exist as a military force, militias would be
disarmed and disbanded, and the TNI would be required to leave.
The imposition of law and order would devolve exclusively to an
Acehnese police, obeying autonomously codified law, under the
strict and singular authority of a locally elected autonomous
government.

In such a model, Acehnese aspirations for self-determination
would be functionally met, while the Indonesian state would
continue to be able to claim its overarching territorial
integrity. The errors of past judgments -- the original
dissolution of Aceh, the failed promises of special status and
autonomy, and the use of the military to solve a political
problem -- would be addressed.

There is no doubt many on both sides would hold out against
such a proposal, at least in the short term. But politics is the
art of the possible, and of compromise. A sustainable peace is
possible in Aceh. But it can only be achieved through real
political compromise, on both sides.

Dr. Damien Kingsbury is Director of International and
Community Development at Deakin University, Australia.