Aceh factor in RI-Sweden relations
Aceh factor in RI-Sweden relations
Bantarto Bandoro, Editor, 'The Indonesian Quarterly', Centre For Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta, bandoro@csis.or.id
Sweden was among the first countries to recognize Indonesia's independence in 1947. Since Sweden opened its embassy here in Jakarta in 1950, Indonesian-Swedish bilateral relations were almost without problems. Even when the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) was established in 1976 and its top leaders flew to Sweden, Indonesian-Swedish bilateral relations were hardly touched by the GAM issue.
The backbone of Indonesian-Swedish relations has always been in trade and industrial contacts. Everyone here recognizes Swedish products such as Sony Ericsson telephone handsets and Electrolux home appliances, and Indonesian women will associate quality cosmetic products with Oriflame. Indonesians here also listen to Swedish music, such as Roxette, Eagle-Eye Cherry and A- teens. Over in Sweden, people use Indonesian products, wear Indonesian-made clothes and enjoy excellent Indonesian pineapples. Thousands of people travel between the two countries every year.
No one had ever thought before that the Aceh integrated operation initiated by the government of Indonesia would touch upon the basic foundation of Indonesia's relations with Sweden. It is a political reality now that the GAM issue has dragged Indonesia and Sweden into a mire of competing interests.
Indonesia seems to be on the offensive, demanding that Sweden legally reprimand its citizens for leading GAM's independence drive in a sovereign country. The government of Indonesia has even threatened to downgrade its diplomatic ties with Sweden, unless the Swedish government takes legal steps against Swedish GAM leaders there. Sweden has made it clear that it will take no action against the Acehnese unless they break Swedish law.
At present, a delegation from Indonesia, led by former foreign minister Ali Alatas, is again in Sweden, taking along with it further evidence, allegedly of the involvement of GAM leaders in Sweden in a series of acts of terror in Indonesia, in its fourth attempt to pressure the Swedish government to take steps against GAM's top leaders. Many here, however, doubt that the team will be successful in pressuring the Swedish government. Will the Swedish government bow to Indonesia's request after seeing the evidence?
If Indonesia continues to press for Sweden's cooperation but the latter objects, Indonesia's steps could fuel a political and legal retaliation from Sweden that might bring the Aceh issue to an international forum, with allegations of human rights abuse being made. If that were to happen, it could be counterproductive for Indonesia. This would mean that Indonesia, through its own action, would have created a new front it needed to defend, thus adding to the country's diplomatic burdens.
One may question the government's belated move to raise the issue of GAM's leaders living in Sweden. It is a political fact that they have been living there for years and are also known for their political and financial support of GAM. So, why has the government raised the issue only recently? Perhaps, by doing so, the government was expecting international support for its integrated operation after a series of negotiations with GAM had ended in failure.
What is so interesting about the current state of affairs in Indonesian-Swedish bilateral relations is that on the diplomatic front the talks between them may lead to a standoff if both are unwilling to yield to the other's requests. Whether the policy of Indonesia, in sending a team to Sweden, may change fundamentally the position of Sweden and thus the climate of the current bilateral relations will mostly depend on the response of the Swedish government and the way the government of Indonesia perceives the response of Sweden.
By presenting evidence to the Swedish government, the government in Jakarta is indeed expecting a positive response from Sweden. Thus, the evidence itself is playing a part in influencing the position of the Swedish government. Not only this. The ability of Ali Alatas' team to convince Sweden that GAM's leaders with Swedish citizenship were instrumental in driving GAM to demand independence will also be another important determinant in the way Sweden reacts to the request of Indonesia.
In this diplomatic game between Indonesia and Sweden, one, however, may conclude that the perception of the Swedish government of evidence presented by Indonesia and Sweden's assessment of overall bilateral relations with Indonesia will play the most significant role in determining the success or failure of Indonesian diplomacy. The response made by Sweden that the GAM leaders have not violated any Swedish laws is a very clear initial indication that Sweden's position is unlikely to change.
Being an independent and law-abiding state, Sweden will definitely not sacrifice its national interest, which is to uphold and respect the law, simply to yield to the request of Indonesia. It is understandable that Sweden has ranked bilateral relations as a lower priority than protecting its citizens.
The above assessment again may lead one to be pessimistic about the effectiveness of Indonesian diplomacy toward Sweden as the latter has continued to stress that it will follows its legislation, which does not allow it to expel its citizens. There is a probability that Ali Alatas' team might lose face, because it could end up with nothing. We shall then see whether Indonesia will act on its threat of severing diplomatic ties with Sweden.